PRATYABHIJNA KARIKA OF UTPALADEVA
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PRATYABHIJNA KARIKA OF UTPALADEVA

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S. P. Indological Researc'

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Basic Text on "Pratyabhijna Philosophy"
(The Doctrine of Recognition)—
Exhaustive Studies: Prose Order of the Karikas with short comments, translation, explanations, Foot-notes, etc.

BY

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...ESEARCH CENTRE,
...GAR, KASHMIR (INDIA)

Sharada Peetha Research Centre,
Karan Nagar, Srinagar, Kashmir,

To the Memory

of

My Father and Mother

APARNA PRINTING PRESS,
Mandir, Srinagar, Kashmir.

FOREWORD

This book which is now being presented as No. 12 of the Sharada Peetha Indological Research Series, gives an exhaustive study of the *"Pratyabhijñā Kārikā of Utpaladeva"* which forms the most important treatise and the basic text of *"The Doctrine of Recognition"*—the main philosophical system of the Kashmir Śaivas. It is furnished with a comprehensive Introduction, prose order of the *Kārikās* (metrical sūtras) with short comments, English translation, explanations and Foot-notes. Appendix (glimpses of the study, etc. for the easy grasp of the text by students of average understanding. The main object of this work is to clarify the meanings and the context of the Kārikās with fidelity to the sense, as intended by the teacher.

This work is being published in two parts—Part I containing the First *Adhikāra* (Book) of the *Pratyabhijñā Kārika* and Part II containing its remaining three *Adhikāras*, So far the Commentaries of *Pratyabhijñā Kārikā* of Utpaladeva (along with the text) have usually appeared in two volumes. It has therefore been decided to issue the present work also in two volums to keep up the same tradition. In this way, at least the first Part of the work, now completed, will reach into the hands of the scholars and students interested in the subject. The present volume I completes all the eight chapters (*Ahnikas*) of *Jñānādhikāra* (Book I) of this work. Volume II of the work, when completed, will contain the four *Ahnikas* of "*Kriyādhikāra*" (Book II), the two *Ahnikas* of *Āgamadhikāra* (Book III) and the two *Ahnikas* of *Tattva-saṁgrahādhikārā* (Book IV, the last Book). The Index for the whole work (published in two parts) will be furnished at the end of Volume II, which is intended to appear shortly.

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Sharada Peetha Research Centre,
Karan Nagar, Srinagar, Kashmir,

Dr. R. K. Kaw

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INTRODUCTION

(A) General

Kashmir Shaivism : Its three main divisions : There are three main divisions of the Kashmir Śaivism corresponding to the division of its literature into three Śāstras : (1) the Āgama Śāstra, (2) the Spanda Śāstra and (3) the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra. A brief history of the development of these Śāstras is given below.

Shaivism is the earliest and the most prevalent cult. Śiva-Śakti cults were In vogue along with the Vedic faith in every part of India from very ancient times, and in Kashmir before the time of Ashoka. The history of the introduction of Śaivism in Kashmir is shrouded in mystery. In fact, it flourised there from the dawn of history. The facts furnished by Kalhana in his *Rājataranginī*, the chronicle of the kings of Kashmir, indicate the wide prevalence of the Śaiva cult in the valley from an early period, and that it occupied the first place among the Hindu cults of the valley. From time to time various philosophical doctrines reached Kashmir from outside which had their impact on the philosophy that had grown there among the followers of Śaiva cult. Buddhism was welcomed by Kashmiris long before the Christian era, and Kashmir became its stronghold since the time of Ashoka (273—232 B.C.). Here was convoked an Assembly of the Buddhist theologinas which recognised the Mahāyāna as superior to Hīnayāna school of Buddhistic thought. In spite of the phenomenal success of Buddhism in Kashmir for a few centuries, Śaivism continued to be the vital force.

The revival of Saivism came in Kashmir from the seventh century A. D., and in the 8th and 9th centuries Buddhism gradually disappeared. In the 9th century, it was the sage Vasugupta, who revealed the *Śiva-Sūtras* which form the bedrock of the whole superstructure of

Kashmir Śaivism. The *Śiva-Sūtras* do not only enunciate the fundamental concepts of Kashmir Śaivism, but also show a way to practical realization. This line of thought was developed by two ācāryas Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa (circa 9th century) and Somānanda (contemporary of Vasugupta, 850—900 A.D.) in two different directions. While Kallaṭa handed down the doctrines as a system of religion, Somānanda supplied the logical reasoning in their support and thus founded a system of Advaita philosophy of the Śaivas on the basis of what was at first taught as a system of faith. This development resulted into the emergence of the three different forms of Kashmir Śaivism : (1) the Āgama Śāstra, (2) the Spanda Shāstra and (3) the Pratyabhijñā Shāstra, corresponding to the three broad divisions of its literature. The whole literature comprising its three divisions is known as ***Trika Śāstra***. The Āgama Sāstra is regarded as of superhuman authorship and of eternal existence. It is said that in course of time, Āgama Śāstra disappeared from the world and was revived again by Shrīkaṇṭa, the incarnation of Śiva, the promulgator of Shaivāgamas. The sage Durvāsa was inspired to spread the knowledge of the Shaivāgamas which was handed down to the later ages by his three mind-born sons and their successors. The same (Āgama Shastra) was taught in the later ages by Vasugupta and his successors. The *Śiva Sūtras* revealed by Vasugupta lay down both the philosophical doctrines (*jñāna*) and the practices (*kriya*) of the system as revelations believed to have come down (*āgama*) through the ages, being handed down from teacher to pupil. Generally speaking, the Āgama Shastra gives the rudiments of Kashmir Shaivism, and shows the path of practical realization by means of the processes of Yoga system., known as *Śaiva-Yoga* or *Śaiva-samāveśā*. The school of Yoga Shaivism prescribes the various yogic methods of *Saṁyam* (concentration of mind) for achieving lower and higher *siddhis* (occult powers) and the glories of liberated life. These methods are called *Śāmbhavopāya* *Śāktopāya* and *Āṇavopāya*. The Āgama Shastra gives an exposition of these three methods of realization which is the main theme of the whole Trika Shastra. The *Śiva-sūtras* form the most important part of the Āgama Shastra from the Trika point of view. The Spanda Shastra, being the second system, was started

by Kallaṭa, the pupil of Vasugupta, who most likely composed the *Spanda Sūtras* The same was carried on by Kallaṭa's successors, Pradyumna Bhaṭṭa, Prajñārjuna, Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa and Bhāskara. The Spanda Shastra gives a comprehensive exposition of the three Yogic methods of realization (the mystical *upāyas*). The Pratyabhijñā Shastra, being the third system, was started by Somānanda, the author of *Śivadṛṣṭi*, and was carried on by the line of his disciples,—Utpaladeva, Lakṣmaṇagupta, Abhinavagupta, and the later teachers. It lays stress on the theoretical method of realization, viz., the pursuit of knowledge and reason alone, necessary for liberation, and relegates the Yogic methods to a subordinate position. It, thus, primarily represents the philosophy proper of the Trika Shāstra.

Agama Shastra : Shaivāgamas - Among the works belonging to Shaivāgama class, there is a number of Tantras, of which the following comprise chiefly the Āgama Shāstra of Kashmir : *Mālinī Vijaya* or *Vijayottara*, *Svacchanda*, *Vijñāna Bhairava*, *Ānanda Bhairava* (lost), *Mṛgendra*, *Matanga*, *Netra*, *Naiśvāsa*, *Svāyambhuva*, *Rudra-yāmala*, *Vidyārṇava* etc. Most of these had existed long before the appearance of the Triks.

Tantra Shastra is mostly Sadhana Shastra. Usually, every Āgama consists of four sections or *Kāṇḍas*: (1) *Vidyā* or *Jñāna Kāṇḍā*, (2) *Yoga Kāṇḍa* (3) *Kriyā Kāṇḍa* and (4) *Caryā Kāṇḍa*. Kashmir Shaivāgamas are mainly dogmatic treatises interspersed with philosophical speculations and logical reasoning. Being mostly devotional, they teach the various methods and practices of Shaiva Yoga, among other theological matters. *Tantrāloka* of Abhinavagupta, an encyclopaedia of Tāntric doctrines, gives the summery of *Advaita Tantras* which existed in Kashmir in the author's time. Tantras are broadly divided into Sadhanā, Siddha and Philosophy.

Malini-vijayottara-tantram is, according to Abhinavagupta, the most important Āgama treatise for the Trika. It is an earlier treatment of the same subjects, more or less, as are dealt with in the *Tantrāloka*. Like the most Āgama texts, it is a conversation beetween Shiva and Shakti Mālinī Vijaya describes the Shaiva Yoga of the Trika sys-

tem. The Tantra is said to be the briefest resume of a large Tantra called the Siddha-Yogīśvarī-Tantram consisting of nine crore verses interpreting Shaivaistic teachings in the light of Bheda, Abheda and Bhedābheda. Mālinī Vijayottara is stated to be the last part of this Tantra. Like all Tantras, this also treats of incantations, their philosophy, initiation, bodily discipline, etc. It is said that the adorer becomes the adored himself by following the prescribed methods. He comes to feel his close kinship with nature. To him both the animate and the inanimate are glowing with divinity. The world is not an illusion to the Tantric adorer. Mālinī Vijayottara Tantra is the source of the conceptions of the three upāyas (methods of liberation), namely, Ānavopāya, Shāktopāya and Shāmbhavopāya, as dealt in the Shiva Sūtras and also incorporated in the Āgamādhikāra of Pratyabhijñā Shāstra, besides those of different types of creations, like. Vijñānakala, Sakala, Pralayākala, Vidyeśvaras and so on, This Tantra is also the main source of the first eleven Tattvas of the Shaiva system in addition to the twenty-five Tattvas of the Sāṁkhya. The original sources of the contents of this Tantra have not yet been traced by any scholar, in the earlier literature. In Tejopaniṣad we, however, have a reference about "Ānavam Shambhavam Shāktam". About the time of authorship of this Upaniṣad we are not in a position to say anything. At any rate we know that the Upaniṣad does not belong to the older group.

Svacchanda Tantram : This voluminous Tantra consisting of 3780 verses, is a dialogue between Shiva as Svacchhanda Bhairava and Shakti as Bhairavi *'Svacchanda'* literally means 'own will' and is thus a synonym of *'Svātantrya,'* i.e., self-dependence or freedom of will. Like *Mālini-Vijaya* and its offshoot *Tantrāloka* of Abhinavagupta, *Svacchanda Tantra* deels with the same principles as are treated of in the former two works, but in a peculiar strain of its own. In its philosophical parts, it gives an exposition of thirty-six *Tattvas* not as merely abstract principles but as great cosmic facts, picturing them in symbols and in forms of exquisite poetry and painting them, as it were, on a most gigantic scale, over and against the background of an equally gigantic cosmic canvas. The Tantra prescribes a form

of *Yoga-dhyāna* for the aspirant who is directed to concentrate his mind, in ecstatic meditation, on this awe-inspiring and, at the same time, irresistibly attractive scene, which presents a great drama of life and action, not just in one world and universe, but in countless universes scatteved all over boundless space and moving about in equally unbounded time. The whole work pulsates with a profound sense of realization of All-independent will, *Svacchanda*.

Śūnyatā plays an important part in certain schools of Buddhist thought. The Tantra describes the six states of *Śūnyatā* and explains the conception of the ultimate *Śūnyatā* as the Transcendental Being (Anuttara, Para, or Viśvottirṇa), the highest and last Reality, which is, in reality, *Aśūnya, (aśūnyam śūnyam ityuktam)*, i.e., not 'voidity' or 'emptiness' in the ordinary sense of the term, but a positive being (*Sattā mātra*) from which emerge infinite universes and annihilate into it. It is this Śunya which contains in itself everything and which materislizes itself in the concrete form of this physical and subtle universes (*tatra tatra paraṁ śūnyaṁ sarvaṁ vyapa vyavasthitam ; tadeva bhavati sthūlaṁ sthūlopādhi-vashāt priye*).[1] The final reality is both transcendental as well as immanent (*sarvātītam paraṁ tattvaṁ sarvaṁ vyāpi vyavasthitam*). Hundereds and thousands of universes as well as all Śāstras, all arts and sciences, all moral and spiritual disciplines, even all magic, are included in the *Tattvas* (*bhuvanāni victrāni śataśo'tha sahasraśaḥ, tattvābhyantara-samsthāni śāstrāni vividhāni ca*). While the universe is so vast, the Jīva is infinitely small, like a mathematicals point (Lit. a hundredth part of the hundredth part of a tip of hair), but he is capable of infinte expanion.[2]

Vijnana Bhairava This work is also a text of the Āgama Śāstra, being a conversation between Śiva as Bhairava and Śakti as Bhairavī. *Vijñāna Bhairava* is regarded as the essence of another Tantra, the *Rudra Yāmala*. Its main topic is *Yoga-dhyāna*, of which it prescribes no less than 112 forms. As its contribution to philosophy, *Vijñāna Bhairava* explains how it is due to Śakti that Śiva appears in the forms which

1. A Descriptive Analysis of KSTS, pp. 35—36.
2. See Ind. p. 37 ; bālāgra-śatabhāgasya, śatadhā kalpitasyatu, tasya sūkṣmataro jīvaḥ, sa cānantyāya kalpate.

are conditioned by space and time.

Para-Trimshiks: It being a collection of of thirty odd verses taken from the *Rudra Yamala Tantra*, also belongs to the Āgama Śāstra. Its importance lies in the fact that it is perhaps the earliest work on the mystery of the Sanskrit alphabet (*varṇa-mālā*). It is really what may be called the 'cosmic phonetics', and is intimately connected with the doctrine of the four stages in the manifestation of speech, viz. *Parā Paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*. Man as Paśu, i. e., 'creature in bondage', is ordinarily acquainted with the *Vaikharī*, the physically articulated speech, alone. The three other forms (stages) of speech are hidden in the 'cave' (*guhā*), i.e. heart. The verses give the relation between the articulated speech and the hidden mystery of the inarticulated sound, and its connection with the thirty-six principles of creation (*Tattvas*), treated as *Spandas*, i.e. speeding vibrations. [3]

Siva-Sutras: The Sūtras are believed to be a *Rahasyāgamashāstra-saṁgraha*, being the work of Śiva Himself They, therefore, form a part of the Āgama Śāstra to which is attributed divine authorship. According to tradition, recorded by Kṣemarāja, the Sūtras were found, by the sage Vasugupta, inscribed on a rock at the foot of Mahādeva mountain, abont 12 miles from Srinagar.

The *Śiva Sūtras* are a protest, first, against certain later schools of Buddhism, preaching the nihilistic doctrine of 'no Ātman', in direct opposition to the Buddha himself, who nowhere says that 'there is no Ātman'. He, on the contrary, states that to say that 'there is no Ātman' would mean preaching the docrine of the nihilist (*Uccheda-vāda*). *(See Saṁyutta Nikāya*, Vol. IV, 400-401). Secondly they are a protest against the doctrine of dualism. This explains why the very first Sūtra so emphatically declares that, not only the Ātman most certainly is, but that man's consciousness, in its essential nature, is in itself the Ātman (*caitanyam ātmā*) and that the Ātman itself is Śiva, the great Lord, Maheśvara, nothing else (*Ātmaiva Śivaḥ*). While

3. *Op. Cit.* p. 33

the *Śiva Sūtras* thus begin with a highly philosophical declaration, they constitute a practical treatise which tells how to realize, in direct experience, the philosophical truths enunciated therein. This practical aspect of the Sūtras is called *'Upāya'*, i.e., 'means of approach' and each of the three divisions of the Sūtras gives 'an exposition of a way of approach (*upāya-prakāshanam*.')[4]

The basic ideas of the *Śiva Sūtras* are the same as we have in the Āgamas of the Trika, i. e., the unfoldment of the three means of liberation, *Śāmbhava, Śāktra* and *Āpaya* the *Malas* (impurities), etc. It is stated that Śrikaṇṭha, an incarnation of Śiva, appeared once before Vasugupta in a dream and told him, 'There exists a sacred lore under this big stone. Reveal it and teach to those who deserve a favour'. Śiva wished to do a favour to the suffering humanity by the revelation of the tradiditional sacred lore which unfolds the three means of emancipation: *'dvaita-darśanādhivasita-prāye jīva-loke rahasya-sampradāyo mā vicchedi*.' On awakening, the sage found the Sūtras engraved on a big stone known in kashmir as *Śiva Pala* which is said to exist on the Mahādeva hill with the side. containing the engravings, remaining inverted after they were revealed to Vasugupta. The Sūtras are divided in three sections, dealing with the three means of liberation. Guru Vasugupta taught them to his disciples Kallaṭa and others-Kallaṭa taught them to Kṣemarāja who added a commentary, called *Vimārshinī*, to the Sūtras.[5]

(2) **Sanda-Shastra :** Spanda Kārios These compositions are the earliest and only original texts belonging to the Spanda Shāstra division of the Trika. They constitute the basis on which the entire Spanda literature developed. Regarding their authorship, there are two views one that they are by Vasugupta himself, and the other that Kallaṭa composed

4. Ibid pp. 10—11

5. See, J. C. Chatterji, Kashmir Shaivism ; p. 8 ;
Paranjyoti, Śaiva Siddhānta ;
M. V. T., KSTS XXXVII, Introduction,
If, 20-23, also p. 112 fn 13 ;
P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar, Shiva Sūtra Vimarśinī (Tr.).

them. Utpala Vaiṣṇava, on the strength of the 53rd Kārikā, not found in the recension of Kṣemarāja, attributes their authorship to Kallaṭa, while Kṣemarāja attributes them to Vasugupta, probably on the authority of the 16th verse of the *Spanda Nirṇaya* found in his recension. The Kārikās, seem, in fact, to be the work of Kallaṭa. The *Spanda Sāstra* lays down the main principles, as enunciated in the *Śiva Sūtras*, in a greater detail and in a more amplified form, without giving philosophical reasonings in their support. In fact, the Spanda system owes its origin to the *Śiva Sūtras* and concerns itself with their elucidation and popularisation. The author describes *Spanda* as that power of consciousnesa which infuses life into the physical senses. An object when sensed has no basis apart from consciousness. *Spanda Kārikās* (verses) are 51 in number in which the fundamental principles of Śaivism, as aphoristically given in the *Śiva Sūtras*, are epitomized. The literature that developed on these Kārikās are (1) *Vṛtti* by Kallaṭa, (2) *Vivṛti* by Rāmakaṇṭha, (3) *Pradīpikā* by Utpala, (4) Spanda Sandoha by Kṣemaraja and (5) Spanda-nirṇaya also by Kṣemaraja. The idea underlying the *Spanda Śāstra* is that Śiva's *Spanda* (energy) out of its own nature manifests on the background of its own pure Self the whole universe compring the thirty-six categories from the earth upto Śiva.[6] According to this doctrine, the world is a play of energy, force or vibration, which is in conformity with modern Science, and not an illusion, the result of error in preception as the Vadāntins suppose; their doctrine that *'viśvam yan na tad eva brahma.'* is rejected.

The discovery of the concept of the *'Spanda'* in the Trika Śāstra is, indeed, most important from the point of view of modern science. The word *'Spanda'* is derived from the root meaning 'to throb', 'to move, and seems etymologically to be the same word as English 'speed' (cf. Dutch, Old English, 'spoed'). But, in the context of the Trika Śāstra, *'Spanda'* means 'speeding with pulsation and rhythm'. *'Spanda'* has the same meaning also in expressions like *'prāṇa spanda'*, i. e., 'life pulsation'. It has been known in India since the Vedic age that

6. The Spanda-Karika, *KSTS* VI,
The Spanda-nirṇaya, *KSTS* XLII, with Eng. Tr.

everything in the universe of objects is only a 'system of ceaseless goings' (*jagati*) (*yat kiñ ca jagatyām jagat—Īsāvāsyopaniṣad 1*). Even the hardest, heaviest, the apparently stand-still, mass of matter, in this physical universe, is just a volume of 'pulsating, throbbing, waving, vibrating flowings' (Spanda-niḥṣyandaḥ, SK, 19). In these circumstances, the discovery of modern physics that 'matter' is only 'waves of various lengths,—without there being any essentially 'solid, hard stuff in matter'—is really a re-discovery of what the Trika Śāstra conceived centuries ago as the 'Spanda'.[7]

(3) **Pratyabhijna Shastra** : (its emergence) Whereas Vasugupta and Kallaṭa (beginning of the 9th century A, D.) are the promulgators of Āgama and Spanda branches of Trika Shāstra, which stress 'its faith, fact and practicle discipline' necessary for realization, Somānanda (towards the close of the 9th century) and Utpaladeva (in the first half of the 10th century) are the founders of the Pratyabhijñā Shāstra, the philosophy proper of the Trika. Abhinavagupta (990-1015 A. D.) combines both the aspects of the Triks, its faith (rituals and practices) and philoscphy. He is, indeed, the greatest exponent of the system as a whole The later teachers, Kṣemarāja, Yogarāja, Jayaratha, Shivopādyāya and Bhāskarācārya (1200-1800 A. D), mostly commentators. follow Abhinavagupta in expounding the various doctrines of the school. The following is the whole of Pratyabhijñā literature given in chronlogical order (pd. in KSTS—Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies) :-

Śivadṛṣṭi (*Śd*) by Somānanda (the first text on the system - 9th cent A. D. *KSTS- 54* ; *Īshvara-Pratyabhtjñā Kārikā* (*PK*) with *Vṛtti* - short commentary (*Pvṛ*) by Utpaladeva 10th Cent. (*St KSTS - 34*) ; Utpaladeva, had written a Tīkā (commentary) on his *Pk* which is irrecoverably lost. *Īshvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarshini* (*Pvi*), a short commentary (called also Laghu-vimarśini) on Utpaladeva's *Pk*, by Abhinavagupta 11th cent.) (*KSTS - 22* & *33*); *Īshvar - Prtyabhijñā Vivṛti - Vimarshinini* (*Pvi*) (called also Brahvati-vimarṣini), a long commentary on *Pk*

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7. Cf. J. C. Chattarji, Art. 'Trika āstra,' *Shāradā*, I, i, 1952.

KSTS-60, 62, 69); *Tantrāloka* (*TA*) by Abhinavagupta, a voluminous work, (pd with commentary of Jayaratha 1180 A. D. in *KSTS*—in 12 volumes) : *Tantra-Sāra* by Abhinavagupta (*K S T S - 17*) ; *Paramartha-sara* of Abhinavagupta (pd. with commentary of Yogarāja 1060 A.D. in *K S T S - 7) Pratyabhijñā - hṛdaya* by Kṣemarāja 1040 A. D. *KSTS* - 3) ; Besides the above, there are : one chapter, Canto VIII, on Pratyabhijñā-darśana in *Sarva-darshana-saṁgrana* (*SDS*) of Madhavācārya 14th cent. (pd. in the Vidyabhawan Sanskrit Granthamālā No 113, Varanasi) ; a Commentary of Bhāskarācārya (1780 A. D.) on *Pvi*, ed by K. C. Pandey and K. A. Subramania Iyer, (pd in the Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhawan Texts, Nos. 82 and 83, 2 volumes, Allahabad). Utpaladeva's *Sidditrayi*, comprising three treatises : *Īshvara-Siddhi*, *Ajaḍa - pramatṛ-siddhi* and *Sambhandha - siddhi*, (*KSTS - 34*) is another allied work on the system.

Trika Shastra : The texts enumerated above under Pratyabhijñā Śāstra mostly include those expounding the so-calld *Trika* Śāstra, i.e., which treat of all the three branches of Kashmir Shaivism : Āgama Shāstra. Spanda Shāstra and Pratyabhijñā Shāstra, the philosophy proper of the Trika, or those which deal with the three mystical Upāyas, practical disciplines necessary for realization, called Shāmbhavopāya, Shāktopāya and Ānavopāya which are initially prescribed for liberation in Āgama Shāstra. The Pratyabhijṇā Shāstra is a 'new approach', easy way or means to the realization of the reality, i. e., the way of knowledge and reason, say, the intellectual pursuit alone, without any supernatural processes practical discipline, i. e., *Ṣaiva-Yoga* (called also *Ṣaiva Samāveṣa*) to which aspect there is no stress in the Pratyabhijñā Shāstra proper, viz. in the works of Somananda and Utpaladeva, the pioneers of the school, although these matters are also incorporated in their works from the Āgama Shāstra, but they are relegated to a subordinate position and not treated as an essential part of the Pratpabhijñā system which is said to be a new and an easy way (*sugaṭa eṣaḥ mārgo navo*). The works dealing with Trika Shāstra also treat of the philosophical aspect of Pratyabhijñā, the glimpses of which are given below :

Tantraloka and Tantra-sara : The *Tantrāloka* is the most voluminous work by Abhinavagupta and forms an encyclopaedia of the *Trika*

shāstra. The *Tantra-sāra*, by the same author, is just a brief summary of the *Tantrāloka*. While the *Tantrāloka* is composed in an abstruse language and in a metrical form, the Tantra-sar is written in easy prose and is considerably short. The *Tantra-sāra* is, in fact, an excellent introduction to the *Tantrāloka*. Both these works indicate the role of Abhinavagupta as an exponent of *Trika Śāstra*. The first chapter of *Tantrāloka*, which is chiefly philosophical, opens with an explanation of the first two Śiva Sūtras and defines the key word '*Caitanya*,' saying '*caitanyam iti bhāvāntaḥ shabdaḥ svātantrya-mātrakam*' (*TA* I, 28). Thus *Caitanya* means not any particular state or states of consciousness, but consciousness in general, consciousness as such, free from all limiting conditions, free absolutely from an objective context, viz., anything to depend upon, like the body, the mind, etc. *Caitanya* is just Self-dependence (*Svātantrya - mātra*). It is '*cit - kriyā citi - kartṛtā*,' i. e. absolute liberty and autonomy of consciousness, as Utpaladeva says. This *Caitanya* is emphatically declared to be the *Ātman*, the one nuclear core in every personality, the one central point of reference in each and every experience, the deepest depth of the subconscious in each vividly conscious personal ego. The *Tantrāloka* I gives also definitions and explanations of various other terms. The next four chapters of the work deal, in detail, with the same three *upāyas* (methods of realization), which constitute the three sections of the Śiva Sūtras. According to Abhinavaguptas' view, the three means described are those of *Abheda*, *Bhedābheda* and *Bheda* respectively. Pratyabhijñā has been treated as another way of realizatian, a way of reasoning (*tarka*), requiring no practice of any kind (*Anupāya mārga*). This, Abhinavagupta says, is the highest of all the methods (*tato 'pi paramam jñānam upāyādi-vivarjitam...anuttaram - ihocyati*). The work also deals with various philesophical topics like time, space, the nature and division of the thirty-six principles (*tattvas*), from the principle of solidity (earth) to *Śiva*, the one All-benign Lord (*devaḥ sa ekaḥ shivaḥ*), who ever shines through all the principles and their infinite combinations and permutations, - shines in the form of a condensed mass of the supreme spiritual effulgence (*esa anvitaṁ rupam bhāti param prakāsha - nibiḍam*, TA, 9, 1). The two chapters (11 and 12) of the work, deal with the principle of *Māyā* and

its five off-shoots, *Kalā*, *Rāga*, *Vidyā*. *Niyati*, and *Kāla*, which, acting as 'veils', make one all-pervading Śiva appear as divided in the form of each microcosm. Another chapter (13) which is also of some philosophical significanca, treats of the conferment of powers (*shakti-pāta*) by Śiva, on his devotees. The rest of the work deals with various ritual practices and forms of worsip.

Pratyabhijna-hrdayam : This is a small work by Rājānaka Kshemarāja in which the contents of Pratyabhijñā Śāstra are summarised, with a stress on Āgamic tenets of the *Trika* and *Śaiva Samvāeṣa* (the *Śāivayoga*). A brief idea of this work is given as follows : *Citi* (consciousness) being absolute or self-dependent (*Svatantra*), is the ultimate cause of this universe. By the power of its own will (*svecchā*), it unfolds the universe upon its own screen (*svabhittau*). This universe is manifold (*nānā*) in consequence of the seperation of mutually related objects and subjects (from one another). The subject, whose essential nature is limited *citi* (*citi-saṁkocātmā*), is a microcosm. *Citta* (the sense organ) is nothing else than *cit* descended from the stage of Cetana and passed into a state of limitation due to the object of perception (*cetya-saṁkocinī*). That *citta* especially constitutes the real nature of the *Māyā-pramātā* (limited subject). He is one *Atman*, being *Śiva* whose essence consists in *cit*. He is of two-fold form, one as light (*Prakāsa rūpa*) and the other as the limited manifestation (*samkocāvabhasavat*). He is three-fold being covered by three impurities (*malas*), *Āṇava*, *Māyīya*, and *Kārma*. He is of four-fold constitution, because he is composed of the void, (*Śūnya*), the life (*Prāṇa*), the subtle body consisting of mind, senses, etc. (*pūryaṣṭaka*) and the body (*Śarīra*). The seven pentads, i. e. the thirty-five *Tattvas* from Śiva to the earth, make up his nature. In consequence of the limitation of the *Śaktis* of the *Māyā-pramātā* (*Ātman*), he becomes the *mala*-covered *saṁsārin*, i. e., takes a succession of births. Like the Lord (Śiva), he carries out the five processes of the universe, viz., emanation (*sraṣṭṛtā*), reabsorption (*saṁhartṛtā*), stabilization (*sthāpakatā*), enveloping (*vilaya-kāritā*) and dispensing grace (*anugrāhitṛta*). Underlying these there exist five other secret processes, viz., manifesting, enjoyment, meditation, seeding and dissolution. To be a *saṁsārin* means being led astray by one's own *shaktis* when one is ignorant of the authorship of the fivefold process. In the following Sūtras, the teacher sets forth a meditative process (*Samāvesha*) for achieving divine realization which 'saves during life-time' from *Saṁsāra* (cycle of births and deaths). In the process of *Samāvesha* (*Samādhi*) *citta*

The Sādhaka (aspirant) gradually approaches more and more permanent *Samādhi* by meditating on one's identity with *cit*. The result achieved by such meditation is stated, in a mystical language, in Sūtra 17, thus: "By opening the Centre, there follows the attainment of spirit and bliss *(cidānandalābhaḥ)*. The *Sādhaka* penetrates into the perfect Self and thus acquires the Lordship (*Śivatā, Māheśvarya*), viz, achieves salvation in one's life time (*jīvan-mukti*).

Vātūla - Nātha - Sūtras: The Śaiva-yoga had a considerable growth even after the twelfth century as is evident from *Vātūla-Nātha - Sūtras*, in which are laid down certain Yogic processes as the means of achieving divine realization. They expound the secret method of *Samāveśa* in a greatly complex manner. These Sūtras are thirteen in number in which a speeial term *Sāhasa* (adventure) is used to describe an unprecedented and extra-ordinary yogic experience. In these Sūtras, the processes and the object of the Yoga *Samāveśa* are described in a complex and mystical language.

Philosophical nucleus of Trika Shāstra: Trika Śāstra comprising the above - mentioned three main divisions of Kashmir Śaivism, represents, in its philosophical context, a concept of positivism in a theistic outlook in contradistinction to the absolute monism of Vedānta; According to the school, Śiva, the Ultimate reality, is the prolific cause and the 'essence and identity' (Self) of every thing He abounds in bliss and consciousness (*nirvṛta-cid-vibhuḥ*) and is endowed with sovereignty of will, omniscience and omnipotence (*aniruddha - icchā-prasaraḥ, prasarad-dṛk - kriyaḥ Śivaḥ*). He is everything and yet beyond everything, or He is both immanent (*Viśvamayaḥ*) and transcendent (*Viśvottīrṇa*). Time, form and space do no limit Him, for He is above all mutation and change. *Paśu* or *Puruṣa* (a living being), being the fragment of the inter - related whole (cosmos), is no other than Śiva Himself, but is in a state of limitation and self-forgetfulness. Recognition of the state of Śivahood (divinity) in oneself restores the original state of absolute perfection to an individual (*Paśu*). This is his state of *Mokṣa* (liberation). The *Pasu* has taken on three impurities (*Malas*) which are responsible for obscuring the divine within him. When these three impurities get dissolved, he realizes the divine within him in its crystalline puriiy.

A bird's eye-view of Pratyabhijñā Philosophy: *Pratyabhijñā Kārikā* of Utpaladeva enunciates a particular system of thought, viz. the Doctrine of Recognition, which is given, in nutshell, here to fecilitate the understanding of the different sections of the text in proper context. The teacher says, at the outset, that man should 'recognise' himseif, viz. be aware of his inner being and his deeper faculties, if he desires to make his life all prosperous and felicitous and attain the glories of liberated life (*samasta - sampat - samavaptihetum*). Our profounder faculties remain hidden from awareness due

to innate forgetfulness (*moha*). The Pratyabhijñā is directed to removing the veil of ignorance (*mohāpasaraṇa - mātram - etat*). Only he who makes use of his faculties of knowing and doing, really lives (*jñānam kriyā ca bhūtānām jīvatam jīvanam matam*). It is on 'living' (*jivad*) that 'non-living' (*jaḍa*) depends (*jaḍa-bhūtanām pratiṣtha jīvadaśrayā*). The teacher further brings, as a Prima Facie view, the objections of the Buddhist Saugata concerning the existence of a permanent subject (*Ātman Maheśvara*), and next explains his point of view establishing the permanence of Self (*Ātman*), the Great Lord (*Maheśvara*) who is endowed with *Māheśvarya* or *Svātantrya-śakti* (sovereignty of the Lord's will, self-dependent power of the Lord, absolute liberty and autonomy of consciousness) with which he executes the acts of creation, etc., of this orderly world. The *Svātantrya-śakti* or creative power of the Lord is two-fold, comprising *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa*, viz. power of manifestation and power of perception and concretization, functioning as Universal Consciousness (Psychical Power), and Universal Energy (Physical Power or Objective Reality), technically called *Śiva* and *Sakti*. The former, i.e. Universal Consciousness, assumes three forms: Power of Remembrance (*Smṛti-śakti*), Power of Knowledge (*jñāna-śakti*) and Power of Differentiation (*Apohana-śakti*). The latter, i.e., Universal Energy, functions as Power of Action (*Kriyā-Śakti*) of the Lord. It is governed by three universal Laws of Nature: the Law of Division (*Bhedābheda*), the Law of Perception (*Māna-tat-phala-meya*) and the Law of Causation (*Kārana-kārya*). The Transcendental Lord (*Viśvottīrṇa*) thus concretises or materializes Himself into this created universe (becomes) *viśvamaya*, viz. takes the form of the cosmos) by evolving thirty-six *Tattvas* or primary realities. In this doctrine of Tattvas, the system analyses the One Objective Reality,—'primordial natural force principle' or 'the *Prima Materia* of all things' into thirty-six *principles* indispensable for the ultimate constitution of the universe. As the Lord is c n eived to be endowed with sovereignty of will, and psychical and physical powers to make Him potent for all creative activity which accounts for the emanation of ever-new creations in this universe (macrocosm), so is every individual created being (as microcosm) endowed with the potential powers of will, cognition and action, including the psychical powers of remembrance, knowlege and differentation (*smṛti-śakti*), *jñāna-śakti* and *apohana-śakti*) and the physical powers (*kriyā-śakti*) as supreme inheritence from his Divine Father Maheśvara to make him potent for all creative activity in his life-time. It is "recognition" or awareness and right use of one's divine faculties (supreme inheritence) with which man is born in this world that make his life felicitous and blissful and enables him to attain the final beatitude or the glories of liberated life.

The following pages give a comprehensive study of the doctrine as systematically presented in the *Pratyabhijñā Kārikā* of Utpaladeva.

Ah. 1, i

उपोद्घातः (प्रत्यभिज्ञकारिकायां ज्ञानाधिकारे प्रथममाह्निकम्)

1 *Meaning and Purpose of Pratyabhijñā* :

कथंचिदासाद्य महेश्वरस्य दास्यं जनस्याप्युपकारमिच्छन्।
समस्तसम्पत् समवाप्तिहेतुं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञामुपपादयामि ॥१॥

योजना संक्षिप्तार्थश्च :–

कथंचित् (परमेश्वरप्रसादादेव[1] अथवा स्वात्मनः प्रसादादेव[7]) महेश्वरस्य दास्यं (ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञादर्शनस्यपात्रताम् अथवा स्वातन्त्र्यपात्रताम्[2]) आसाद्य (परिपूर्णतया सादयित्वा, अथवा स्वयंलब्ध्वा), जनस्य[3] (संपत्तिरहितस्य तस्मात् पारतन्त्र्यादि-दुःखैः पीडितस्य अखिलस्य लोकस्य) उपकारम् अपि इच्छन्, समस्तसंपत्[4] (सर्वं ऐश्वर्यं तस्य, स्वातन्त्र्यसंपत्ति-रूपा-सिद्धिः तस्याः, परमार्थलाभः[5] तस्य) समवाप्तिहेतुः (सम्यग् 'अवाप्तिः' - विमर्शरूढिः, सैव हेतुः, ताम्) तत् (तस्य महेश्वरस्य, स्वात्मनः वा) – प्रत्यभिज्ञाम् उपपादयामि (संपादयामि) ।

Trans: Somehow (viz by the grace[6] of the Lord, the Self), having myself become a deserving recipient of the Lord's gift of the highest knowledge (of Self-recognition) or freedom, wishing to render service (do good) to humanity (suffering from want and dependence on others) I am setting forth the doctrine of Self-recognition (*Pratyabhijñā*[8]) as a means of achieving affluence and freedom (*svātantrya-sampatti*), viz. all that is of highest value (*paramārtha-lābha*).

(Note :- A human being suffers owing to dependence on others (*pāratantrya*) and inferiority complex. Pratyabhijñā teaches that freedom (*svātantrya*) is the essential nature of Self. The individual is the architect of his own fate.)

K 1—1. *Pvr (Ud)*; 2. दीयते अस्मै स्वामिना सर्वं यथाभिलषितम् इति दासः तस्य भावः (दास्यम्) इत्यनेन परमेश्वररूपस्वातन्त्र्यपात्रता उक्ता (*Pv 1,14)*
3. अनवरतजननमरणपीडितस्य (*Pv I,15*)
(suffering from incessant births and deaths — Ag)

4. समस्ताः— पूर्णतादिरूपाः सर्वाः (*Bh I,33*); 5. *Pvr (Ud)*- १, संपत्तिः सिद्धिः (*Pv 1,15*) तां तां विभूति परविभूतिपर्यन्तां—(*Pv II, 272-73*).

२, परापरसिद्धिप्रदायिनी (*Pv II*, 275) ३, परापरसिद्धिलक्षणा जीवनमुक्तिविभूति (*Pv II* 272-73)

(i. Prosperity, fortune, success and happiness; ii. both the higher and lower spiritual powers, and iii. the glories of the liberated life).

6. प्रसाद, अनुग्रह, शक्तिपात, 7. परमेश्वररूपः निजात्मैव (*Bh* 1, 3)

8. The term "*Pratyabhijñā*" is used, for the first time, in philosophic sense by Buddhists. According to them the special feature of knowledge ('*saññā*', the Pali form of '*sajñā*' meaning the 'conceptual knowledge') is the *recognising* (*paccabhiññā*), the Pali form of '*pratyabhijña*' by means of a sign (*abhiññānena*', the Pali form of '*Abhijñānā*'). According to another explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion of the totality of the aspects of a thing. (See *History of Indian Philosophy* by S. N. Dass Gupta, P. 98)

Somānanda uses the term *Pratyabhijñā*, for the first time and once only, in his *Śivadṛṣṭi*, in a special philosophic sense, for the realization of the identity of this world, consisting of multiple objects —sentient and insentient, with the Supreme Being (Reality), by means of the processes of *perception* or direct observation (*arṣṭa*) of one of His aspects, viz. His *prakāshamanatā* (omnipresence), and *remembrence* (*smarṇa*) of His other aspects, His *sarvajñatā* (ominiscience) *sarvashaktimatta* (omnipotence), etc., as known from scriptures -

तस्माज्ज्ञेयं समग्रैकयवस्तु शैवं व्यत्रस्थितम् ।
दृष्टस्मरणयोरैक्ये स्थिते तदुपपद्यते ।
तथा सा प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् स एवायमिति स्थितिः ॥ (*Śd IV*, 118-120)

In *recognition* the processes of *perception* (*dṛṣṭa*) and *remembrance* (*smaraṇa*) are associated or unified.

Utpaladeva uses the term *Pratyaibhijñā* in the sense of revealing the powers of Self—powers of knowledge and action (*dṛkkriyātmikā shakti*) :-

शक्त्याविष्करणेनेयं प्रत्यभिज्ञोपदर्श्यते । (*Pk I*, 3)

Abhinavagupta explains the term Pratyabhijñā as follows :-

अ] तस्य महेश्वरस्य 'प्रत्यभिज्ञा' प्रतीपमात्माभिमुख्येनज्ञानं प्रकाशः प्रत्यभिज्ञा। प्रतीपम इति - स्वात्मावभासो हि न अननुभूतपूर्वो ऽविच्छिन्नप्रकाशत्वात्

तस्य, स तु तच्छक्त्यैव (माया शक्त्या स्वातन्त्र्यरूपया) विच्छिन्न इव विकल्पित इव लक्ष्यते... ।

('Tasya' means 'of Maheśvara'.; '*Prati*' (*pratīpam*) means 'backward'— in the inverted order or indirectly-i. e , that which was already known before but was forgotten (due to *Moha* or *Māya* - *shakti*) and is now remembered; 'Abhi' (abhimukhena) means 'directly', that which is cognised now; '*Jñānam*' means '*Prakashaḥ*', light of consciousness, i. e. awareness.)

अथवा प्रतीपं ज्ञातस्यापि विस्मृतस्येव छादितस्येव पुनः आभिमुख्येन न तु स्मर्यमाणतया अपितु स्फुटत्वेन ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं...

(*Pv*-I, 20 Fn. 44)

ब] प्रत्यभिज्ञा च - भात-भासमानरूपानुसंधानात्मिका, स एवायं चैत्र इति प्रतिसंधानेन अभिमुखीभूते वस्तुनि ज्ञानम् ... ।

Recognition consists in the unification of what appeared before with what appears now, as in the judgement 'This is the same Chaitra, (known before)'.

ज] इहापि प्रसिद्धपुराण सिद्धान्तागमानुमानादिविदितपूर्ण-शक्तिस्वभावे ईश्वरे सति स्वात्मन्यभिमुखी - भूते तत्प्रतिसंधानेन ज्ञानम् उदेति, नूनं स एव ईश्वरोऽहम् — इति । (*Pv*—I, 20. 21)

(The Lord as possessed of supreme power is known from the Purāṇas, Siddhāntas, Āgamas as well as reasoning, inference, etc. and the Self is a fact of everybody's direct experience. Recognition (*Pratyabhijñā*) arises when the two experiences, the knowledge of the Lord as Supreme Power and the awareness of one's own Self, are unified in one's experience: 'Certainly I am that very Lord').

The experiences of direct perception (*dṛṣṭa*) and remembrance (*smaraṇa*) are unified in the experience of 'recognition' :-

स्मरणानुभवारूढा सामानाधिकरण्यधीः ।
संस्कारेंद्रियजन्या च प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रकीर्तिता ।

(*Pv* I, 20 Fn)

Pratyabhijñā is, therefore, 'Recognition of Self as Maheshvara (the great Lord), because he possesses the powers of knowledge and action' :—

कर्तरि ज्ञातरि आत्मन्यादिसिद्धे महेश्वरे ।
अजडात्मा निषेधं वा सिद्धिं वा विदधीत कः ॥२॥

योजना :- कर्तरि ज्ञातरि आदिसिद्धे[1] (पूर्वसिद्धे) महेश्वरे (स्वातन्त्र्ययुक्ते) आत्मनि सति, अजडात्मा (चेतनः, अजडात्मवादी वा, वैशेषिकादेः सांख्यादेः बौद्धादेर्जडः आत्मा, तान् विहाय[3]) कः निषेधं वा सिद्धिं वा विदधीत (कुर्यात्) ।

When *Ātman* (Self) is already a fact of everybody's experience, as possessing powers of action and cognition and having freedom (*svātantrya*) to use his powers, which sensible person (other than a Bauddha, Vaiśeṣika, and Sāṅkhya, according to whom Ātman is not sentient) would deny or establish the existence of such a being?

किंतु मोहवशादस्मिन्दृष्टे ऽप्यनुपलक्षिते ।
शक्त्याविष्करणेनेयं प्रत्यभिज्ञोपदर्श्यते ॥३॥

योजनाः- दृष्टे अपि, किन्तु मोहवशाद् (माया-व्यामोहाद्) अनुपलक्षिते (सर्वथा हृदयंगमीभावमप्राप्ते), अस्मिन् (आत्मनि) शक्ति (असाधारण-दृक्क्रियात्मिकाया शक्ति) आविष्करणेन (प्रदर्शनेन)[1] इयं प्रत्यभिज्ञा उपदश्यते (निरूप्यते) ।

K I ctd — तदयं प्रमाता ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तियोगाद् ईश्वरः इति—

(Pv 1, 43)

Thus it is established that Maheshvara is the Self of all creatures, since all their activities follow from their powers of will, knowledge and action (which constitute their divine inheritence) :-

इच्छा-ज्ञान-क्रिया पूर्वा यस्मात्सर्वाः प्रवृत्तयः ।
सर्वेऽपि जन्तवस्तस्मादीश्वरा इति निश्चिताः ॥ (*Pv I 43Fn*)

K 2-1, पूर्वसिद्धस्य (Known before) Pvr; अविच्छिन्नप्रकाशे (whose light (consciousness) is uninterrupted) (*Pv* I, 34); 'eternal' (Pandey)

2, ज्ञानं क्रिया च स्वसंवेदनसिद्धमैश्वर्यं, (*Pvr*); तदयं प्रमाता ज्ञान-क्रियाशक्तियोगाद् ईश्वरः इति (*Pv I, 43*); स चायं स्वतन्त्रः । स्वातन्त्र्यं च अस्य अभेदे भेदनं भेदिते च अन्तरनुसंधानेन अभेदनम् —इति — तदेव अस्य पारमेश्वर्यं मुख्यमानन्दमयं रूपम् -इति- 31); (3) *Bh* I, 55

Though the powers of Self are already known, yet they are hidden from awareness due to delusion or forgetfulness (*moha*); Pratyabhijñā is, therefore, set forth to reveal those powers of Self.

Maheshvara is the Self of all sentient and insentient :-

तथाहि जडभूताना प्रतिष्ठा जीवदाश्रया ।
ज्ञान क्रिया च भूतानां जीवतां जीवनं मतम् ॥४॥

योजना :- तथाहि (दृश्यतां किल), जडभूतानां प्रतिष्ठा (अवस्थानम्) जीवदाश्रया ('जीवन्तं' प्रमातारमाश्रित्य भवति)[1] । ज्ञानं क्रिया च जीवतां भूताना जीवनं मतम्[2] ।

Ques. This world comprises multiple objects of experience, sentient and insentient. It is only sentients who possess powers of knowledge and action; Insentients do not either possess the power of knowledge, or the power of action. How is it then possible to establish that *Maheshvara* is the Self of all ?

Ans, It is an evident fact that the existence of insentients depends upon sentient beings; and (the powers of) knowledge and action are admitted to be the very life of living beings (sentients).

K 3 1, शक्त्याविष्करणेन असाधारण—प्रभावाभिज्ञापनरूयापनेन (*Pvr*)
(i, e revealing the extra-ordinary powers or profounder faculties of Self).

कथं शक्तेः .. दृक्क्रियात्मिकाया (शक्त्या) 'आविष्करणेन'...
(bringing into awareness higher powers of comprehension (दृक्) and action (क्रिया) (Pv I, 37)

मोहापसारणमात्रमेतत्
(It is the mere removal of the veil of obscuration, *moha* or *māyā*).

Note :- Pratyobhijñā, therefore, means to become aware again of the (profounder) powers of Self (*Maheṣvara*), which are not unknown before (*nānānubhūta-pūrvah*)' but which are obscured by the veil of *moha* or *māyā*.

(In this view the insentients also possess the essential characteristics of *Maheshvara.*)

तत्र ज्ञानं स्वतः सिद्धं क्रिया कायाश्रितासती ।
परैरप्युपलक्षयेत तयान्यज्ञानमूह्यते ॥५॥

योजना :- तत्र (तयोर्ज्ञानक्रिययोर्मध्ये) ज्ञानं स्वतः सिद्धम् । क्रिया अपि (स्वतः सिद्धा, सा) कायाश्रितासती परैरुपलक्ष्येत । तया (क्रियया)

K 4 1, तेषां 'जडभूतानां' चिन्मयत्वेऽपि, मायाख्यया ईश्वरशक्त्या जाड्यं प्रापितानां 'जीवन्तं प्रमातारमाश्रित्य 'प्रतिष्ठा' तत्प्रमात्राभिमुख्येन अवस्थानं, ततो जडा नाम न पृथक् सन्ति ।

(*Pv I*, *41-42*)

The commentator says that the insentient objects, though they are essentially of the nature of sentience (consciousness), yet they are reduced to the state of insentiency by the power of the Lord called *Māyā Śakti* They, therefore, have their being only as related to and dependent upon sentient subjects Hence insentient objects do not have independent existence

2, जीवनं च जीवनकर्तृत्वं तच्च ज्ञानक्रियात्मकं, यो हि जानाति च करोति च स जीवति—इत्युच्यते । तदयं ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तियोगाद् ईश्वरः- इति

(*Pv I*. 43)

The subject is characterised by life, that is the act of living which consists of knowing and doing. For, only he is said to be living who knows and acts, Therefore, the individual subject is the Lord, because he possesses the powers of knowledge and action. The Lordliness (*Māheshvarya*) is essentially the possession of these two powers in relation to all objects.

अन्यज्ञानम् ऊह्यते 'गम्यते[1]' ।

Ques. How do you establish the existence of powers of knowledge and action in the individual subject due to which he can be said to possess lordliness (*Maheshvarya*)?

Ans Out of these two powers, the power of knowledge is self-established; and the power of action (Which is also self-established), is perceptible to other perceivers, as it is associated with a particular body. From that (action) the presence of (the power of) knowledge in others is inferred.

K 5 1, तत्रापि प्रत्यक्षाज्ज्ञानमात्मसंवेद्यं परत्रापि क्रिययैव प्रसिद्ध्यति—इति सिद्ध एव (*Pvr*); 2, तत्र जानामि – इत्यन्तः संरम्भयोगोऽपि भाति ... स च संरम्भो विमर्शः क्रियाशक्तिरुच्यते तेन आन्तरीयक्रियाशक्तिः ज्ञानवदेव स्वत.सिद्धा स्वप्रकाशा, सैव तु स्वशक्तया प्राणपुर्यष्टकक्रमेण शरीरमपि - संचरमाणा स्पन्दनरूपा सती व्यापारव्याहारात्मिका ... सा च परशरीरादि - साहित्येन अवगता स्वं स्वभावं ज्ञानात्मकमवगमयति । (*Pv I*, *46-47*)

In the cognitive experience such as 'I know', there is consciousness of its association with a stir (*saṁrambha-yogaḥ*) also. This stir (*saṁrambha* or *spanda*) is called *Vimarsha*. It is the power of action Therefore, says the commentator, internal power of action, like that of cognition, is self-established and self-shining That very internal power of action, because of its inherent power, enters into body through the vital air and 'the group of eight' and being of ...ing nature in itself, become directly perceptible as physical action in the sphere of *Māyā*. That physical action, when seen in another person's body, logically makes us infer the presence of the power of knowledge (*jñāna*) which is its essential nature.

(Pandey - *Bh*. III, 17)

'The group of eight'—comprises five *prānas*, the group of sense organs the group of organs of action and *Buddhi* (mind).

पूर्वपक्षविवृत्ति : (प्रत्यभिज्ञाकारिकायां ज्ञानाधिकारे द्वितीयमाह्निकम)

The Prima Facie View—the Existence of Atman Refuted :-

The Buddhist Saugata refutes the view of Shaivātma-vādin that there exists a permanent subject (Self) :-

ननु स्वलक्षणाभासं ज्ञानमेक परं पुनः ।
साभिलापं विकल्पाख्यं बहुधानापि तद्द्वयम् ॥१॥

नित्यस्य कस्यचिद्द्रष्टु-स्तस्यात्रानवभासतः ।
अहं - प्रतीतिरप्येषा शरीराधवसायिनी[6] ॥२॥

योजना :- ननु स्वलक्षण-आभासं ज्ञानम् (निर्विकल्पकम्) एकम्, पुनः परम् (अन्यत्) साभिलापं (शब्दनरूपेण सह वंतते) विकल्पाख्यम् (सविकल्पकम्) बहुधा (स्मृतिसंशयोत्पेक्षादिबहुभेदं), तत द्वयम् अपि नित्यस्य कस्यचिद् द्रष्टः न (भवतः), तस्य अत्र अनवभासतः, एषा अहं प्रतीतिरापि शरीरादि अवसायनी (भवति) ।

(Saugata Purvapakṣin says, it is not right to say that there exists a permanent self-luminous Self. There are only the chains of indeterminate and determinate cognitions, but there is no substratum of the cognitions, nor any permanent bsing as cogniser apart from the fleeting cognitions)

Trans :— (There are only two kinds of cognitions); one is (indeterminate) cognition, which manifests itself in its essential nature (*svalakṣaṇābhāsam jñānam*) characterised by the limitations of time, space and forn.[1] (Being self-confined it is not applicable to others[2]) It is one (*ekam*), i. e has no variety[3]. The other (*param*) is the determinate cognition (*vikalpākhyam*), which admits of linguistic expression (*sābhilapām*)[4]. It is of many kinds (*bahudhā*) such as

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1) स्वरूपसंकोच भागि 'लक्षणं' देशकालाकार - रूपं यस्य तस्य 'आभासः' प्रकाशनम् अन्तर्मुखं यस्मिन् बहिर्मुखीन स्वरूपधारिणि ज्ञाने । *Pv*, I, 54;

2) 'स्वं' अन्याननुयायि । *Ibid.*

3) 'एकं' - विषय भेदेऽपि एकजातीयं स्वरूपे । *Ibid*

4) 'साभिलापं'-अभिलापेन संजल्पात्मना शब्दनरूपेण सह वर्तते । *Ibid. 55*

remembrance, doubt, imagination, etc.).[5] Neither of these two (chains of cognitions) belongs to a permanent perceiver (Self), because none such is experienced. As regards the I-consciousness *(aham-pratītiḥ)* (which persists in different experiences like "I am thin" *(kṛṣo'ham)* "I am happy" *(sukhyaham)* and so on, it has reference only to (cognitions pertaining to) the body (or mind), etc.[6 & 7]

अथानुभवविध्वंसे स्मृतिस्तदनुरोधिनी ।
कथं भवेन्न नित्यः स्यादात्मा यद्यनुभावकः ॥ ३ ॥

योजना :—अथ अनुभवविध्वंसे (सति) तद् (अनुभव) अनुरोधिनी [1] स्मृति कथं भवेत,—यदि अनुभावकः आत्मा नित्यः न स्यात् [2] ?

The Śaivatma-vādin says :— (At the time of remembrance) when the direct perception ceases to exist, how can there arise memory, which closely follows the direct perception, if the perceiving Self were not permanent?

K 2–5 स्मृतिसंशयोत्प्रेक्षादिवहुभेदम्
Pvṛ
6. शरीरसन्तानो वा कृशोऽहम्...ज्ञानसन्तानो वा सुख्यहम्–इति प्रतीतेः । *Ibid 57-58*
7, ज्ञानमेकं स्फुटावभास–स्वलक्षणानुभवरूपं निर्विकल्पकं ते कथयन्ति । अपरं तु शब्दारूषणया स्मृति–संशयोत्प्रेक्षादि–बहुभेदं विकल्पसंज्ञम् । उभयमप्येतन्न युज्यते बोधरूपज्ञानातिरिक्तस्यान्यस्य संबन्धितया, तस्यानुपलब्धेः, कोऽसौ स्थिर आत्मा ? साभिलापाहंप्रत्ययेनापि शरीरादिक–वेद्यवस्तूत्तीर्णो वेदयिता न कश्चिल्लौकैरवधार्यते ॥
Pvṛ
K 3–1. 'तदनुरोधिनी'-पूर्वानुभवावष्टम्भधर्मा *(i. e.* which retains the nature of the former direct perception)
Pvṛ
अनुरुन्धाना–अस्यपदमनुसरन्ती , अपेक्षमाणेति यावत् (which closely follows the direct preception; which depends upon the direct preception).
Bh
अनुभवप्रकाश एव स्मृतौ प्रधानम् (the light of the former preception is the chief characteristic in rememberance).
Pv I, 60
2. स्मृतिकाले पूर्वानुभवनाशात्कथं...स्मृतिर्जायेत यदि तदापि तदनुभवबोधो नावर्तत, यश्च अनेक–कालस्थायी बोधः स एव आत्मानुभविता (How can there arise memory, if the knowledge of the former direct preception would not turn up in the later experience—*i. e.* remembrance. The knowledge which lasts in different times—former and the later—that is the experiencing Self).
Pvṛ

(The Śaiva means to say that remembrance arises, because the Self (*Ātman*) persisted from the former direct perception to the later remembrance as witness (*dṛṣtā* or *sākṣī*). The experience of remembrance, in fact, shows that the knowledge of the former direct perception is retained in the permanent perceiving Self, which is revived in the later experience of remembrance).

सत्यप्यात्मनि दृङ्नाशात्तद्द्वारा दृष्टवस्तुषु ।
स्मृतिः केनाथ यत्रैवानुभवस्तत्पदैव सा ॥ ४ ॥

योजना :— (अत्र सिद्धान्तिनं पूर्वपक्षवादी पृच्छति) आत्मनि सति अपि, दृग् (अनुभवः) नाशात् तद् (अनुभव) द्वारा दृष्टवस्तुषु केन स्मृतिः भवति ? अथ यत्रैव (विषये) अनुभवः तत्पदैव सा (स्मृतिः) [1] ।

(The Saugata replies the Śaivātma-vādin :—) Even if there exists a permanent Self, the direct preception having ceased to exist, how can there arise memory of things, experienced through that (preception)? (The Saugata himself gives the reason for the rise of memory :) He says, remembrance depends upon (refers to) the same thing (as its object) that was the object of the former direct perception. (For this reason, the Saugata thinks that, although the direct perception of the former time does not exist at the time of the later remembrance, it can still be the object of the remembrance *(asato-'rthānubhavasya viṣayena sā viṣaya-vatī)*, as such there is no need of assuming the existence of *Ātman*.

K 4–1. बोधात्मनि सत्यप्यात्मनि अर्थाभासनाशात्...सा स्मृति निर्विषयैवेति *Pvṛ*
Even if there exists Self, the essential nature of which is knowledge, but the former preception together with its object is absent in *smṛti*. Hence, in the absence of the object, *smṛti* also cannot arise. The Saugata replies here, *smṛti* can have as its object that which was the object of the former direct perception, though it is not existing then; ("असतोऽर्थानुभवस्यविषयेण सा विषयवती").

यतो हि पूर्वानुभव–संस्कारात् स्मृति–सम्भवः ।
यद्येवमन्तर्गडुना को ऽर्थः स्यात्स्थायिनात्मना ।। ५ ।।

योजना :–यतः[1] (यस्मात्कारणात्) पूर्वानुभव–संस्कारात् स्मृति–सम्भवः (तस्मात तद्विषय एव स्मृतेर्विषयः)[2]; यदि एवं, स्थायिनात्मा अन्तर्गडुना को ऽर्थः स्यात्?[3,4]

(Ātma-vādin questions here, "how can remembrance claim to have the same thing as its object that was the object of the former direct perception, which is not existing at the time of remembrance[1] ? The Saugata says :-) It is because the rise of memory is due to residual traces of the former direct. perception. (*pūrvānubhava smskāra*)[2] . (The Saugata, therefore, concludes :) If it be so, what is the use of a permanent Self, which is a superfluous entity (thing)[3] ?

ततो भिन्नेषु धर्मेषु तत्स्वरूपाविशेषतः ।
संस्कारात्स्मृतिसिद्धौ स्यात्स्मर्ता द्रष्टेव कल्पितः ।। ६ ।।

योजना :—(संस्कारः गुणत्वाद् आश्रयमपेक्षते, य आश्रयः स कात्मा) (सुख–दुःख–ज्ञानसंस्कारादि) धर्मेषु ततः (आत्मनः) भिन्नेषु, तत् (आत्म)-स्वरूप–अविशेषतः संस्कारात् स्मृति सिद्धौ, स्मर्ता द्रष्टा इव कल्पितः स्यात् ।[1]

(The Saivātma-vādin objects to this point : He thinks that residual trace is a quality and, therefore, needs a substratum. That substratum is the Self. The Saugata replies to this objection :)

K 5–1. कथं सा नष्टस्य अनुभवस्य विषयेण विषयवती इत्यत्र हेतुमाह । *Pv 29 Fn*
2. अनुभवात्संस्कारः संस्काराच्च स्मृतिर्जायमाना तं पूर्वानुभवमनुकुर्वन्त्यवगाहितविषयं तमनुभवम् अवभासयति । *Pvṛ*
3. अनुपयोगिना आत्मस्थैर्येण किम् । *Ib.*
What will the permanance of *Ātman* do here, which is useless ?
4. संस्कारस्यात्मवादे ऽप्यङ्गीकरणात्तेनैव च सिद्धेः (स्मृतेः)

K 6–1. सुखदुःख-ज्ञानादि भिन्न—धर्माश्रयत्वेनाप्यात्मनो नोपयोगो भिन्नैरसंभिन्नस्यानुपजातविशेषस्य स्मृतावव्यापृतेः । *Pvṛ*

Ātman is supposed by the Ātma-vādin to be the substratum of attributes or qualities (*dharmas*) like pleasure, pain, cognition, etc., including residual traces, yet it is unaffected by them. It can be concluded from this that a permanent Self has nothing to do with remembrance which functions by residual traces only. So it is useless to suppose the existence of a permanent Self.

Qualities (*dharmas*) (like pleasure, pain, cognition as well as the residual traces) are different from (the supposed) *Ātman* (Self), because the essential nature of that (*Ātman*) is admitted by Ātmavādin to remain unaffected by them (the residual traces and other qualities) (*tat-svarūpa-aviseśataḥ*). As remembrance is admitted to take place by residual traces only (without recourse to a permanent self as remember), so the rememberer is a mere fancy just like the perceiver.

ज्ञानं च चित्स्वरूपं चेत्तदनित्यं किमात्मवत् ।
अथापि जडमेतस्य कथमर्थप्रकाशता ॥ ७ ॥

योजना :—(आत्मनः ज्ञानशक्ति निराकरोति) ज्ञानं च चित्स्वरूपं चेत्, किं तद् आत्मवत् अनित्यम् ?[1] अथापि एतत् (ज्ञानं) जडम्, (ततः) एतस्य अर्थप्रकाशता कथं स्यात् ?

(After refuting the existence of a permanent Self, the Saugata now refutes its possession of powers of knowledge and action. He first enamines the power of knowledge :—)

The Saugata says, if the power of knowledge be admitted to be of the nature of sentiency (*citsvarūpam*), then is it transient like Self? But, if it is admitted to be insentient, how can it make the objects manifest?

K 7–1. तेन यथा आत्मा किमनित्यः, तथा ज्ञानमपि किमनित्यम्, उभयोरपि अनित्यताधर्मी ऽनुपपद्यमानत्वेन पर्यनुयोगमात्रम् इति । *Pv I 69 Fn*
तदपि कस्मात् न नित्यम् ? न च द्वयोर्नित्ययो कश्चित् संबन्धः, कार्यकारणभावो हि असौ, नान्यः, तत आत्मनो ज्ञानं शक्तिर्–इति अवसन्नम् अदः । *Pv I, 69*
चित्स्वाभाव्ये ज्ञानस्य...आत्मन इव नित्यतादिप्रसंङ्गः । *Pvs*
This line also implies that both *Ātman* and knowledge (*Jñānam)* (both of them being *citsvarūpa*) will be admitted as two separate permanent entities, in that case, it is not possible to assign one (*Jñāna-śakti)* as a quality to the other (*Ātman*).

अथार्थस्य यथारूपं धत्ते बुद्धिस्तथात्मनः।
चैतन्यमजडा सैवं जाड्ये नार्थप्रकाशता ॥ ८ ॥

योजना :— जडोऽपि एतत् (ज्ञानम्) इत्थं (सांख्यमत–अनुसारेण) अर्थस्य प्रकाशो भविष्यति—इति।

अथ बुद्धि यथा अर्थस्य रूपं (प्रतिबिम्बत्वेन) धत्ते, तथा आत्मनः चैतन्यम् (अपि धत्ते) (तस्मात् बुद्धिरेव स्वच्छत्वात्प्रकाशप्रतिबिम्बमपि परिग्रह्णाति), एवं सा अजडा[1] सा (बुद्धिः) (अर्थचित्प्रतिबिम्बद्वयग्रहणेऽपि) जडैव, (बुद्धिः) जाड्ये न अर्थ-प्रकाशता (भवितुम् अर्हति)[2]।

'अथ' प्रश्ने, बुद्धिर्यथा बहिरर्थस्य रूपं धत्ते–प्रतिबिम्बत्वेन गृह्णाति, तथा अन्तः आत्मनः–भोक्तुः, चैतन्यम्–स्वरूपभूतां चेतनताम्, धत्ते, तथा च जडत्वेऽपि तस्या अर्थप्रकाशनं युक्तमेवेति भावः। *Bh I, 109*

(In the first case, the view point of the Bauddha is established: *viz.* that both Ātman and the power of knowledge are transient; the second case can be considered according to the view of the Sāṅkhya theory, that is to say that knowledge, though insentient in itself, yet illumines the external objects as follows :—)

If it be said that *Buddhi* assumes the sentiency of the Self exactly as it does the form of external object (as a reflection). (Because of its crystalline purity, it can receive the reflection of the self-luminous Self also.)

K 8–1. ज्ञानं बुद्धिः सा जडापि यथा विषयरूपच्छायां धत्ते तथात्मनोऽपि चैतन्य–च्छायामतोऽसावर्थप्रकाशः, तथा च तस्या चित्स्वरूपता स्यात्। *Pvr*

2. Another idea which seems to be in the mind of the teacher, is that insentient *Buddhi* can have no capacity to manifest objects, even if it receives the reflection of *Caitanya* from *Ātman*, just as a mirror receiving reflection of the flames of a burning fire, cannot have the capacity to burn. So in that case also we shall have to admit that *Buddhi* is itself sentient by nature, not that it is so because of the reflection of *Caitanya* of *Ātman*. *Buddhi* is to be admitted as sentient; otherwise how can it manifest objects?
अथ तत्प्रतिबिम्बेऽपि न तद्रूपापत्तिः, अग्निप्रतिबिम्बेऽपि दर्पणस्य दाहकत्वादृष्टेः। तर्हि सा बुद्धिः अर्थचित्प्रतिबिम्बद्वयग्रहणे ऽपि जड़ैव। तत् स एव दोषो विषयव्यवस्था ततः कथम् इति सूत्रार्थः। *Pvi I, 78 Fn*

(But even the theory of reflection does not alter the Saugata's view against the permanence of Self. He thinks that it is not possible for *Buddhi* to receive reflection of sentiency from a source (Self) whose existence is not proved. With this idea in his mind he says :—)

Thus, the *Buddhi* shall have to be admitted itself as sentient, for in an insentient thing there cannot be the capacity of making the objects manifest *(Jādye nārtha-prakāśatā)*.

क्रियाप्यर्थस्य कायादेस्तत्तद्देशादिजातता ।
नान्या ऽदृष्टेर्न साप्येका क्रमिकैकस्योवो चोचिता ॥ ९ ॥

योजना:— क्रिया अपि कायादेर् अर्थस्य, तत् तद्देशादि–जातता, न अन्या, अदृष्टे: (प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामनुपलब्धे:[1]) । सा एका क्रमिका अपि च न एकस्य उचिता[2] ।

क्रियापि कर्त्री कायादेरर्थस्य, आदिशब्देन परिणामादि क्रियाविषयस्य, दुग्धादेर्ग्रहणम्, तेन कायदुग्धादे: पदार्थस्य ते ते च ते देशादय: तेषु जातता–तद्वैशिष्ट्यकृतोऽन्य: प्रादुर्भावो भवति, नवीनो न भवति। कुत: ? अदृष्टे: प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामनुपलब्धेरिति। *Bha I, 114*

(Having examined the power of knowledge (*jñāna*), the Saugata now examines the power of action :)

Action also belongs to objects like body, etc., as it appears to be produced, as it were, from them (objects) in their association with different places, times and forms. For, nothing else is perceived.

The view that it (action) is one and successive and belongs to one (agent) is not also sound.

K 9–1. केवलं गमनपरिणामादिरूपा सा क्रिया, कायादीनां तु तत्तद्भिन्नदेशकालगता–पूर्वसत्तामात्रमेतदतिरिक्तस्यान्यस्यानुपलम्भात् । *Pvṛ*
एवं तद्देशतया तत्कालतया तदाकारतया च भाव एव भाति । *Pv I, 81*
2. नापि कालक्रमव्यापी चैकस्वभावश्च तस्या आश्रयो युक्त: । *Pvṛ*
अनेककाल–स्पृक्त्वं हि क्रमिकता, एकश्च तत्कालो ऽतत्कालश्च-इति कथं स्याद् इति । *Pv I, 83 Fn*

तत्र तत्र स्थिते तत्तद्भवतीत्येव दृश्यते।
नान्यन्नान्योऽस्ति संबन्धः कार्यकारणभावतः ॥ १० ॥

योंजनां :— तत्र तत्र स्थिते तत् तद् भवति इति एव दृश्यते न अन्यत् (क्रिया)। कार्यकारणभावतः अन्यः संबन्धः नास्ति [1]।

तत्र तत्र–तस्मिन् तस्मिन् मृतपिंडादिरूपे भावक्षणे सति, तत्तत्–स्तूपकादिरूपः स स भावक्षणोऽस्ति, इत्येव–एतावन्मात्रमेव दृश्यते, अन्यत् – अतो व्यतिरिक्तं कार्यकारणरूपं किंचिन्न दृश्यते। ननु कार्यकारणभावव्यतिरिक्तो ऽन्यः कोऽपि संबन्धो भवतुव, इत्यत आह "नान्योस्ति" इति, कार्यकारण भावतो ऽन्यः संबन्धो नास्ति तस्यायुक्तत्वादिति भावः) *Bh. I, 117*

(Having thus examined both, the power of knowledge and power of action, the Saugata now refutes the relation that may be supposed to exist between them and the Self (*Ātman*), so that by attributing these two powers to him, he may be said to be omniscient (*sarvajña*) and omnipotent (*sarva-kartā*).

Only this much is perceived that certain things exist before and the other things come into being later. (According to the Saugata's view) there is no relation other than that of cause and effect (The Saugata means to say that even this relation cannot exist between Knowledge or Action and the Self for the apparent reasons).[2]

K 10–1, पूर्वस्मिन् सति परस्य सत्तेत्येतावन्मात्रे ऽनुभवः, क्रियावच्च न क्रियाकारकादिसंबन्धः कश्चिद्भिन्नस्यास्यानुपलम्भात् कार्यकारणभावादृते नान्यद्वस्तूनां ज्ञातेयम्। *Pvr*

न च ज्ञानक्रियाभ्यां सह आत्मनः कार्यकारणभावः आत्मनस्तत्कार्यत्वाभावात् ज्ञानस्य च स्वसामग्रीकार्यत्वात्, क्रियायाश्च अभावात्,–इति न ज्ञानक्रियासंबन्धो यतो ज्ञातृत्व–कर्तृत्वे स्याताम्। *Pv I, 86*

The commentator gives the following reasons regarding the absence of any relation between knowledge or action and the Self :—

1. Because, the Self (*Ātman*) cannot be spoken of as the effect of knowledge or action;
2. Because, the knowledge is the effect of things necessary for its rise; and—
3. Because, there is no separate thing called action. *Bh III, 30.*

द्विष्ठस्यानेकरूपत्वात्सिद्धस्यान्यानपेक्षणात् ।
पारतन्त्र्याद्ययोगाच्च तेन कर्तापि कल्पितः ॥ ११ ॥

योजना :— (संबन्धः) द्विष्ठः (द्वि–स्थः), (स) अनेकरूपत्वात् (न चैकेनात्मना उभयत्र स्थितियुक्ता); सिद्धस्य अन्य अनपेक्षणात् (न च द्वयोः सिद्धयोरन्योऽन्यापेक्षा). पारतन्त्रादि–योग्रगाच्च (नापि स्वात्ममात्रनिष्ठयोः पारतन्त्र्यसंबन्धः), तेन कर्तोपि कल्पितः (ततो यथा ज्ञातृत्वं कल्पितं तथा कंतृत्वम्–अपि इति, कथम् आत्मा सर्वेश्वर इति[1]

Having thus refuted the arguments in support of the relation that may be supposed to exist between the powers of knowledge and action and the Self, the Saugata now argues against it in general as well as in special terms.

As a rule, relationship refers to two things (*dve-sthaḥ*). And that which exists in two must have multiplicity of forms (*aneka-rūpaḥ*). (It is not right to think that one *Ātman* is connected with both in relation). An established thing (*i.e.* a thing having independent existence-*siddha*) does not need another (*anyonyāpekṣā*). Nor is it related to another by relation of dependence (*pāratantrya*). Therefore, just as knower is a mere supposition and not real, so is actor also.



K 11-1. Explained according to *Pvṛ*

See, Kaw, R. K., *The Doctrine of Recognition*, pp 107ff 115ff (for Ah, I. i) and pp 123ff (for Ah. I, ii)

परदर्शनानुपपत्तिः (प्रत्यभिज्ञाकारिकायां ज्ञानाधिकारे तृतीयमाह्निकम्)

The refutation of the prima facie view –Permananance of Self (Ātman) established :-

The Śaivātma-vādin refutes the Saugata's reasoning against the doctrine that there exists a permanent subject (Self) :-

सत्यं किन्तु स्मृतिर्ज्ञानं पूर्वानुभवसंस्कृतेः ।
जातमप्यात्मनिष्ठं तन्नाद्यानुभववेदकम् ॥१॥

योजना :— सत्यम्[1], किन्तु स्मृतिर्ज्ञानं पूर्वानुभवसंस्कृतेः जातम् अपि, आत्मनिष्ठम्, आदि अनुभव-वेदकं तत् न (भवति)[2] ॥

The Śaivātma-vādin says,–True (satyam) (I quite agree with certain points stated in the *prima facie*). Although, it may be admitted, that remembrance arises out of the residual trace of the former perception (*pūrvānubhava-saṁskṛteḥ jātam-api*), yet, being self-confined (*ātma-niṣṭhaṁ* —i.e., resting in itself) as every cognitive experience is, it cannot ma[ke] the former perception known (*ādi-anubhava-vedakam tat na bhavati*), [that] is to say, remembrance has no scope to cognise directly the [former] perception).

The Saugata questions with regard to this point. He [says, if] remembrance originates from residual trace, it will have to [be admitted] that remembrance has the former perception also as its obje[ct and] has direct cognition of the former experience. To this point the [Śaivātma-] vadin says :-

दृक्स्वाभासैव नान्येन वेद्या रूपदृशेव दृक् ।
रसे संस्कारजत्वं तु तत्तुल्यत्वं न तद्गतिः ॥२॥

K 1—1. पूर्वपक्षमध्यात् मया तावत् बहु अङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । Pv

2. पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारप्रबोधजापि स्मृतिरात्ममात्रनिष्ठत्वात्स्वरूपसंवेदिकैव न तु पूर्वानुभवावेशाभावात्पूर्वानुभतार्थव्यवस्थापिका घटते । Pvr

योजना :— [1] दृक् (ज्ञानम्) स्व-आभासा एव[2] (स्वप्रकाशा एव भवति); अन्येन वेद्या: न (भवति)[3], (का इव ?) रूप-दृशा रसे दृक् इव[4] (यथा रसे दृक् रूपदृशा वेद्या न भवति तथा); (स्मृतेः पूर्वानुभव) संस्कारजत्वं तु तत्तुल्यत्वं[5] (पूर्वानुभव तुल्यत्वम् भवति); न तु तद्गतिः[6] (पूर्वानुभव अवगतिः न भवति) ।।

Perception is self-luminous (*dṛk-svābhāsaiva*), it cannot be the object of any other experience, say remembrance, (*nānyena-vedyā*) just as the perception of colour cannot be the object of the perception of taste (*rūpa-dṛśeva dṛk rase*) The fact that remembrance arises from residual trace only makes it similar to the former perception (i.e., direct experience) in respect of having the same object (*tat tulyatvam*), but the former perception does not come within the range of remembrance (*na tad-gatiḥ*). In remembranee there is no direct cognition of the former perception (*na tad-avagatiḥ*). In fact, the former perception does not shine in remembrance, i.e., the experience of former perception does not recur in the later remembrance, but the latter has only the similarity or likeness of the former (*tat sādṛśya-mātram*).

N. B.—Bhāskari text reads 'सस्कारजत्वे' in place of 'संस्कारजत्वं' as in *KSTS* and *Pvr*. In this commentary, the *Kārikā* reads "····संस्कारजत्वे तु तत्तुल्यत्वं न तद्गतिः" and it is explained as follows :-

संस्कारजत्वे तु तत्तुल्यत्वं भवति, तद्गतिः—पूर्वानुभवावगमस्तु न भवति, अथ च तद्गतिः—तत्तुल्यत्वावगमोपि न भवति इति ।। *Bha I, 130*

K2— 1. ननु मा भूत् परविषयस्य स्वीकारो, यस्तु संस्कार-महिमोपनतोऽध्यात्मसिद्धश्च मम अनुभवोऽभवत्—इति स्मृतावनुभवस्य अवभासः स किं नाङ्गीक्रियते-इत्याशङ्क्य् तन्निराकरणहेतुतया दृगिति सूत्रम्········ (*Pv I, 93 Fn*)

2. सर्वा हि ज्ञप्तिः स्वसंवेदनैकरूपा, *Pvr*, स्वप्रकाशत्वं ज्ञानस्य भण्यते, *Pv I, 95*

3. नान्यसंवित्संवेद्या *Pvr*

4. रूपरसज्ञानयोरन्योन्यसंवेदने-अन्योन्यविषयवेदनमपि स्यात्ततश्चेन्द्रियनियमाभावः । *Pvr*

5 पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारजत्वेन तत्सादृश्यमात्रं । *Pvr*

6. न तु पूर्वानुभवावगतिः तदभावात् तत्सादृश्यमपि नावसेयम् । *Pvr*

The Saugata now urges the following view against the objection of the Śaivātma-vādin :-

अथातद्विषयत्वेऽपि स्मृतेस्तदवसायतः ।
दृष्टालम्बनता भ्रान्त्या तदेतदसमञ्जसम् ॥३॥

योजना :— अथ स्मृतेः अतद्-विषयत्वे (पूर्वानुभव तद्विषय असत्त्वे, अथवा, पूर्वानुभव तद्विषयानवगमत्वे, अथवा, न तावनुभवतद्विषयौ विषयो यस्याः स्मृतेः) अपि, तद् (पूर्वानुभव तद्विषयस्य च) अवसायतः (अध्यवसायतः, अर्थात्, निश्चयात्) स्मृतेः दृष्टालम्बनता (अनुभुवाश्रयत्वम्, अर्थात्, दृष्टविषया) भ्रान्त्या[1], तत् एतद् असमञ्जसम् (युक्तियुक्त न भवति)।

The Saugata says :- Although remembrance does not have the former perception or its object as its object, (*a-tat-viśayatve api*), yet, since *smṛti* (remembrance) has the knowledge of both, the perception and its object, (*tad-avasāyataḥ*), it must, therefore, be admitted to be resting upon them illusively (dṛṣṭālambanatā bhrāntya). (Saugata thinks, it is because that remembrance, being a form (process) of determinate knowledge (*vikalpa-rūpā*), cognises the invisible past perception and its object, and, therefore, it must be of illusive nature. Since there is neither the former perception nor its object as the object of remembrance, yet, there being the consciousness of both, this must be due to *smṛti* being illusive in nature)

The Śaivātma-vādin refutes the Saugata's view :- (He says,) This view is quite incongruous (*tad-etad-asmanjasam*).

The Śaivātma-vādin contradicts the Saugata view :-

स्मृतितैव कथं तावद्भ्रान्तेश्चार्थस्थितिः कथम् ।
पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारापेक्षा च किमितीष्यते ॥४॥

K 3— 1. न चापि भ्रान्त्या पूर्वानुभवं तद्विषयं शुक्तौ रजतमिवासंवेद्यमानमध्यवस्यतीति स्मृतिस्तद्विषया । *Pvṛ*

यावता स्मृतिर्विकल्परूपत्वात् केवलमप्रकाशमानमेव अनुभवं तद्विषयं च अध्यवस्यति, तत् इयं भ्रान्ति-स्वभावा,......*Pv I 97-98*

न तद्दर्शनं नापि तद्विषयः स्मृतेर्विषयः, तथापि तु उभयम् अध्यवसीयते, भ्रमरूपतया स्मतेः । *Pv I, 98*

योजना :— (स्मृतिः) भ्रान्तेः तावत्, स्मृतितैव कथम् ? अर्थस्थितिः च कथम्[1] ? पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारापेक्षा च किम् इति इष्यते ?

If it is thought to be an illusion (*bhrānte*), how can it have the essential nature of remembrance (*smṛtitaiva katham*) ? How can the order of real objects be established on the basis of illusion (*arthasthitiḥ katham*) ? Moreover, why should it be supposed to depend upon residual trace, left by the former perception (*pūrvānubhava-saṁskārāpekṣa ca kim itīṣyate*) ?

As to the point said by the Saugata that there is similarity between remembrance and the former perception, since both, the former perception and its object, are determinately cognised by remembrance, and this similarity is due to residual trace, the Śaivātma-vādin states that the use of the word 'similarity' in this connection has no significance. He, therefore, argues :-

भ्रान्तित्वे चावसायस्य न जडाद्विषयस्थितिः ।
ततोऽजाड्ये निजोल्लेख-निष्ठान्नार्थस्थितिस्ततः ॥५॥

योजना :— (स्मृतिः) अवसायस्य भ्रान्तित्वे[1] च (अत एव जडस्वभावत्वे), जडाद् विषयस्थितिः न[2] (भवति), ततः (तद्) अजाड्ये, निज-उल्लेखनिष्ठात् (निजं स्वसंवेदनम् 'उल्लेखश्च' स्वाकारः इति-ईयति एषा परिनिष्ठता-नियता-अवसानं गता स्मृतिः), ततः (स्मृत्यध्यवसायात्) अर्थस्थितिः न[3] (विषयस्य व्यवस्थापनं न भवति) ।

If the knowlenge of remembrance be supposed to be illusive in its nature and, therefore, lacking sentiency or self-luminosity (*avasāyasya bhrāntitve ca*), it cannot manifest (establish) the real objects (*jaḍad viśayasthitiḥ na*).

K 4— 1. पूर्वानुभवाप्रकाशात्तद्विषयसंप्रमोषेऽध्यवसायमात्रात्स्मृतित्वं न युक्तम् । *Pvr*

अनुभूतस्य विषयस्य असंप्रमोषः कंचित् कालं मध्ये मुषितस्येव न पूर्णः प्रमोषोऽपहारः पुनः प्रकाशनेन लाभादिति स्मृतेः मुख्यं रूप, येन ज्ञानान्तरेभ्योऽस्या विशेषः, तदेव पूर्वसूत्रार्थेन उन्मूल्यते अनुभवो न प्रकाशते तद्विषयोऽपि नैव प्रकाशते अपितु सम्यक् प्रकर्षेण मुषित इवासौ जातः इति । *Pv I*, 100 *Fn*

न च अनुभवेन विषयप्रकाशनात्मना स्मृत्यभिधानाया भ्रान्तेः किंचिदपि सादृश्यम अस्ति । *Pv I*, 100

Even though it be accepted to be self-luminous, sentient. (*ajaḍa*), yet its self-luminosity being confined to illuminating (making manifest) itself (*nijollekha-niṣṭhāt*), it cannot establish the order of external objects (*tataḥ arthasthitiḥ na*).

The Saugata might think, that part of remembrance which refers to the indeterminate cognition (consciousness) of itself is not illusive in nature, on the other hand, that part of it which refers to the determinate cognition of object in contradistinction to indeterminate cognition of itself, involves illusiveness. Hence, remembrance is an error and, so, non-luminous (*jaḍa*) in relation to its object. On this point the Śaivātma-vādin thinks that whether we take into consideration that aspect of remembrance which refers to the determinate cognition of the objects (being *jaḍa*) or the other aspect of remembrance which pertains to the indeterminate cognition of itself (which is confined to illuminating itself), it cannot, in any case, manifest (or establish) the order of real external objects.

The Śaivātma-vādin arrives now at his own point of view. From the above discussion, it is evident that even though we may agree with the Saugata that there remains the residual trace (*saṁskāra*) of the former perception, yet remembrance cannot originate from it, for, then all kinds of cognitions (*jñānāni*) will be dissociated from one another. The established order of the world depends upon the unification of cognitions of all kinds, which figure in remembrance in association with one another. So remembrance is indispensable to practical life. Even the direct perception of Self 'I' is impossible without remembrance of one's conventional self which depends upon the unification of the conscious-

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K 5— 1. इह स्मृतेः......स्वसंवेदानांशे (इदमिति निर्विकल्पांशे – *Fn*) प्रकाशमाने न भ्रान्तिता, तत्र वैपरीत्याभावात्, यस्तु तत्र अध्यवसीयते स्वाकारः स विपरीततया अस्वाकारत्वेन अर्थतया,—इति तत्र अंशे भ्रान्तिता *Pv I*, 102

2. अध्यवसाय एव भ्रान्त्या विषयव्यवस्थापको न तु संवित्, स च जडः कथमर्थव्यवस्थाया हेतुः । *Pvr*

3. अथ तु तम् अवसायरूपं स्वसंवेदनांशं स्वाकारं वा अवलम्ब्य अजडत्वम् अस्याः, एवमपि......कथं विषयस्य व्यवस्थापनं व्यवहार्यत्वसंपादन-सामर्थ्यम् ? *Pv I*, 102

ness of the former and the later states of consciousness. If we are to believe as the Saugata states that all cognitions are self-luminous but they mutually differ and do not know one another, then they will be like dumb and deaf and hence insentient in relation to one another. So the teacher states his point of view in the following two concluding verses of this *Ahnika* :-

एवमन्योन्यभिन्नानामपरस्परवेदिनाम् ।
ज्ञानानामनुसंधान-जन्मा नश्येज्जनस्थितिः ।।६।।

न चेदन्तः कृतानन्त विश्वरूपो महेश्वरः ।
स्यादेकश्चिद्वपुर्ज्ञान-स्मृत्यपोहन-शक्तिमान् ।।७।।

योजना :— एवम् अन्योन्यभिन्नानाम् अपस्परवेदिनाम् ज्ञानानाम् अनुसंधान-जन्मा[1] जनस्थितिः नश्येत्[2], अन्तःकृत-अनन्तविश्वरूपः चिद्वपुः ज्ञान-स्मृति-अपोहन-शक्तिमान् एकः महेश्वरः न चेत् स्यात्[3]।।

The teacher says :- All human transactions originate from the unification of various kinds of cognitions (like, perception, remembrance, etc.) (*jñānānām-anusandhāna janmā*), although they mutually differ (***anyonya-bhinānām***) and cannot know one another (aparaspara-vedinām) ;

if we deny the existence of One great Lord, a permanent subject, the Self of all, (*ekaḥ maheśvaraḥ na cet syāt*), who is essentially of sentient nature (*cid-vapuḥ*), who holds within Himself the whole form (manifestation) of this infinite universe (viz., the innumerable objects of the world) (*antaḥ kṛta-ananta viśvarūpaḥ*), and who possesses the powers of cognition, remembrance and differentiation (*jñāna-smṛti-apohana-śaktimān*), all this human transaction will come to an end (*janasthitiḥ naśyet*).

K6, 7— 1. 'जनस्य' लोकस्य या काचन 'स्थितिः' व्यवहारः सा सर्वज्ञानानां यत् 'अनुसंधानं'—एक-विषय-भावोपपन्नस्मृतिताप्राप्तिरूपं, तत्र आयत्ता। तथा हि-स्मरणनिबन्धनः सर्वोव्यवहारः। *Pv I, 103, 104*

2. ज्ञानानि स्वात्ममात्र-परिनिष्ठितानि स्वसंविद्रूपतया नापरसंवेद्यानि तेषामन्योन्यविषयसंघटनामयः ···लोकव्यबहारः कथम्। *Pvr*, 6

3. चित्तत्त्वमेव विश्वरूपमतोऽतिरिक्तस्यानुपपत्तेः। अशेषपदार्थज्ञानानामन्योन्यानुसंधानमस्यैव ज्ञानादिकाः शक्तयः। *Pvr*. 7

It is an established fact that there exists one eternal Supreme Lord (*Maheśvara*), the Self (*samvid*) that is the basis of unification of all kinds of cognitions, and that includes the whole objective world within itself, the world comprising sentient and insentient beings. It is, therefore, implied that this *samvid* is not only the Supreme Consciousness but is also the Ultimate Substance, *Prima Materia* of all things:

अतोऽर्थप्रकाशरूपां संविदम् इच्छता बलादेव अर्थोऽपि तद्रूपान्तर्गत एव अङ्गीकर्तव्यः। *Pv I, 107.*

Abhinavagupta explicitly refutes the doctrine of Vijñāna-vādins and some Vedāntins that the Supreme Being is of the nature of consciousness (*cit, vijñāna*) only. The Pratyabhijñā holds that this One great Lord (*Maheśvara*), who is essentially of sentient nature (*cid-vapuḥ*), *samvid*, contains within Himself the endless objective world (antaḥ-kṛtānanta-*viśva-rūpaḥ*). Being of such nature He is the Universal Substratum, the source of all the material objects. The objects are, as it were, heaped in it (*vedya-rāsiḥ tena krodīkṛtaḥ*), or are merged in it :

अत एक एव असौ,—इति एकत्वात् सर्वो वेद्यराशिः तेन क्रोडीकृतः,—इत्येतदपि अनिच्छता अङ्गीकार्यम्। *Ibid.*

He, in whom indwell all the objects, as identical with it, isolates some objects and makes them manifest, emerged, as it were, from the ocean of light (*prakāśa*), by the sovereignty of His will. This is called His power of Knowledge (*Jñāna-Śakti*) :

अतः स्वरूपान्तर्ब्रुडितम् अर्थराशिम् अपरमपि भिन्नाकारम् आत्मनि परिगृह्य, कंचिदेव अर्थ-स्वरूपात् उन्मग्नम् आभासयति......सैषा ज्ञान-शक्तिः। *Pv I; 107, 108.*

When the consciousness pertaining to some particular object has once been manifested in the form of its perception and, on some later occasion, it is revived in the form of the idea recalled, His another power comes into play which is called the power of Remembrance (*Smaraṇa-Śakti*) :

तेन क्वचित् आभासे गृहीतपूर्वे यत् संवेदनं बहिर्मुखम् अभूत्, तस्य यत् अन्तर्मुखं चित्स्वरूपत्वं तत् कालान्तरेऽपि अवस्थास्नु स्वात्मगतं तद्विषयविशेषे बहिर्मुखत्वं परामृशति, इति एषा स्मृति-शक्तिः। *Pv I, 109.*

In this process nothing new is manifested, but the things, ever existing in the ocean of consciousness, emerge from it :

नवं न किंचित् आभासितं स्मृतं वा स्यात्। *Ibid*.
उन्मग्नाभाससंभिन्नं च चित्स्वरूपं बहिर्मुखत्वात् तच्छायानुरागात नवं नवं ज्ञानमुक्तम्। Pv *I*. *108, 109*.

That power, which isolates the manifestation of some particular object from the Supreme Consciousness, in which all the objects are devoid of any distinction that is caused by their association with time, place and form, and makes it distinct from the rest in the form of determinate cognition (*vikalpa-rūpa vijñāna*) owing to an impression of some past experience (*vāsanā mātra*) roused by varying nature of His will (*vicitreccha-prabodhitā*), is called His power of Differentiation (*Apohana-Śakti*):

एष एव परितश्छेदनात् परिच्छद उच्यते, तदवभासनसामर्थ्यम् अपोहनशक्तिः। Pv *I*, *110*
देशकालविशेषावच्छेदशून्यत्वेन विचित्रेच्छाप्रबोधितावभास-भेदवासनामात्रोपपादित-विकल्प-रूपविज्ञाना अपोहन-शक्तिः। *Ibid*., *71 Fn*

All the worldly transactions are performed by this triad of powers.
अनेन शक्तित्रयेण विश्वे व्यवहाराः। *Ibid*.

It is that Self, who directly perceives (*janati*), remembers (*smarti*) and determinately cognises (*vikalpayati*) through the various limited subjects.
स एव हि तेन तेन वपुषा जानाति, स्मरति विकल्पयति च। Pv *I*, *111*.

And innumerable and varied are the ways in which the powers of Knowledge, Remembrance and Differentiation function.
एतासां च ज्ञानादिशक्तीनाम् असंख्यप्रकारो वैचित्र्यविकल्पः। *Ibid*.

This function of His powers, in variety of ways, is called His *Svātantrya* (self-dependent power) (*tat samarthyam svatantryam*).*

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*See, Kaw, R. K., *The Doctrine of Recognition*, pp 131ff.

Ah. I, iv

स्मृतिशक्तिनिरूपणम् (प्रत्यभिज्ञाकारिकायां ज्ञानाधिकारे चतुर्थमाह्निकम्)

Power of Rememberance :-

It has been proved, in Ah. I, iii, that the Self (*Ātman*) is a permanent being, who is endowed with the powers of Remembrance, Knowledge aud Differentiation. In the actual order of conscious activity, the power of knowledge (*Jñāna-Śakti*) precedes the power of Remembrance (*Smaraṇa-Śakti*), and the power of Differentiation (*Apohana-Śakti*) is antecedent to the both and is their very essence. Remembrance is already introduced as an evidence in support of the existence of the Self as a permanent being, against the contrary view held by the Buddhist Saugata. In this *Ahnika*, the power of Remembrance (*smṛti-Śakti*) is first dealt with in a greater detail. Remembrance brings the various cognitions in association with one another and is the cause of all determinate knowledge. The Self (*Ātman*) is the substratum of remembrance (*smṛti*) and hence the rememberer (*smartā*). In the former experience (the direct perception), he receives its residual trace (*saṁskāra*) which subsequently causes the phenomenon of remembrance. *Smartā*, the remembering Self, is not the fleeting experience or the phenomenon of remembrance itself, but it is a permanent being behind the experience, who possesses the power of remembrance. Even without experiencing the phenomenon of remembrance, that being exists He is not only *Smartā* but has also so many other powers and lasts as a permanent being even in the absence of their functions. He is the common substratum or nucleus (*keṅdra*) of all these powers.

In the first Kārikā, it is explained how the Self functions in the experience of *smṛti* :-

स हि पूर्वानुभूतार्थोपलब्धा परतोऽपि सन् ।
विमृशन्स इति स्वैरी स्मृतीत्यपदिश्यते ॥१॥

योजना :— हि (यस्मात्), स्वैरी (स्वतन्त्रः) स परतः (स्मृतिकाले) अपि सन्, पूर्वानुभूतार्थ-उपलब्धा[1] (अनुभवितृतया) 'स' इति विमृशन् स्मरति[2] इति अपदिश्यते (कथ्यते) ।

हि यस्मात्, स पूर्वानुभूतार्थोपलब्धा परतोऽपि सन् अत एव 'स' इति विमृशन् 'स्मरति' इति......, कुतः ? स्वैरी-स्वतन्त्रः, न हि स्वतन्त्रस्य किमपि दुष्करम् ।
Bha I, 155.

The Self is free to recall (*svairī sa vimarśan*) in the state of remembrance (*smṛti-kāle*), the knowledge of the object perceived previously. Having perceived the object in the former experience (*pūrvānubhūtārtha-upalabdhā*), he recalls the same to memory at a later time (*parataḥ*) and determinately knows: 'it is that same object' (*sa iti vimṛśan smarati*). (It is because the Self exists in all the states, i.e., in past, present and future experiences as *samvid* (consciousness) that is not limited by time—*kāla-vichheda-śūnyaḥ*)

Now the question arises that *smṛti*, being *vikalpa* (determinate knowledge), cannot make the object manifest in its real nature. The direct experience which cognises the object in the past perception, becomes a matter of past time at the later time of remembrance. The subsequent remembrance cannot, therefore, make the former perception manifest, because one cognitive experience cannot be known by another (*jñānasya jñānāntarena asamvedyatvāt*), and because the former cognitive experience (direct perception) ceases to exist at the time of the later remembrance (*asattvācca*). Thus the knowledge, 'I remember this', is mere illusion, since the object is not manifest in remembrance. The teacher answers this objection as follows :-

भासयेच्च स्वकाले ऽर्थात्पूर्वाभासितमामृशन् ।
स्वलक्षणं घटाभासमात्रेणाथाखिलात्मना ।।२।।

योजना : - (स्वैरी स) अर्थात् (सामर्थ्यात्-स्मृत्यशक्त्या) पूर्वाभासितम् स्वलक्षणम्[1] (स्वाऽन्याऽननुयायि स्वरूपसंकोचभागि-लक्षणम्) आमृशन् स्वकाले (स्मरणकाले) घटाभासमात्रेण अथ अखिलात्मना (सर्वाभासमिश्रेण वपुषा) भासयेत् च[2] ।

K 1—1. 'पूर्वानुभूतस्य अर्थस्य' य 'उपलब्धा' अन्तर्मुखो बोधः.........'परतः' स्मृतिकालेऽपि अस्त्येव......'स्वैरी' स्वतन्त्रः स्मरति ..... *Pv I, 118*

2. पश्चादपि पूर्वानुभूतार्थानुभवितृतया पूर्वानुभूतार्थप्रकाशासंप्रमोषणं तस्यैकस्य विभोः कर्तुः स इत्यत्र पूर्वानुभूतत्वेन प्रत्यवमर्शः स्मृतिर्नाम व्यापारः
Pvr

The subject (*Ātman*) knows determinately (*āmṛśan*), by the power of remembrance (*arthāt—smṛtya-śaktyā*), that the object that was made manifest to him before, i.e., in the former experience (*pūrvābhāsitam*), becomes manifest again (*bhāsayet-ca*), at the subsequent time of remembrance (*sva-kāle—smaraṇa-kāle*), either as mere manifestation of itself (*svalakṣaṇam*), say as jar (*ghaṭā bhāsa-mātreṇa*), or as comprising the entire group of attributes (*akhilāt manā*).

The Self recollects, at the later time, the former manifestation (ābhāsa) of the object previously perceived, either in its indistinct form, or in the distinct form as unification of the manifestations of the object associated with time, place, etc., viz., the object becomes manifest along with all attributes of time, place and so on

By the expression '*svalakṣaṇam*', the teacher means that the manifestation of the object perceived in the past experience reappears, in the later remembrance, as a new manifestation, giving up its indeterminate universal character identical with the Supreme Consciousness and thus becoming limited (*saṁkucitaḥ*) in that state.

The expression '*akhilātmanā*' implies that the knowledge of the former perception and that of the later remembrance are unified in the later state.

The question arises, the expression '*svalakṣaṇam*' denotes that, in remembrance, the picture of the object comes by itself without recourse to the perception. Hence it may be observed that there is a clear difference in the formation of the two experiences, perception and remembrance, as in the former the object is present and in the latter the picture of the object occurs itself without recourse to the perception. The teacher replies this objection in the following Kārikā :-

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K 2—1. वेद्यांशस्पर्शी भूतकालो घटाभासस्य केवलस्य स्वालक्षण्यापत्तिहेतु दर्शित: । इयदेव स्मृते: अव्यभिचारि वपु., अर्थितातिशयात् तु स्फुटत्वम्...... *Pv I, 126*

2. स्मृत्यशक्त्या स इति पूर्वानुभूतं स्वलक्षणं परामृशन्नाभासयत्येवान्यथा प्रकाशितस्य परामर्शो न कृत: स्यात् स्वसत्ताकाल एव च तेन स्मरणकाले नष्टस्याप्याभासो न दुष्यति । कदाचित्त्वर्थितावशाद्घटकाञ्चनद्रव्यसत्ताद्यन्यतमैकाभासरूपेणैवास्या: स्फुटावभासोऽन्यदा तु (अखिलात्मना) सर्वात्मनार्थित्वेन तथवातिशयनिरन्तरावहितचेतसस्तु दृष्टार्थप्रत्यक्षीकार एव । Pvr

न च युक्तं स्मृतेर्भेदे स्मर्यमाणस्य भासनम् ।
तेनैक्यं भिन्नकालानां संविदां वेदितैष सः ॥३॥

योजना— स्मृतेर्भेदे (स्मृतिविषयस्य अर्थस्य स्मृतेः सकाशात् भेदे) स्मर्यमाणस्य (अर्थस्य) भासनं च न युक्तम्,[1] तेन भिन्नकालानां संविदाम् ऐक्यम्; एष सः (संविदाम् एकत्वलक्षणः प्रमाता) वेदिना (इति उक्तम्)[2] ।
एवमत्र संक्षेपः ।

स्मृतेः भेदे, अर्थात् स्मृतिविषयस्य अर्थस्य स्मृतेः सकाशाद् भेदे, इदन्ताग्रहणेन भेदे सति, स्मर्यमाणस्य भासनं न च युक्तं स्यात्, सोऽर्थः प्रकाशमान एव स्यान्न स्मर्यमाणः इति भावः, तेन-ततः, भिन्नकालानां संविदाम्—अनुभवस्मृत्यादि ज्ञानानाम्, ऐक्यं भवति, एककालत्वात् भिन्नकालस्याकिंचित्करत्वात् । तथा च प्रकाशमानत्वेऽपि स्मर्यमाणत्वमर्थस्य सिद्ध्यति इति भावः । ननु तथापि ग्रहीतुरभावात् कथं सिद्ध्यति इति अत आह 'वेदिता' इति । एष सः—उक्तम् ऐक्यमेव लक्षणया क्रियातद्वतोरैक्यात् योजकः ऐक्यग्रहीतैव वेदिता ग्रहीता भवति ।......

Bhā I, 166.

If we say that the object of remembrance, i.e., the past perception, is different from the knowledge of remembrance, then it is not proper for the former to shine (or recur) in *smṛti* (*smṛti-viṣayasya arthasya smṛteḥ bhede, smaryamānasya bhāsanam na ca yuktam*). We must, therefore, admit that there is unification of cognitions, associated with different times, i.e., the time of the former perception and that of the later remembrance (*tena bhinna-kālānām saṃvidām aikyam*) And, that subject is the knower of these cognitions (*veditā eṣa saḥ*).

K 3—1. स्मरणज्ञानात् भिन्नत्वेन बहीरूपतया यदि सोऽर्थो भासेत 'स्मर्यमाणस्य' च यत् 'भासनं' तदेव न स्यात् स्मर्यमाणमेव तत् न स्यात् ।

Pv I, 128

2. पूर्वानुभूतश्चार्थोऽनुभवेन सह तात्कालिकस्मृतिप्रकाशे ऽवभासमान; स्मृत्यभिन्न एव प्रकाशाद्भिन्नस्य प्रकाशमानतानुपपत्तेः । एवंचानुभव-स्मृत्यादिसंविदामैक्यं स एवात्मा वेदकः, तथाहि । *Pvr*

On this point, another objection is raised :- If the light of the object externally manifested by the later remembrance is not other than the former perception itself, why should we not simply say that the former experience is the object of remembrance ? What is the use of this odd and uncommon expression 'unification of cognitions' (*aikyena tu alaukikena ko-arthaḥ*) ? To this objection, the teacher explains as follows :-

नैव ह्यनुभवो भाति स्मृतौ पूर्वो ऽर्थवत्पृथक् ।
प्रागन्वभूवमहमित्यात्मारोहण-भासनात् ॥४॥

योजना— स्मृतौ पूर्वो अनुभवो अर्थवत् (अनुभूत अर्थवत्) पृथक् (-भूतो) नैव भाति हि, कस्मात् कारणात् ? 'प्राग् अन्वभूवम् अहम' इति (प्रत्ययस्य) आत्मा-आरोहण (आत्मनि विश्रमना, तेन हेतुना) भासनात् ॥

एवं दृष्टान्तद्वय योजना । हि—यस्मात्, स्मृतौ पूर्वः अनुभवः पृथक् नैव भाति, कथम् ? अर्थवत्—यथा प्राग् अर्थः पृथग् भाति स्म नैवमनुभवः इति । अत्रा-र्थानुभवगतस्य भानाभानरूपस्य विरुद्धधर्मद्वयस्य साधनात् वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तत्वम् इति एका योजना । अथ द्वितीया । स्मृतौ पूर्वोऽनुभवो न पृथग्भाति । कथम ? अर्थवत्—यथा प्राग् अर्थः स्मृतौ न पृथग् भाति तथा अनुभवोऽपि न भाति इति । अत्र च साधर्म्य दृष्टान्तत्वम्, न भानरूपस्य समानधर्मस्योभयत्र साधनात् ।
Bh I, 167.

It is not that the former perception shines separately in remembrance (*smṛtau purvo-anubhavo pṛthak naiva bhāti hi*), as the object (shines in perception) (*arthavat*). It shines as the knowledge (*pratyayaḥ*) expressed in words : 'I experienced it before', because it shines only as resorting to the subject, i.e , the knowledge of the past perception is carried to the later remembrance as resting in the Self (*prāg-anvabhūvam-aham iti-ātmarohanabhāsanāt*).

The self, experiencing the former perception and retaining in itself the knowledge of the same, persists in remembrance. In *smṛti* the object does not stand externally as in the perception, but the knowledge of the past perception (of the object) remains unified with the consciousness that persists from the previous experience to the later. In this manner the knowledge of various cognitions is unified in the lasting consciousness, the permanent Self.

A very important point is made here for discussion. Objection is raised to the point that the former experience (direct perception) does not shine apart from the subject in remembrance, as in perception the object shines separately. Even in perception, the object (jar) does not shine separately, exactly as perception does in remembrance. But, in reality, both of them do shine separately, according to their individual nature. In both the cases, it is a common point that, in one view, even the object does not shine separately in perception as perception does in remembrance; in another view, they (i.e., the object in perception as well as the perception in remembrance) do shine separately from the subject. This view is supported, by the opponent, with the evidence that the Yogins get insight into their own remote past and future experiences, as separate from their consciousness (*samvid*), so they do also the knowledge of others' minds. He says, as the experiences of others become the object of Yogin's knowledge, so his own remote past and future experiences may also be the object of his knowledge. The teacher explains this point as follows :-

योगिनामपि भासन्ते न दृशो दर्शनान्तरे ।
स्वसंविदेकमानास्ता भान्ति मेयपदे ऽपि वा ॥५॥

योजन— योगिनाम् अपि दर्शनान्तरं (परचित्तविषयो ज्ञानविशेषः) दृशः (परकीयाः दृशः) न भासन्ते, ता स्वसंविद् - एकमाना (स्वसंवित्-मात्रवेद्यस्वभावाः स्वात्मारूढा एव) भान्ति[1] ; मेयपदे (प्रमेयकक्षायाम्) अपि वा (स्वात्मारूढा एवाभासेरन्)[2] ।

Even in the particular kind of knowledge of Yogins, the experiences of others (*darśanāntaram*) do not become manifest as such (i.e., as others' experiences) (*yoginām parakīyāḥ dṛśaḥ na bhāsante*) ; but they

K 4—1. स्मृतौ स्मर्यमाणोऽनुभूतार्थो यथा पृथग्भूतो भाति न तथानुभवः स्वात्मन एवाहन्ताप्रत्येयस्यानुभवमयत्वेन प्रथनात्, यश्चानेककालोऽहंवेद्योऽर्थः स एवात्मा

Pv

'अहम्'—इत्येवं स्वभावो य 'आत्मा' पूर्वापरसंविदन्तर्मुखस्वभावः तत्र यत् 'आरोहणं' विश्रमः तेन हेतुना पूर्वसंविद्रूपतायाः स्वप्रकाशाया 'भासनात्' ... ...

Pv I, 132

shine as unified with their own Self (*ātam*), consciousness (*Samvid*) (*sva-samvid-ekamanaḥ*). Even at the level of objects, the experiences of others are one with the self-consciousness of the Yogin (*meya pade api vā*).

A Yogin in no case, has recourse to an object for getting the knowledge of his own remote experiences, past or future, or the knowledge of others' experiences. When a Yogin calls to his mind the knowledge of others' experiences, it is nothing but the part and parcel of his own self-consciousness, although he does not acquire this knowledge as a result of his direct cognition of others' experiences. Similarly, he gets the knowledge of his own remote past or future experiences or other subtleties of his life not apart (*pṛthak*) from his own self-consciousness. This unification of the knowledge of others' experiences with the Yogin's self-consciousness (*samvid*), as it were his own personal knowledge, shines as *prakāśa* or *bhānam* (effulgence) of his Self (soul). In all cases, viz. in the case of ordinary men as well as Yogins, the knowledge of the former experiences (perceptions) is unified in their Self, the lasting consciousness, not that the former experiences play the role of object in remembrance and, hence, stand apart from the rememberer (the Self). As a matter of fact the Self is the knower of different cognitions or experiences and has the power of recalling the knowledge of remote experiences, past as well as future, of himself as well as others.

It may be admitted, the opponent says, that, in certain exceptional cases, like Yogins, the former experience (perception) does not shine apart from the subject in remembrance, as it is resting on his self-consciousness (*aham-bhāva*), but in the case of common people, the cogni-

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K5— 1. सर्वज्ञानामपि प्रमात्रन्तरगतोपलम्भाः स्वसंविन्मात्रवेद्यस्वभावाः स्वात्मारूढा एवाभासेरन्...... *Pv*

'योगिनां' यत् एतत् 'दर्शनान्तरं' भावनाद्युद्भवः (भूतार्थभावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्तजः) परचित्तविषयो ज्ञानविशेषः, तत्र 'दृशः' इति उपलब्धयो (परकीयाः) न भान्ति (वेद्यतया) *Pv I, 135*

2. प्रमेयकक्ष्यायामपि घटादिवत्प्रातिस्विकेन बोधेनावभासेरन् यदि तथा सम्भवेत् । *Pvr*

tions are not unified in their self-consciousness; they resort to the objects perceived externally as denoted by the word "this". To this objection the teacher replies :-

स्मर्यते यद्दृगासीन्मे सैवमित्यपि भेदतः ।
तद्व्याकरणमेवास्या मया दृष्टमिति स्मृतेः ॥६॥

योजना— 'यत् दृग् मे आसीत्' इति (एतदेवमनुभवोऽसौ ममाभूदिति) सा एव दृग् (अनुभवो) एवम् भेदतः अपि स्मर्यते ; 'मया दृष्टम्' इति अस्या स्मृतेः तद्व्याकरणम् (व्याख्यानम्)[1] एव ।

The particular experience in which one remembers, 'I had that perception before', and in which the former perception appears apart from remembrance as its object (*yad dṛg me āsīt iti sa evam bhedataḥ api smaryati*), is only an analysis of the process of remembrance: 'it was seen by me before' (*mayā dṛṣṭam iti asya smṛteḥ tad-vyākaraṇam eva*).

It is the experience of common people that a person remembers that he had the knowledge of the past perception just as (*evam*) he remembers it now (on the later occasion). This later knowledge, i.e., the knowledge of the later remembrance, is a different exposition (*vyākaraṇam*) of the past knowledge, i.e., the knowledge of the former perception, as is denoted by the words: '*mayā dṛṣṭam iti*'. This shows that the knowledge of the former perception is one with the knowledge of the later remembrance, i.e., they are unified in self-consciousness.

Another objection is raised by the opponent: he says, if one looks at things indeterminately without taking special notice of anything particular determinately, there is no remembrance of any particular thing possible, just as when one looks at trees, plants, grass and leaves on the way while going to some place. So long as there is no determinate perception of anything, i.e., so long as the indeterminate knowledge

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K 6— 1. मया दृष्टमिति प्रमात्रन्तर्गतदर्शनपरामर्शात्मिकाया एव स्मृतेर्विभज्य कथनमेतदेवमनुभवोऽसौ ममाभूदिति भेदेनापि निर्देशः । Pv_r

स हि न पृथग्भूतां दृशं कांचित् मन्यते—'सा दृक् मे आसीत्' इत्येवम्, अपि तु यत् स्मर्यते एवं-भूतमपि यत् स्मरणं कस्यचित् विवेचकंमन्यस्य, तत् स्मृतेर्व्याकरणम् *Pv I, 138-39*

of a thing does not shine as determinate : 'this' (object), there can be no remembrance of it. The opponent wants to lay stress again on the point that the former perception is separate from remembrance and, as such, it has to be accepted as the object of the latter. The teacher replies to this objection as follows :-

यां च पश्याम्यहमिमं घटोऽयमिति वाऽवसा ।
मन्यते समवेतं साप्यवसातरि दर्शनम् ॥७॥

योजना— 'अहम् इमं पश्यामि', 'अयं घटः' इति वा अवसा (बोधैः, अध्यवसाय:) या मन्यते, सापि अवसातरि (प्रमातरि) समवेतं (प्रमातृमयमेव) दर्शनम् –निर्विकल्पकम् अनुभवनम् (प्रत्यवमृश्यते)[1] ।

Whether one takes the form of determinate knowledge (experience) to be as expressed in : 'I see this' or 'this is the jar', (*aham imam paśyāmi ghato ayam iti va avasa manyate*), it is one with the knowing subject, the self-consciousness, (*sa api avasātari—pramātari—samavetam-darśanam*), resting in it as indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpakam anubhavanam*).

The teacher means to say, whether the knowledge be determinate or indeterminate, it is ultimately indeterminate being unified in the knower. The determinate knowledge of the former perception, as a matter of fact, rests on the knowing subject in the form of indeterminate knowledge, and, in the later state (remembrance), it is revived again as determinate knowledge. All cognitions are, therefore, inseparate from the Self and are invariably dependent upon it.

K 7— 1. पुरःस्थितार्थविकल्पनेऽपि घटमिमं पश्यामि घटोऽयमिति वा प्रमातृमयमेव दर्शनं प्रत्यवमृश्यते । *Pvr*

अवसायः अवसा, समवेतम् इति अपृथग्भावमाह । अवसातरि इति स्वतन्त्रेऽन्तर्मुखे बोधात्मनि अहन्तास्पदे इत्यर्थः । 'दर्शनं' इति निर्विकल्पमनुभवनम् । ...... विकल्पयाम्यहम् स्मराम्यहम्, विकल्पितं मया, स्मृतं मया इति अहन्तारूढ्यैव विकल्पादेः अवभासात् । अत एव आत्मनोऽमी विकल्पाद्याः शक्तिविशेषाः तद्विश्रान्तशरीरत्वात् इति दर्शितम्,.........*Pv I, 144-45*

The teacher sums up the topic in the last Kārikā, as follows :-

तन्मया दृश्यते दृष्टोऽयं स इत्यामृशत्यपि ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकताभिन्नावर्थौ भातः प्रमातरि ॥८॥

योजना— 'मया दृश्यते', 'मया दृष्टः', 'अयं', 'स' इति तत्-ग्राह्य-ग्राहकता-भिन्नौ अर्थौ (एक) प्रमातरि भातः (एक प्रमातृलीनौ एव अनुभाव्य-अनुभावकौ-मायाकृतविच्छनौ-अवभासौ अपि प्रकाशेते) । [1]

The perceiver (subject) experiences various cognitions in the orders denoted by the expressions : 'is seen by me' (or 'I see'), 'was seen by me' (or 'I saw'), 'this' and 'that'. (*tan mayā dṛśyate, mayā dṛṣṭaḥ, ayam, sa*). They fall into two categories, as knowers (*grāhaka*) and the known (*grāhya*). Both of them shine in the subject, in their essential nature (*tat-grāhya-grāhakatā-bhinnau arthau eka pramātari bhātaḥ*)

All objects are manifested by the Supreme Self in two main divisions, the limited perceivers (*grāhaka*) and the objects perceived (*grāhya*), which are ultimately identical (*abhinnu*) with Him.

Abhinavagupta divides all cognitions into twenty-two categories (*dvāviṁśatiḥ-saṁvedana-bhedāḥ*), according to the differences in the various experiences of the perceiver (*Pramātā*). A perception (*anubhava*) is of two forms : (1) sometimes it is preceded by self-consciousness, which remains predominant in it. In this case the stress is on the subject as denoted by '*mayā-dṛśyate*', it is still at the level of indeterminate knowledge ; (2) sometimes the subject perceives the object primarily ; in this case stress is laid on the object as denoted by '*ayam iti*'. It assumes the form of determinate knowledge of the object. In this case also there is the light of self-consciousness. Remembrance consists of two experiences, the past perception (*purvānubhavaḥ*) as denoted by '*dṛṣṭa iti*' and the later experience as denoted by "*sa iti*'. As every perception is of two forms, so remembrance consisting of two experiences (*anubhavas*) falls into four categories, (*iti catvāraḥ smaraṇa-bhedāḥ*). Recognition is the unification of the two experiences : remembrance (*smaraṇa*) and perception (*anubhava*). Recognition, therefore, falls into eight categories, since the four categories of remembrance will multiply into eight because of the two different forms of perception. These eight categories are further multiplied by two, since each of them has two forms according as the

former or the later experience predominates (*pūrvāpara-viśrāntikṛtāt pratyekam dvidhā-bhedācca ṣoḍaśadhā*) Thus recognition has sixteen forms. Adding up the two forms of perception, the four forms of remembrance and the sixteen forms of recognition, there are twenty-two forms of cognition (*tad ete dvā-viṁśatiḥ saṁvedana-bhedāḥ*). See (Pv I, 147–48.)

K 8— 1. तस्माद् दृक्परामर्शपुरःसरायां स्मृतौ विकल्पमात्रे वा दृक्शब्दानुवेधं विनापि स इत्ययमिति वार्थमात्रनिर्देशेन सर्वत्रैकप्रमातृलीनावेव......प्रकाशेते। *Pvr*

इह स्मृतिः अनुभवं क्रोडीकरोति (स्वान्तः करोति) इत्युक्तम्। अनुभवश्च द्विधा, –परामर्शभेदात् कदाचित् (द्रष्टृभागबहुमाने) स्वात्मपरामर्शपूर्वकम् आमृशति यत्र अस्य अभिसंधिप्रधानता 'मया दृश्यते' इति, कदाचित्......अर्थक्रियां प्रति आग्रहविशेषो वा 'अयम' इति,.......एवमुभयथानुभवे प्रयेकं स्मृतिरपि द्वयपरामर्शमयी (दृष्ट इति स इति च उभयपरामर्शमयी) उदेति, इति चत्वारः स्मरणभेदाः, द्वौ अनुभवभेदौ अनुसंधानरूपं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमपि एतदुभयमेलनात्मकम् (स्मरणानुभवयोर्मेलनात्मकम्) अत्रैवान्तर्भूतम्। तच्च (स्मृतानुभूतमेलनात्मकेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन) एतद्भेदात् अष्टधा, पूर्वापरविश्रान्तिकृतात् प्रत्येकं द्विधाभेदाच्च षोडशधा। तदेते द्वाविंशतिः संवेदनभेदाः। तेषु च ग्राह्यं......अर्थराशिः...मायाप्रमाता......स च ग्राहकः इति उच्यते।......ग्राह्यरूपेण ग्राहकरूपेण योजितौ घटादिदेहादिस्वभावौ अर्थौ वेद्यौ प्रमातरि विशुद्धप्रकाशरूपे भातः प्रकाशेते। *Pv I, 147-49.*

See Kaw, R. K., ***The Doctrine of Recognition***, pp 138ff.

Ah. I, v

ज्ञानशक्ति-निरूपणम् (प्रत्यभिज्ञाकारिकायां ज्ञानाधिकारे पञ्चममाह्निकम्)

Power of knowledge :-

In Pratyabhijñā, *Jñāna-Śakti* (the power of knowledge) means the faculty of cognition, comprehension, conscious activity and the light of the Self (*Prakāśa*). The power of perception (*anubhava*) is a form of power of knowledge (*jñāna-śakti rūpāḥ*), on which depends the power of Remembrance (*Smaraṇa-Śakti*)

In this Ahnika, the teacher lays down the doctrine that all the objects directly perceptible to the perceiving subjects (*Pramātā*) exist in their real nature within the Self (*Ātman*) and are projected outward as manifestations (*ābhasaḥ*). *Jñāna-Śakti* functions in making objects manifest externally in the form of their perceptions, which, in reality, indwell in self-consciousness. By virtue of this power, the Self takes out for separate manifestation only certain things from the unlimited mass which lies merged in it (*svarūpad-unmagnam-ābhāsayati*), that is to say, it isolates some objects and manifests them externally, emerged, as it were, from the ocean of light (*prakāśa*) of consciousness.

In kārikā 1, the teacher explains the nature of perception (*anubhava*), which is the very 'life' of remembrance, determinate knowledge, etc. (*smaraṇa-vikalpādīnām anubhava eva jīvitam*) :—

वर्तमानावभासानां भावानामवभासनम् ।
अन्तःस्थितवतामेव घटते बहिरात्मना ॥१॥

योजना संक्षेपार्थश्च :— वर्तमानावभासानां भावानाम् (अवभासनम्) अन्तःस्थितवताम् बहिरात्मना अवभासनम् एव घटते ।[1]

अत्र चायमभिप्रायः । परमार्थतः स्वरूपतया स्थितेषु स्वावयवभूतेषु भावेष्वहमिति ग्रहणयोग्येषु मायावशेन स्वतः भेदेन यदिदम् इति भासनं तत्तत्रैवावयवतया स्थितानामेव सतां भवति, न ततः च्युतानाम्, यथा मृन्मयस्य घटस्य मृन्मयत्वेन स्थितस्यैव घटतया ग्रहणम्, नहि मृदो निर्गतो घटः किमपि भवति, मृत्सत्तयैव सतायुक्तत्वात्, इति तदन्तःस्थित्वं तदभिन्नतामात्रमेव न तु तदन्तराधेयत्वेनावस्थानं

मृद्भावेन हि स्थितो घटः मृदन्तस्थ उच्यते, न तु तदाधारत्वेन स्थितः, तद्-बहिःस्थितत्वं तु ततो भिन्नत्वमेव, मृदो भिन्नो जलतरङ्गो मृदो बाह्य इत्युच्यते। अतश्च चिदन्तःस्थितस्य भावराशेः चिन्मयत्वमेव तदन्तःस्थितत्वम् न तु स्व-प्रधानतया तत्रावस्थानम्, ततो बहिःस्थत्वं च मायावशेनेदन्तया ततो भेदेन भासनम्, न तु ततो निर्गत्य कुत्रापि देशेऽवस्थानम् इति तद्बहिरवस्थानं माया-कार्यमेव.........*Bh I, 197*

The external manifestation of the objects, which are directly perceptible (as separate from the perceiver) (*vartamana-avabhasanam bhavanam-avabhasanam*), can only be possible on the ground that they exist within the Self (*antaḥ-sthitavatam eva*)

In support of the same thought, the teacher says :—

प्रागिवार्थोऽप्रकाशः स्यात्प्रकाशात्मतया विना ।
न च प्रकाशो भिन्नः स्यादात्मार्थस्य प्रकाशता ।।२।।

योजना :— प्रकाशात्मतया विना (प्रमातृसंज्ञा–प्रकाशस्वरूपतां विना) अर्थः प्राग् इव (अग्रहणकाले इव) अप्रकाशः स्यात् (ग्रहणकालेऽपि । (स्वात्म-) प्रकाशः (अर्थ-स्वरूपाद्) भिन्नः न च स्यात्; (अतः) (आत्म-) प्रकाशता अर्थस्य आत्मा (भवति) ।[1]

अयमत्र संक्षिप्तार्थः—प्रकाशात्मतया विना-प्रकाशमानतारूपशुद्धप्रकाशाख्यनिजस्व-रूपासादनद्वारागतशुद्धप्रकाशरूपतां विना, अर्थः प्रागिव—अग्रहणकाले इव ग्रहण-कालेऽपि अप्रकाशः स्यात्, प्रकाशते च अतो ज्ञायते प्रकाशान्तःस्थितस्यैव भावस्य बहिर्-इदन्तया भासनमस्तीति भावः ननु प्रकाशविषयतयैव अस्य भानं भवतु किं तद्रूपता-कल्पनायासेन इत्यत आह 'न च' इति। प्रकाशः भिन्नः न च स्यात्, तथा च अस्य घटसंबन्धित्वमेवायुक्तं भिन्नयोः सम्बन्धायोगादिति भावः। अतः प्रकाशोऽर्थस्यात्मा—अलौकिकं स्वरूपं भवति। *Bh I, 203*

K I—1. प्रत्यक्षेऽपि यावदर्थानां भेदेनावभासः प्रमात्रन्तर्लीनानामेव सतां युक्तः ।
Pvr

ततो माया प्रमातुःविच्छिन्नानाम् अवभासनम्' (अवच्छिन्नतया) तत् परमार्थ-प्रमातरि शुद्धचिन्मये 'अन्तःस्थितवतां' तेन सह एकात्म्यम् अनुज्झितवतामेव 'घटते' प्रमाणंन उपपद्यते ; *Pv I, 153-4, see also Fn. 11*

If the object were lacking the light of the subject, it would remain unmanifest (*arthaḥ prakāśātmatayā vinā-aprakāsaḥ syāt*), even as it was before (*prāg-iva*). The light of the subject cannot be different from that of the object (*na ca prakāśo bhinnaḥ syāt*). The light of the subject is, therefore, the very essence of a thing (*prakāśatā arthasya ātmā*).

It is not possible to say that knowledge pertaining to an object is separate from the light of the subject (self-consciousness). If we think that the knowledge of an object is apart from that object, say a jar or cloth, then it will not be possible to cognise it. Unless the knowledge of each one of the different objects rests on the subject (*svātman*), practical life would become impossible. The teacher, therefore, holds the view that knowledge is one, not diverse, and it is not apart from the object. To prove this, the teacher says :-

> भिन्ने प्रकाशे चाभिन्ने संकरो विषयस्य तत् ।
> प्रकाशात्मा प्रकाश्योऽर्थो नाप्रकाशश्च सिद्ध्यति ॥३॥

योजना :— (आत्म-) प्रकाशे (स्वविषयाद्) भिन्ने अभिन्ने च, तत् विषयस्य (विषयाणाम्) सङ्करः (सङ्कीर्णता स्यात्) ; प्रकाश्यो अर्थो प्रकाशात्मा ; अप्रकाशश्च (प्रकाशरहितो विषयः) न सिद्ध्यति । तस्मादर्थसिद्धिः प्रकाशात्मतायता भवति ।[1]

एवमत्रसंक्षेपः—प्रकाशे-ज्ञाने, भिन्ने—स्वविषयाद् भिन्ने सति, तथा अभिन्ने अर्थ एव प्रकाशः, अभिन्ने च सति, विषयस्य, जातावेकवचनम्, तेन विषयाणामित्यर्थः । सङ्करः—सङ्कीर्णता, एकज्ञानेन सर्वविषयग्रहणात् , अप्रकाशः-प्रकाशरहितो विषयः न सिद्ध्यति, यतः प्रकाशात्मा अर्थः प्रकाशो भवति इति । *Bh I, 208-9*

K 2—1. प्रमातृसंज्ञाप्रकाशस्वरूपतां विना यथादौ घटोऽस्य नावभातस्तथा ज्ञानकालेऽपि स्यात्, प्रकाशमानता चार्थस्य प्रकाशः स्वरूपभूतो न तु भिन्नः । *Pvr*

'प्राग्' इति ज्ञानानुदये,...... अतश्च इदम् उपपत्त्या आयातम्—अर्थस्य स्वरूपं प्रकाशमानत्वं प्रकाशाभिन्नत्वम् । प्रकाशश्च यदि घटेऽन्यः पटेऽन्यः तदा अनुसंधानस्य अयोगः, द्वयोः प्रकाशयोः स्वात्ममात्रपर्यवसानात् इति वितत्य उपपादितं 'नश्येत् जनस्थितिः' इत्यत्र । तस्माद् एक एव प्रकाशः । *Pv I, 158, Fn 12*

If the light of the subject be different from the object (*bhinne prakāśe*) and remains as one in itself (*abhinne ca*), i.e., if it remains without variety or distinction in respect of different objects, it would result, then, in the confusion of one object with another (*saṅkaro viṣayasya tat*). Therefore, the object, that is made manifest, has the light of the subject as its essential nature (*prakāśyo 'rtho prakāśātmā*). For, what is not light, i.e., what is not known by a perceiver, cannot be said to exist (*aprakāśaś ca na siddhyate*).

An objection is raised against the above-said view by the Bāhyārthānumeya-vādin (Pūrvapakṣin), a school of Buddhists, who believe in the existence of inferable external objects. According to them, all the worldly transactions, connected with *Pramāṇa* (perception), are dependent upon determinate cognition and that is possible only because there is the direct perception of an external object which has the nature of mere reflection of *Pravṛti-vijñāna* (consciousness) that is changing and momentary, but the *Vijñāna* (bodha) remains really as one. So the Purpaksin says :-

तत्तदाकस्मिकाभासो बाह्यं चेदनुमापयेत् ।
न ह्यभिन्नस्य बोधस्य विचित्राभासहेतुता ॥४॥

योजना :— अभिन्नस्य (अविचित्रस्य) बोधस्य विचित्राभास हेतुता नहि (संभवति, *or* युक्तः), (अतः) तत् तद् आकस्मिकाभासः (अज्ञातहेतूद्भवाभासः) बाह्यम् अनुमापयेत् चेत् ? (चेदिति निपातो—यदि बाह्यार्थवादिना उच्यते—अथवा—बाह्यार्थवादिना संभाव्यमानतामाह)[1]

Prima facie view :- If the light of consciousness (*bodha*) be assumed to be without diversity in itself, it cannot be the cause of variety in manifestation (in determinate cognition) (*abhinnasya bodhasya vicitrabhasa*

K 3—1. प्रकाशमात्र चार्थाद्भिन्नं सर्वार्थसाधारणं तस्य घटस्य प्रकाशोऽयमयं पटस्यैवेति विषयनियमो निर्निबन्धनः। तस्मादर्थसिद्धिः प्रकाशात्मतायत्ता। *Pv*
भिन्ने प्रकाशे इति, भिन्ने स्वात्म-मात्रपर्यवसाने, 'अभिन्ने' नीलाद्याकारशून्ये *Pv I, Fn 36, P* 159.

'न च प्रकाशः प्रकाशाद्भिन्नः न च प्रकाशोऽर्थात'; यदि प्रकाशतैव घटस्य वपुः सव पटस्य इत्यादि विश्ववपुः प्रकाशः सिद्धः, तस्मात् प्रकाशरूपाद्-बोधादभिन्न एवार्थ इति राद्धान्तः। *Pv I, 163. Fn. 56, 58*

hetutā na hi). Therefore, this variety in manifestations, being without any perceptible cause (i.e., mere accidental affections), leads to the inference of external objects (*tat tad-ākasmikābhāso bāhyam anumāpayet*).

The Pūrvapakṣin further says :-

न वासनाप्रबोधोऽत्र विचित्रो हेतुतामियात् ।
तस्यापि तत्प्रबोधस्य वैचित्र्ये किं निबन्धनम् ।।५।।

योजना :— विचित्रः वासनाप्रबोध अत्र (अर्थाभासवैचित्र्ये) तस्य (वैचित्र्यस्य) हेतुतां न इयाद् अपि ; तत्—प्रबोधस्य वैचित्र्ये निबन्धनं किम् ?[1]

Prima facie continues :-

The rise of *Vāsanā* (*vāsanā-prabodhaḥ*), being of diverse nature (*vicitraḥ*), cannot be (assumed to be) its cause (*na hetutām-iyāt*) (i.e., *Vāsanā*, according to the view of the *Vijñāna-vādin*, is nothing else but the residual trace of impressions—*saṁskāra*, so it cannot be taken to be the cause of variety in manifestations.) For, then the question will arise, 'What is the cause of variety in the rise of *vāsanā* (*tat-prabodhasya vaicitre kim nibandhanam*) ?

K 4—1. जडानामाभासमानतैव सत्तासिद्धिः सा चाभासमानतैव । ततश्च बोधमात्रमेवात्र तत्त्वं, तस्याविशेषेऽपि क्रमेण विशिष्यमाणोऽर्थावभासस्ततोऽन्यमप्रकाशमानं हेतुतया बाह्यमर्थमूहयेदिन्द्रियवत् । *Pvr*

'आकस्मिकाभासो'—अज्ञातहेतूद्भवाभासः *Pv I, 164, Fn.* 65

चेदिति निपातो बाह्यार्थवादिना संभाव्यमानतामाह,.........न ह्यविचित्राद्बोधात्-क्रमिक आभासभेदो युक्तस्तत एकान्तेन बाह्य एव हेतुतयानुमीयते इति ।

Pv I, 164 Fn 66

'तत्तदाकस्मिकाभासो'- can better be translated as "those accidental affections", i.e., variety in manifestation of objects.

K 5—1. विचित्रवासनाप्रबोधो न बोधाद्भिन्नः, तस्यापि वैचित्र्ये को हेतुस्ततो बाह्य एवार्थो भिन्नाभासहेतुः । *Pvr*

एवं वासनानां तदुद्बोधहेतूनां च विचित्राणाम् अनुपपत्तिरेव । ततश्च स्थितमेतत्, अभिन्नो बोधः (चिन्मात्रम्—*Fn*) तस्य आकस्मिकाभास-(ज्ञानम्-*Fn*)भेदहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः बाह्योऽर्थोऽनुमेयः संभाव्यते—इति यदि बाह्यार्थवादिना उच्यते,......

Pv I, 175-6

The teacher denounces the point of view of the Pūrvapakṣin who upholds the separate and independent existence of external objects. He first weakens the supposition of the Pūrvapakṣin in the following Karikā :—

स्यादेतदवभासेषु तेष्वेवावसिते सति ।
व्यवहारे किमन्येन बाह्येनानुपपत्तिना ।।६।।

योजना :— स्याद् एतत्, व्यवहारे तेषु एव अवभासेषु अवसिते (समाप्ते) सति, अन्येन अनुपपत्तिना बाह्येन किम्[1] ?

Refutation of the Prima Facie :—

(The teacher says :—) It may be so (There may be the possibility of admitting the existence of objects) (*syād-etad*), (but there is another possibility also, that is,) since all transactions are performed by means of the various manifestations (*vyavahāre teṣu eva avabhāseṣu avasite sati*), what is then the use of admitting the external objects (*anyena bāhyena kim*), whose existence cannot be established by any reason *(anupapattinā)* ?

In the Vimarśini, various reasons are given to establish the existence of external objects, according to Bāhyārtha-vādin The teacher is not inclined to accept the Bāhyārtha-vādin's view, since, according to Pratyabhijñā, it is the nature of the light of consciousness (*Prakāśa*) to manifest various objects, as different from one another. The following Kārika gives the explanation about the existence of external objects :—

चिदात्मैव हि देवोऽन्तः स्थितमिच्छावशाद्बहिः ।
योगीव निरुपदानमर्थजातं प्रकाशयेत् ।।७।।

योजना :— चिदात्मा देव एव हि योगी इव अन्तः स्थितम् अर्थजातम् निरुपादानम् इच्छावशाद् बहिः प्रकाशयेत्[1]।

K 6—1 आभासमानैरेवार्थैर्व्यवहारस्ते चाभासात्मकाः सन्तु का क्षतिः । तत्किं बाह्येन कार्यं तावता लोक-यात्रा-समाप्तेः । बाह्यश्चार्थः प्रमाणबाधितः सावयवो विरुद्धधर्माध्यासादेः, निरवयवश्च दिक्-षट्क-योगादेर्बहुशः । Pv_r

K 7—1 चित्तत्त्वमेवेश्वरत्वात्स्वात्म-रूपतयोपपन्नाभास-रूपमनन्त-शक्तित्वादिच्छादि-वशात्-मृदादिकारणं विनैव बाह्यत्वेन घट-पटादिकमर्थराशिं प्रकाशयेत् । Pv_r

(contd, on P. 42)

(The teacher states his doctrine as follows :—) The Self (*Ātman*) who is the Lord (*deva*), the Supreme Being, whose essential nature is sentience (*cidātmā*), manifests externally all the objects (*artha-jātam bahiḥ prakāśayet*), which are within him (*antaḥ sthitam*), by the sovereignty of His will (*iccā-vaśāt*), without requiring any material cause (*nirupādānam*), like a Yogin (*yogī iva*) (who brings into existence innumerable objects he desires to create, by the mere power of his will, without recourse to any extraneous substance).

Since the teacher admits that the power of freedom of *Samvid* is the only cause of manifestations of objects, he refutes the possibility of inference regarding the existence of external objects, against the Bauddha opponent's point of view, in the following Kārikā 8 :—

(There are two ways in which the external phenomenon can be explained by inference : (i) Should we follow the analogy of jar, etc., reflected in a mirror, in the case of appearance of variety of reflection in the light of consciousness (*jñāna*) and suppose some external objects as the cause of variety, different from the mirror of *vijñāna*, (ii) or follow the illustration of Yogin and represent the power of freedom of *samivd* to be the only cause? This is doubtful. Therefore, the teacher refutes the possibility of inference with regard to external objects in Kārikās 8, 9 and 10.)

अनुमानमनाभातपूर्वे नैवेष्टमिन्द्रियम् ।
आभातमेव बीजादेराभासाद्धेतुवस्तुनः ।।८।।

योजना :— अनाभातपूर्वे (वस्तुनि) अनुमानं नैव इष्टम्, इन्द्रियम् आभातमेव (किंचिदुपलब्धः कारणम्—अर्थात्—अनुमीयते किंचिन्मात्र निमित्तं), (कुतः) बीजादेः हेतुवस्तुनः आभासात्[1] ।

'एव'-कारेण इदमाह—सर्वेन तावत् वादिना विषय-व्यवस्थापनं संविद्रूपम् अभिपलवनीयम् आदि-सिद्धं हि तत् इति उक्तम् । तस्य च स्वातन्त्र्यमेव 'देव'-शब्दनिर्दिष्टं चिद्रूपत्वम् । *Pv, i, 185*

K 8—1 पूर्वावभासान्तःस्थित एवार्थो नान्तरीयकार्थ-दर्शन-वशात्तत्देशकालादि-योजनया विमर्शनमनुमानम् । इन्द्रियमप्यनुमीयते किंचिन्मात्रं निमित्तं, तच्च बीजाद्याभासाद्-आभासितमेव । *Pvr*

(contd. on P. 43)

(The teacher says :) Inference is not possible with respect to things which have not been previously perceived (*anābhata-pūrve*). As for the senses, they have, of course, been cognised (as cause of external objects) to some extent (*ābhātam eva kimcin-matram*), because of the cognitions of manifestations (i. e. perceptions) of things like seed, etc., which are (recognised to be) of the nature of cause (*bījādeḥ hetu-vastunaḥ ābhāsat*).

आभासः पुनराभासाद्बाह्यस्यासीत्कथंचन ।
अर्थस्य नैव तेनास्य सिद्धिर्नाप्यनुमानतः ॥९॥

योजनाः— पुनः, आभासाद् (चिदात्मप्रकाशाद्) बाह्यस्य अर्थस्य आभासः (बाह्यस्य अनाभासस्य आभासनम्) कथंचन नैव आसीत्, तेन अस्य (अर्थस्य) सिद्धिः अनुमानतः अपि न (आसीत्)[1] ।

एवमत्र श्लोकद्वये (8 & 9) योजना । पण्डितैः अनुमानम् अनाभातपूर्वे नैवेष्टम् । इन्द्रियम् आभातमेव भवति, सामान्येनेति शेषः । कुतः ? बीजादेः हेतुवस्तुनः आभासात् । पुनः —पक्षान्तरे, आभासाद् बाह्यस्य आभासः कथंचन न आसीत्, तेनास्यार्थस्य बाह्यार्थस्य अनुमानतोऽपि सिद्धिर्नास्ति इति । *Bh, i, 235*

(The teacher further says :) There has never been, in any way, the manifestation of the object that is outside the light of consciousness (*ābhāsād bahyasya arthasya ābhasaḥ katham ca naiva āsīt*), i e., the object that is outside the light of consciousness never becomes manifest (externally) in any way. Therefore, its existence cannot be proved even by inference (*tena asya arthasya siddhiḥ anumānataḥ api na*).

यत्किंचिदनुमानं तत्समग्रं विकल्परूपं, विकल्पश्च-अननुभूते नोदेति (*Pv, i, 186 Fn*), इन्द्रियमपि पूर्वानुभूतमेव, न हि तत्प्रातिस्विकेन आकारेणानुमीयते अपि तु सामान्येन । *Pv, i, 188 Fn*

K 9—1 घटाद्याभासाद्-बाह्यस्य-अनुपपत्तेर्-नासीद्-आभासस्तत्र नानुमानाद् अपि सिद्धिः । *Pvr*

तेन बाह्ये साध्ये यत् किंचित् प्रमाणम् आनीयते, तदबाह्यतामेव प्रत्युत प्रसाधयति इति विरुद्धमेव, अत एव आह 'कथंचन' इति, केनापि प्रकारेण प्रत्यक्षात्मना अनुमेयात्मना वा आभासनम् आभासो बाह्यस्य अनाभासस्य न कदाचित् अभूत इति, तस्मात् सिद्धं 'चिदात्मैव हि देव' इति । *Pv i, 191*

The teacher, therefore, lays stress on the principle that every thing external indwells in the Self :-

स्वामिनश्चात्म-संस्थस्य भावजातस्य भासनम् ।
अस्त्येव न विना तस्मादिच्छामर्शः प्रवर्तते ॥१०॥

योजना :— स्वामिनः आत्मसंस्थस्य एव (आत्मनीवाभेदेन वर्तमानस्य) भावजातस्य भासनम् अस्ति, तस्माद् विना इच्छामर्शः (इच्छारूपो निर्मातृतामयो विमर्शः) न स्यात्[1] ।

अयमत्र संक्षेपः । स्वामिनः—विमर्शाख्यैश्वर्ययुक्तात् प्रभवापादनरूपाच्चित्तत्त्वात्, आत्मसंस्थस्य-तादात्म्येन स्वान्तर्गतस्यैव सतः, भावजातस्य-भावराशेः, भासनमस्ति, तस्माद्विना—तस्यात्मनि समवस्थानं विना, इच्छामर्शः—"करवाणि" इति इच्छारूपो विमर्शो न प्रवर्तते निर्विषयत्वात् *Bh. I 241*

(The teacher says :-) The mass of the so-called objects is manifested only as resting within the Lord (Self) (*Svaminaḥ ātma-samsthasya eva bhāva jatasya bhāsanam asti*). Without that there cannot be the rise of will, which is a kind of the determinate consciousness (*āmarśaḥ*), i.e., the first conscious activity in the process of making externally manifest the objects from within (*tasmad vina icchamarśaḥ na syat*).

The teacher believes that the process of creation or emanation from the Lord follows the illustration of potter who proceeds producing externally pots, etc., from his reflective desire (*icchāmarsaḥ*) And the act of creation cannot be possible without this reflective desire on the part of the Lord. The opponent questions here : How can the reflective desire (*paramarśa*) being a *viklapa* (a determinative process) be attributed to the Lord, who is of the nature of pure consciousness? The teacher says on the point :

K 10—1 चिदात्मनश्चेश्वरस्य-आत्मनीवाभेदेन-अर्थेऽपि प्रकाशोऽस्त्यन्यथा प्रतिभासमानार्थैकविषयो निर्मातृतामयो विमर्श इच्छारूपो न स्यात् । *Pvr*

[illegible]त् स्थितम् अन्तःस्थितं भाव-जातं—तेन विना तद्विषयस्य परामर्शस्य अयोगात् इति । *Pv, i, 196*

स्वभावमवभासस्य विमर्शं विदुरन्यथा ।
प्रकाशोऽर्थोपरक्तोऽपि स्फटिकादिजडोपमः ॥११॥

योजनाः— अवभासस्य (आत्मप्रकाशस्य) स्वभावम् (मुख्यं रूपम्) विमर्शं विदुः, अन्यथा अर्थ-उपरक्तोऽपि प्रकाशः स्फटिकादि जडोपमः (स्यात्)[1]

It is known (*viduḥ*) that sentiency or autonomy of consciousness (*vimarśa or āmarśa*) is the very nature of the light of the subject (*avabhāsasya svabhāvan*), for, otherwise, though there be the reflection of external objects in it (*anyathā artha-uparaktopi prakāśaḥ*), yet this light would be merely like insentient crystal and the like (*sphatikādi-jaḍopamaḥ*).

The teacher, now, lays stress on sentiency of the Self or freedom of consciousness, as follows :-

आत्मात एव चैतन्यं चित्क्रिया चितिकर्तृता ।
तात्पर्येणोदितस्तेन जडात्स हि विलक्षणः ॥१२॥

योजना :— अत एव आत्मा चैतन्यं, (चैतन्यं) चित्क्रिया (चेतन-क्रिया), चितिकर्तृता (स्वातन्त्र्यं......चितावेव), (तत्) तात्पर्येण उदितः (उक्तः), तेन (चैतन्येन) स जडाद् विलक्षणः हि[1] ।

अत्रायं संक्षेपः—अत एव-अवभासस्य विमर्शस्वभावत्वादेव, चित्क्रिया-चितिकर्तृता-तात्पर्येण हेतुना आत्मा चैतन्यमुदितः—"चैतन्यमात्मा" इति सूत्रे शिवेन

K 11—1 प्रकाशस्य मुख्य आत्मा प्रत्यवमर्शस्तं विना-अर्थ-भेदिताकारस्य अस्य स्वच्छतामात्र न तु-अजाड्यं चमत्कृतेरभावात् । *Pvr*

'अहमेवं प्रकाशात्मा प्रकाशे' इति हिविमर्शोदये स्वसंविदेव प्रमातृ-प्रमेय-प्रमाणादि चरितार्थम् अभिमन्यते न तु अतिरिक्तं काङ्क्षति, स्फ़टिकादि हि गृहीत-प्रतिबिम्बमपि तथाभावेन सिद्धौ प्रमात्रन्तरम् अपेक्षते, इति निर्विमर्शत्वात् जडम् । सर्वं तु वस्तुतो विमर्शात्मक-प्रमातृस्वभाव-तादात्म्य-अहंपरामर्शविश्रान्तेः अजडमेव.... । *Pv 198-99*

K 12—1 आत्मद्रव्यस्य भावात्मकमप्येतज्जडाद्भेदकतया विमर्शाख्यं मुख्यं रूपमुक्तं चैतन्यं चितिशक्तिर्दृशिरिति सा चेतनक्रिया चितिकर्तृतैव । *Pvr* (see P. 46)

कथितः । हि—यस्मात्कारणात्, सः-आत्मा, तेन-चैतन्येन, जडाद्विलक्षणो भवति, भवति च बाहुल्येन प्रधानस्य धर्मस्य स्वरूपतया निर्देशः मनोधर्मस्य संकल्पस्येव मनस्तया इत्यलम् ।। *Bh I*, 249-50

Therefore (*ata eva*), i e, ***vimarśa*** being the very nature of the light of the subject, the Self is sentiency (***caitanyam***), the implied sense of which is said to be the sentient activity (*cit-kriyā tātparyeṇa-uditaḥ*), the liberty or sovereignty in respect of conscious activity (***citi-kartṛtā***). It is, therefore, said, in Agamas, that the Self (*Ātman*) is distinct from the insentient (***jadāt sa hi vilakṣaṇaḥ***).

It is now arrived at that the essential characteristics of the Self (***Ātman***) are light or luminosity (***Prakāśa***) and thought (*Vimarśa*) and, as such, it is distinct from the insentient. The question arises here, how is the existence of insentients to be explained, if non-luminosity (*a prakāśa*) and lack of thought (*a-vimarśa*) be attributed to them, which distinguish them from the sentient. With this question in mind the teacher says :-

चितिः प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा परा-वाक्स्वरसोदिता ।
स्वातन्त्र्यमेतन्मुख्यं तदैश्वर्यं परमात्मनः ।।१३।।

योजनाः— चितिः प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा (प्रत्यवमर्शः-स्वात्मचमत्कारलक्षण आत्मा-स्वभावः, विमर्शो हि सर्वं सहः परमपि आत्मी करोति, आत्मानं च परीकरोति......) परा (पूर्णत्वात् परा) वाक् (वक्ति विश्वम् अलपति प्रत्यवमर्शेन इति च वाक्) स्वरसोदिता (स्वरसेन चिद्रूपतया अनस्तमिता-सदोदिता), एतत् स्वातन्त्र्यम्, तत् परमात्मनः मुख्यम् ऐश्वर्यम्[1] ।

चितिक्रिया च चितौ कर्तृता, स्वातन्त्र्यं संयोजनवियोजनानुसंधानादिरूपम् आत्ममात्रतायामेव (चितावेव) जडवत् अविश्रान्तत्वम् अपरिच्छिन्न-प्रकाश-सारत्वम् अनन्यमुख-प्रेक्षित्वम् इति । *Pv*, 1, 202

यथा जडः स्वात्ममात्रनिष्ठः संयोजन-वियोजनादि-स्वातन्त्र्यरहितः नैवमात्मा इत्यर्थः । *Ibid. Fn*

K 13—1 अभिन्नवाच्याद्या वागमेया नित्यचित्स्वरूपत्वेन-अनाद्यन्ता परतन्त्र-भावान्तरानपेक्षं शुद्धमेतत्स्वातन्त्र्यमैश्वर्यसंज्ञम् । *Pvr*

(see P. 47)

The creative thought is the very life (nature) of sentiency (*citiḥ pratyavamarśātmī*). It is the Transcendental Word (*parā-vak*), which ever shines with its self-dependent sentient nature (*svarasoditā*). It is the freedom of consciousness (*svātantryam etat*). It is the chief power of the Supreme Self (*mukhyam tad-aiśvaryam paramātmanaḥ*).

The teacher further states the characteristics of the *citiḥ*, as follows :-

सा स्फुरत्ता महासत्ता देशकालाविशेषिणी ।
सैषा सारतया प्रोक्ता हृदयं परमेष्ठिनः ॥१४॥

योजनाः—सा स्फुरत्ता (स्फुरणकर्तृता....भवनकर्तृता-विश्वविस्तारः चितिक्रिया-शक्ति), महा-सत्ता (विश्वजीवनम्), देशकाल-अविशेषिणी (अस्पर्शणी), सा एषा सारतया परमेष्ठिनः (परमे पदे तिष्ठतः ब्रह्मनः) हृदयं (प्रतिष्ठास्थानं विमर्शरूपम्) प्रोक्ता (आगमेषु अभिधीयते)॥ स्फुरणं=स्पन्दनम्, 'सारम्'=इति यत् अतुच्छं, हृदयं च नाम प्रतिष्ठास्थानम् उच्यते,
"महा सत्ता महादेवी विश्वजीवनमुच्यते......।"[1]

'चितिः' चितिक्रिया तस्याः प्रत्यवमर्शः (स्मर्शात्मा *Fn*) स्वात्म-चमत्कारलक्षण आत्मा स्वभावः (*Pv, i, 204*)...... विमर्शो हि सर्वंसहः परमपि आत्मीकरोति, आत्मानं च परीकरोति उभयम् एकी-करोति,... ... प्रत्यवमर्शश्च अन्तरभिला-पात्मक-शब्दन-स्वभावः । *Ibid. 205*

पूर्णत्वात् 'परा', वक्ति विश्वम् अपलपति प्रत्यवमर्शेन इति च 'वाक्', अत एव सा स्वरसेन चिद्रूपतया स्वात्मविश्रान्तिवपुषा उदिता सततम् अनस्तमिता (सदोदिता *Fn*) नित्या अहमित्येव, (पृ-पालनपूरणयो) । *Ibid. 205-6*

K 14—1 स्फुरत्ता स्फुरण-कर्तृता अभावाप्रतियोगिनी अभाव-व्यापिनी सत्ता भवत्ता भवनकर्तृता नित्या देश-कालास्पर्शात् सैव प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा चितिक्रिया-शक्तिः । सा विश्वात्मनः परमेश्वरस्य स्वात्मप्रतिष्ठारूपा हृदयम् इति तत्र तत्रागमे निगद्यते । *Pvr*

'स्फुरणं'—स्पन्दनम्...स्पन्दनं च किञ्चित् चलनम्, एषैव च किञ्चिद्रूपता—यत् अचलमपि चलमाभासते इति । किंचिच्चलनं च यदि स्वरूपाद्वस्त्वन्तराक्रमणं तच्च चलनमेव न किंचित्त्वं... ..। *Pv, i, 208, Fn 347*

'सत्ता' च भवनकर्तृता सर्वक्रियासु स्वातन्त्र्यम् । 'सारम' इति यत् अतुच्छं रूपं तत् इयमेव विमर्श-शक्तिः, ग्राह्य-ग्राहकानां यत् प्रकाशात्मकं रूपं .....। 'हृदयं' च

It is the eternal stir (*sa sphurattā*), the Supreme Reality (*mahā-sattā*). It is beyond the limitations of time and space (*deśa-kāla-aviśeṣiṇi*). This (*citiḥ*), being the essence of all (*sāra*), is spoken of as the heart (i. e., the resting place) of the highest Lord (Self) (*proktā hṛdayam parameṣṭhinaḥ*).

Citi being of such nature, in reality, no distinction can be made between the sentient and the insentient. With this idea in mind, the teacher says :-

आत्मानमत एवायं ज्ञेयी-कुर्यात्पृथक्स्थिति ।
ज्ञेयं न तु तदौन्मुख्यात् खण्ड्येतास्य स्वतन्त्रता ॥१५॥

योजना:—अत एव अयम् (विमर्शरूप: प्रकाशात्मा परमेश्वर:) आत्मानम् (स्वात्मानम्) ज्ञेयी कुर्यात् (अज्ञेयमपि ज्ञेयी करोति), ज्ञेयं तु न पृथक्-स्थिति, तद् औन्मुख्यात् अस्य स्वतन्त्रता (स्वातन्त्र्यम्-आत्मन: स्वरूपम्) खण्ड्येत (अन्याधीनत्वं नाम पारतन्त्र्यम् अस्य आनीयते)[1] ।

Because of this stir (*spanda*) or the power of creative thought (*vimarśa-śakti*), therefore (*ata eva*), He (the Self) makes himself as the object of knowledge (*ayam jñeyī kuryāt*). The objects have no separate existence (*jñeyam tu na pṛthak-sthiti*) If it be contrary to that (*tad-aunmukhyāt*), his freedom would be lost (shattered), (*asya svatantratā khandeta*).

नाम प्रतिष्ठास्थानमुच्यते,......तस्यापि विमर्शशक्ति: इति विश्वस्य परमे पदे-तिष्ठतो विश्रान्तस्य इदमेव हृदयं विमर्शरूपं परमन्त्रात्मकम्......। *Pv, i, 209-12*

K 15—1 एतादृग-शुद्ध-स्वातन्त्र्यवशात् नैष तदा पृथगेव लब्दप्रतिष्ठं-वस्तु-अवैति अपि तु अज्ञेयमात्मानमनियन्त्रित-प्रभावतया ज्ञेयी-करोति, भिन्न-ज्ञेयसापेक्षत्वे ज्ञान-कर्तृता म्लायेत् । *Pvr*

प्रकाशात्मा परमेश्वर: स्वात्मानं ज्ञात्रेकरूपत्वात् अज्ञेयमपि ज्ञेयीकरोति इति...... ननु एषैव कुत: संभावना आत्मानं ज्ञेयी करोति ? इति आह पृथक् प्रकाशात् बहिर्भूता स्थिति: यस्य तादृक् ज्ञेयं नैव भवति ।......यदि व्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञेयं स्यात्.. ... तेन व्यतिरिक्त-विषयौन्मुख्येन अन्याधीनत्वं नाम पारतन्त्र्यम् अस्य आनीयते । पारतन्त्र्यं च स्वातन्त्र्यस्य-विरुद्धम् । *Pv, i, 214-15*

The teacher said above that *Citi* (sentiency) is eternal and shines independently (*svarasodita—svarasena cidrūpatayā anastamita—sadodita*). It is *parā-vāk*. Parā means infinite or all pervading (*pūrnatvāt parā*) and *vāk* implies that this world existed first in the Transcendental Word which is identical with thought (*vakti viśvam alapati pratyavamarśena iti vāk*). All the limited perceivers included in the category of objects (*bhāva-rāśau*) also derive their limited powers from the *Citi*. This *Citi* is absolute existence (*mahā-sattā*), uneffected by the limitations of time and space. The world is the expansion of the *mahā-sattā*, hence it is also called *sphurattā*. It is the *sāra* (essence) of all that exists. It is also said to be ***hṛdayam*** (heart) of the Transcendental Self. *Hṛdaya* implies, in the Āgamas, the supreme power of *Vimarśa* (*idam eva hṛdayam vimarśa-rūpam*). This power of thought or reflective activity (***Vimarśa-Śakti***), called also '***parā-vāk-śakti-mayam***', is ultimately the origin of all. Although the Supreme Self possesses innumerable powers, yet it is His power of *Vimarśa* that mainly brings forth objects from Himself, which are not apart from Him (*avyatirikta* . The Lord (Self) manifests Himself in two ways, one in the form of sentient objects which are full of power of freedom (*svātantrya-yuktatābhāsanena*) and the other in the form of insentient objects lacking power of freedom (*svātantrya-sūnyatābhāsanena*). Both the kinds of objects, being identical with the Self, are manifested by Him by virtue of His power of *Vimarśa*, which is His chief power (***vimarśa-śakti-balāt...saiva pradhānam***).

On the point of creation of the sentient and the insentient, the teacher further says :-

स्वातन्त्र्यामुक्तमात्मानं स्वातन्त्र्याद्द्वयात्मनः ।
प्रभुरीशादिसंकल्पैर्निर्माय व्यवहारयेत् ॥१६॥

योजना :— अद्वयात्मनः (महेश्वरस्य) स्वातन्त्र्यात् स्वातन्त्र्य—अमुक्तम् (युक्तम्) आत्मानम् (ईशादिरूपैः) निर्माय, प्रभुर्-ईशादि-संकल्पैः व्यवहारयेत् (व्यवहारेण योजयति भावनादि व्यवहारार्थं—अथवा—जगत्-व्यवहारार्थं')

K 16—1 अत एव वेद्यैकीभावलक्षण-पूर्णतामयात् स्वातन्त्र्यात्-तदानीन्तनमेव वेदकमात्मानमीश्वरः शिवो वेदिता इत्येवमादि-विकल्पैराभासयति भावनादि-व्यवहारार्थम् इति । *Pvr*

(contd. on P. 50)

From the freedom of His own (i.e. of Himself), who is one without a second (*advaiyatmanaḥ svātantryāt*), creating Himself (in the form of various subjects and objects, as separate from Himself), thus not losing His freedom *svātantrya-amuktam ātmānam nirmāya*), the Lord (Supreme Perceiver) carries on the transactions of the world by the desires of the created beings like Īśa and others (*īśādi-saṁkalpai vyavahārayet*).

The 2nd line of this Kārikā implies that besides the ordinary objects (*nīla, pīta*, etc.) the Lord creates from Himself *Īśa, Śiva* and other gods as objects of worship and meditation, etc., who are also possessed of freedom (*svātantrya-yuktam*), in other words, who are not devoid of freedom (*svātantrya-amuktam*).

Here the opponent raises the question : It is said that Īśa and other gods, who are the created beings, and, as such, as good as insentient objects like stones, etc., are of the order of "this", viz. being reduced to the level of objects. They should, therefore, be lacking freedom. The Pūrvapakṣin asks, how do you account for the freedom of these gods and other created beings? The teacher explains, in the following Kārikā, how the created beings like Īśa and other gods are not devoid of freedom (*svātantrya-amuktam*) :—

नाहन्तादिपरामर्श-भेदादस्यान्यतात्मनः ।
अहंमृश्यतयैवास्य सृष्टेस्तिङवाच्यकर्मवत् ।।१७।।

योजना :— (ईशादि) अहंतादिपरामर्शभेदाद् अस्य आत्मनः अन्यता (भेदः, अन्यान्यरूपता) न (युक्ता), अस्य (आत्मनः) सृष्टेः (सृजमानस्य) अहंमृशतयैव (अहं-विमर्शनीयत्वमेव), (तद्भेदः) तिङवाच्यकर्मवत् (भवति)[1] ।

न च केवलं नीलादिरूपमेव ज्ञेयं, यावत् अत्यक्त-कर्तृ स्वभाव स्वातन्त्र्येण, अपरित्यक्तमेव सन्तम् आत्मानं निर्माय व्यवहारेण ध्यानोपासनार्चनोपदेशादिना योजयति इति यत् संभाव्यते तदपि अत एव इति संबन्धः। *Pv, i,* 215-16
स्वातन्त्र्यामुक्तम्-स्वातन्त्र्ययुक्तम् ।

K 17—1 वर्तमान-प्रमातृभावेन-आहित-प्रत्यवमृश्यस्य प्रमेयत्वेन-इदन्ताविमर्शभेदे च आभासभेदे च प्रमातैव ईश्वर-शब्देन सृष्टोऽहंपरामर्शो व्यवधानेन केवलं, यथा क्रियादिशब्देन क्रियादय उच्यन्ते पचत्यादिवत् पचत्यादिमुखेन इत्यभिधानात्, ईश्वर-शब्दादात्मशब्दात् चाहमिति परामृशन्-नात्मानम् अवैति न साक्षात् प्रतीतिस्तु अस्त्येव स्मृत्येव अनुभवमुखेन-अनुभूतस्य इति । *Pvr*

(contd. on P. 51)

(The teacher says): The Lord, the Supreme Self, does not become different in the form of (different) gods like Īśa and other created beings (*na asya anyatātmanaḥ*) because of the difference in their mental attitudes, *saṅkalpas* or *vimarśa*, (*ahamtādi-parāmarśa bhedāt*) Their freedom is intact, because the mental attitudes of these created beings, gods and others, are one with 'I-Consciousness' of the Supreme Self, i. e. with the Universal Consciousness (*asya sṛṣṭeḥ aham-mṛśyatayaiva*), just as the consciousness of the meaning of a noun, derived from a root, rests on the consciousness of the action, represented by personal termination (*tinvācya-karma vat*).

On the basis of this idea, even the so-called insentient objects are also not devoid of *svātantrya*, for the existence of the object is not apart from the existence of the subject. When we say: '*nīlam idam*' (this is the blue object), we mean to say; "*aham vedmi*—'*nīlam idam*'" (I know this is the blue object). The essential characteristic of *svātantrya* is *aham parāmarśa* (self-consciousness), devoid of which even the insentient objects do not exist. Thus, there ultimately exists no gulf between the subject and the object.

It has been established above that all thoughts of all the created beings, in reality, rest in one pure "I-Consciousness" (*aham-parāmarśa*), which is the essence (*tattva*) of all cognitions This *aham-vimarsa* has perception and remenbrance as its main powers, and perception has variety of forms, such as certainity (*nirnaya*), doubt (*samśaya*), etc. The teacher now explains how one and the same thought (aham-parāmarśa) functions in variety of forms corresponding to various kinds of objects :—

अहम् इत्येवंरूपो यः परामर्शो, यश्च ईश्वरः प्रमाता आत्मा शिव इत्यादिः अनन्त-प्रकारः परामर्शः, तस्य यद्यपि भेदोऽन्यान्य-रूपता, तथापि तद्भेदात् हेतोः अस्य आत्मनो निर्मातृरूपस्य अहंपरामर्शमयस्य निर्मेय-रूपस्य च ईश्वरादि-परामर्शास्पद-स्य यो भेदः शङ्कितः, स न युक्तः .....। अस्य ईश्वरस्य आत्मनः सृष्टेः सृज्यमानस्य अहंविमर्शनीयत्वमेव ।......अस्य ईश्वरस्य यतः ईश्वरादिसंकल्पेषु अपि अहं-परा-मर्शनयोग्यस्यैव सृष्टिः। ......परामर्शो नाम विश्रान्तिस्थानम्, तच्च पार्यन्तिकमेव पारमार्थिकं, तच्च अहमित्येवंरूपमेव। *Pv, i, 219-21*

मायाशक्त्या विभोः सैव भिन्नसंवेद्यगोचरा।
कथिता ज्ञानसंकल्पाध्यवसोयादिनामभिः ॥१८॥

योजना :— विभोः (परमेश्वरस्य) सा (अहंविमर्शमयी चितिः) माया-शक्त्या भिन्न-संवेद्यगोचरा (सती) (भेदेन आभास्यते), (सा एव चितिः) ज्ञानसंकल्पाध्यवसायादि अनेक-नामभिः कथिता[1]।

(The teacher says :) The same power of *Vimarśa* or *Citi* of the Lord (Supreme Self) which is *aham-vimarśa-mayī* (characterised as self-consciousness) (*sa vibhoḥ citīḥ*), by coming within the range of various objects, which are separated from Him (the Lord) by His power of Maya (*māya śaktyā bhinna samvedya-gocarā*). is called by different names such as perception (*jñāna*), imagination or thought (*saṅkalpa*), etc., (assuming the various forms of determinate consciousness) (*jñāna-saṅkalpadhyavasayadi aneka-namabhiḥ kathita*)

The teacher further states :-

साक्षात्कारक्षणेऽप्यस्ति विमर्शः कथमन्यथा।
धावनाद्युपपद्येत प्रतिसंधानवर्जितम् ॥१९।

योजना :— साक्षात्कारक्षणे (निर्विकल्पविज्ञानक्षणे) अपि विमर्शः अस्ति, अन्यथा धावनादि-प्रतिसंधान-वर्जितम् (अनुसंधानेन विना) कथम् उपपद्येत[1] ?।

K 18—1 प्रकाशात्मनः परमेश्वरस्य मायाशक्त्या स्वात्मरूपं विश्वं भेदेन आभास्यते, ततः 'सैव' चितिः ज्ञानमध्यक्षं, तस्यैव भिन्नस्य-आभातस्य स्मृतिः संकल्पोऽध्यवसायो मनो-बुद्धिवृत्ति-रूपत्वेनापि चितिरेवेति। *Pvr*

ततो ज्ञानसंकल्पादयो भिन्नाः तस्य अप्रध्वस्त-स्व-स्वभावाभेदस्य संवित्तत्त्वस्य अनुसंधातुः शक्तय इति उक्ताः, संशयादयश्च भिन्ना नीलादि-वैचित्र्यं च इति सर्वम् अखण्डितम् (अभिन्नम्)। *Pv, i, 224*

K 19—1 साक्षात्कार-क्षण-ज्ञानेऽपि चितोऽर्थप्रत्यवमर्शोऽस्ति सूक्ष्मः, वाचन-धावनादौ शीघ्रक्रिया तत्तद्दृश्यमान-देशाद्य-उपादित्साजिहासानुसंधानेन हि भवेदिति। *Pvr*

प्रथमसमये-साक्षात्कारलक्षणे (बालः, *Pv, i, 225 Fn*), निर्विकल्प-विज्ञानक्षणे विकल्पव्यापारः। साक्षात्कारः-प्रत्यक्षनिर्विकल्परूपः (*Ibid. 228, Fn*)। तस्मात् अस्ति साक्षात्कारे प्रत्यवमर्शः (*Ibid. 228*)।

(contd. on P. 53)

At the time of indeterminate experiences (like the first moments of experiences of boys, etc.) also, there exists the determinate consciousness (*sākṣātkāra-kṣaṇe api vimarśaḥ asti*), otherwise (*anyathā*), how can there be the possibility of running, etc., if there were no determinate consciousness (not even in a subtle form, in such experiences)? (*dhāvanādi prati-sandhāna*-varjitam katham upapadyeta).

The Pūrvapakṣin questions here, *Vimarśa* or *Pratyavamarśa* cannot be admitted to be present in the first experiences (*sākṣāt-kāra-kṣaṇe*), as, for instance, in the case of small boys learning the meaning of such expressions as '*gām ānaya*, naya, ..', but the first experineces in their case must be due to the remembrance arising from the impressions (*saṁskāra*) of such experiences which they had in their previous lives (atha *bālasya prāg-janma-anubhūta-saṁketa*-smṛteḥ *evam*). In reply to this, the teacher says: *Vimarśa*, the determinate knowledge, is the essential nature (*svabhāva*) of *Citī* (Self-Consciousness). Even in the first experiences of boys (*prathama anubhava samaye*) or in the acts of speaking, running quickly, etc., *Vimarśa* is present. It cannot be supposed to be entirely lacking, even though it may be present in a subtle form.

The Pūrvapakṣin states, it may be possible that the subtle determinate consciousness be present in the indeterminate in certain cases, as shown above; but, in other cases, the determinate consciousness is explicitly present, because of its grossness and also being denoted by certain indicatory words which appear as separate from the subject like other external objects. The question arises, how can the indicatory words be held as one with or non-separate (*apṛthakbhūtaḥ*) from the light of the subject, i.e, indeterminate consciousness? In reply to this question, the teacher says :-

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विकल्पो हि प्रत्यक्षस्य व्यापारः,......न च व्यापारः तद्वतो भिन्नो युक्तः, तत्-स्वरूपभूतो हि सः । भवतु वा क्षणमात्रस्वभावः साक्षात्कारः तत्रापि अस्ति विमर्शः, अवश्यं चैतत्—अन्यथा इति यदि स न स्यात्, तत् एकाभिसंधानेन जवात् गच्छन्, त्वरितं च वर्णान् पठन्, द्रुतं च मन्त्रपुस्तकं वाचयन्, न अभिमतमेव गच्छेत्, उच्चारयेत्, वाचयेत् वा......। *Pv*, i. 228-29

घटोऽयमित्यध्यवसा नामरूपातिरेकिणी ।
परेश-शक्तिरात्मेव भासते न त्विदन्तया ॥२०॥

योजना :— 'अयं घट:' इति अध्यवसा (अध्यवसाय:) नामरूप-अतिरेकिणी (अति-रिक्त-भूत्वा) परेश-(चिति-) शक्तिर् (एव), (तत्तदाकारेण) आत्मा एव (अभेदेन) भासते, न तु (कदाचित्) इदन्तया (विच्छन्नत्वेन) (भाति)[1] ।

The determinate knowledge (adhyavasāya) such as expressed by the words "this is the jar", is the potency of the highest Lord (Self) (ayam ghaṭaḥ iti adhyavasā pareśa śaktiḥ), which is beyond the name and form (nāma-rūpa-atirekini), and always shines as one with the Self (ātmeva-abhedena bhāsate) and never apart as object denoted by the word "this" *(na tu idantayā bhāsate)*.

The teacher clearly says that even the determinate knowledge, expressed by the words "this is the jar" rests in the indeterminate consciousness.

Although all cognitions rest in one indeterminate consciousness or 'I-Consciousness' (*aham-vimarśa*), yet they appear, at the objective level, in diverse forms of determinate knowledge. This is what the teacher states in the concluding Kārikā :—

K 20—1 अयमिति घट इति वा-अध्यवसायो भिन्न-प्रकाशमान-नाम-रूपातिरिक्त-चितिशक्तिमय ऐव-आत्मेवाभेदेन आभासते इति । *Pvr*

...घट: इति य: स्थूल: शब्द: स प्रकाश-जीवितस्वभावो विमर्श इति । सोऽपि हि स्थूल: शब्दोऽर्थवत् पृथग्भूत एव भाति । तौ नाम-रूप-लक्षणौ शब्दार्थौ एक-रूप-तया 'सोऽयम्' इत्येवंरूपत्वेन परामृशन्ती अध्यवसायशक्ति: या, सा परमेश्वरशक्ति: विमर्शरूपा आत्मवत् एव अहमित्यनवच्छिन्नत्वेन भाति, न तु कदाचित् इदन्तया —विच्छन्नत्वेन भाति...... । *Pv, i, 232-33*

केवलं भिन्नसंवेद्य देशकालानुरोधतः ।
ज्ञानस्मृत्यवसायादि सक्रमं प्रतिभासते ॥२१॥

योजना :— (यद्यपि अक्रममेव संवित्तत्त्वम्), (परं तु तत्) केवलं भिन्नसंवेद्य (विषय) देशकाल-अनुरोधतः (तौ अनुरुध्य—च्छायामात्रेण अवलम्ब्य, अर्थात्—विभिन्न-देशकालादिना) ज्ञान-स्मृत्यवसायादि (भेदेन) सक्रमं प्रतिभास्यते[1] ।

Though Citi (Consciousness) is one and devoid of diversity (akramā), yet, owing only to the affection by temporal and special limitations of the variety of objects (*bhinna samvedhya deśa-kālānurodhataḥ kevalam*), it assumes diverse forms (becomes *sakrama*) as perception (*jñāna*), remembrance (*smṛti*), determinate knowledge (*avasāya*), etc (*jñāna-smṛtya-avasāyādi sakramam pratibhāsate*).

K 21—1 चित्तत्त्वस्य मायाशक्त्या भिन्नं घटादि संवेद्यं तत्तद्देशकालभिन्नं प्रकाश्यते, यस्याभेदेन-अवष्टम्भाद्विभिन्नदेश-कालादिना ज्ञानस्मृत्यादि अवभासते इति । *Pvṛ*

अक्रममेव संवित्तत्त्वम्, किन्तु स्वशक्तिवशात् भिन्नत्वेन भासितानि यानि वेद्यानि तेषां मूर्तिभेदकृतो यो दूरादूर-वैतत्यावैतत्यादिः देशः, क्रिया-भेदकृतश्च चिरशीघ्र-क्रमादिरूपः कालः, तौ अनुरुध्य—च्छायामात्रेण अवलम्ब्य, ज्ञान-स्मरणाध्यवसायानां स्वांशा इव भान्ति......। *Pv, i, 234-5*

*See Kaw, R. K. *the Doctrine of Recognition*, pp 147 ff

Ah. I, vi

अपोहनशक्ति-निरूपणम् (प्रत्यभिज्ञा-कारिकायां ज्ञानाधिकारे षष्टमाह्निकम्)

Power of Differentiation :-

The power of Differentiation (*Apohana-Śakti*) is indispensable to all determinate knowledg (*vikalpa*) Differentiation (*apohana*) is a determinative process (*vikalpa*) which implies certainity (*viniścaya*) between two different things of contrary nature, such as between fire (*vahni*) and non-fire (a-*vahni*). In determinacy many images are constructed in the mind and one particular manifestation is differentiated from all else, which was first doubted.[1] 'The determinative process begins with the selection by the mind (*manaḥ*) of some points out of the mass reflected on the *Buddhi*. It is like carving an image out of a big stone. It consists in a reaction of the mind on the sense data recorded (to speak figuratively) on the *Buddhi*, in making a selection of certain group of points from the whole mass, in adding to the selected something from the old store of memory and in giving it a definite shape and name'.[2] By virtue of *Apohana-Śakti*, the perceiver is capable of determining or ascertaining the manifestation of one object as different from that of another. It upholds both the former two powers, the powers of Remembrance and Knowledge (*tad ubhaya anugrāhiṇī apohana-śakti*). The determinative process (*vimarśa* or *vikalpa*) applies only to the worldly things, which are of the nature of diversity (*Māyā*), to whatever is related to speech. It cannot apply to the Self (*Ātman*) or the self-consciousness (*aham-pratyavamarśaḥ*), the essential nature of which is light (prakāśātmā), although it is embodied in speech (*vāg vapuḥ*), but that is the transcendental speech (*parā*), the inner speech which is one with *saṁvid* (*saṁvid-rūpāveśī*) and ever shines within (*antara avabhāsamānaḥ*); it is different from that sound which is of the nature of an object and, as such, is the object of the sense of hearing[3].

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1. विविधा कल्पना विविधत्वेन च शङ्कितस्य कल्पोऽन्यव्यवच्छेदन विकल्पः *Pv, i, 240*
2. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta, An Historical & Philosophical Study*, 1935, 282–83.
3. विषयरूपात् श्रोत्रग्राह्यात् शब्दादन्य एव अन्तरवभासमानः संविद्रूपावेशी शब्दनात्माभिलापो वागित्यनेनोक्तः। *Pv, i, 239-40*

The teacher, in the first **Kārikā**, says that the nature of determinacy cannot be attributed to self-consciousness :-

अहं प्रत्यवमर्शो यः प्रकाशात्मापि वाग्वपुः ।
नासौ विकल्पः स ह्यक्तो द्वयाक्षेपी विनिश्चयः ॥१॥

योजना :— अहं प्रत्यवमर्शः, यः प्रकाशात्मा वाग्वपु अपि, (स्वभाव-भूतः सन्) असौ विकल्पः (अपोहन-समुत्पन्नं ज्ञानं) न (भवति), स द्वयाक्षेपी (घटाघटयोर्द्वयोर्ज्ञानयोर्मध्ये एकः प्रतियोगि-निषेधपूर्वो) निश्चयः उक्तोहि [1] ।

The Self-consciousness (*aham-vimarśa*), whose very life or essense is light (i. e , that of consciousness) (*prakāsatmā*), even though it is embodied in the transcendental speech (*vag vapuḥ*), is not the determinate knowledge (*nasau vikalpaḥ*), because determinacy is certainty (*viniścayaḥ*) that implies two objects (different from each other, say jar and non-jar) (*dvayakṣepi*).

भिन्नयोरवभासो हि स्याद्घटाघटयोर्द्वयोः ।
प्रकाशस्येव नान्यस्य भेदिनस्त्ववभासनम् ॥२॥

योजना :— (कदाचित्) भिन्नयोः घटाघटयोः द्वयोः (विषययोः) अवभासः स्याद् हि, प्रकाशस्य इव तु भेदिनः (प्रकाश-भिन्नस्य) अन्यस्य (अप्रकाशस्य) अवभासनं न[1]।

It so happens that there appears manifestation of both jar and non-jar, which are essentially different from one another (*bhinnayoravabhāsaḥ*) (in place of one and the same object), due to imperfect perception, and the perceiver determines or ascertains it to be the manifestation of one

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K 1—1. प्रकाशस्यात्मन्यहमिति परावाग्रूपत्वात्साभिलापोऽपि स्वभावभूतः प्रत्यवमर्शो न विकल्प इत्युच्यते, स हि प्रतियोगिनिषेधपूर्वो निश्चयो न चात्र प्रतियोगिसम्भवः ।
Pvr

यदि वाग्वपुः—कस्मान्न विकल्पः ? आह—न ह्यस्य विकल्पलक्षणमस्ति, तथाहि—विविधा कल्पना विविधत्वेन च शङ्कितस्य कल्पोऽन्यव्यवच्छेदनं विकल्पः, विविधत्वं च वह्नावग्निसंभावना-समारोपनिरासे सति भवत्, द्वयं वह्न्यवह्निरूपमाक्षिपति, तेन (हेतुना) विकल्पेऽवश्यं तच्च (द्वयरूपत्वम्) निश्चेतव्यम्—अतश्च व्यपोहितव्यं भवति ।
Pv, i, 240-41

object as different from another), but nothing else shines like the light of consciousness (subject), which is different from that (i e , which is not light) (*prakāśasya iva tu bhedinaḥ anyasya avabhāsanam na*)

The act of determinacy cannot, therefore, apply to the Self (*Ātman*) which is of the nature of light (*prakāśa*), since nothing contrary to light (*a-prakāśa*), viz of the nature of darkness, shines Differentiation is not possible in respect of such entities as *prakāśa* (light) and *a-prakāśa* (darkness), which are contrary in nature, since the latter does not shine. For this reason, the essential nature of the Self, which is sentient (*cit*) and luminous (*prakāśa*), is only self-consciousness (*aham-pratyavamarśaḥ*) and not determinacy (*vikalpa*)

The Pūrvapakṣin asks the teacher to elucidate the process of differentiation, since we have not even heard of the name of *a-ghaṭa*, not to speak of its rejection How can the impression or idea (*vāsanā*) of non-jar arise on perception of jar ? In reply to this question, the teacher says :-

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K 2—1. प्रकाशाद्-द्वितीयस्य भिन्नस्य प्रतियोगिनोऽप्रकाशसंज्ञकस्यानवभासने प्रकाशेतरत्वं न स्यात् तस्यानवभासे व्यपोहनायोगाद्विकल्पताहानिः । *Pvr*

......अतो घटाघटयोर्द्वयोरवभासस्य संभावनात् समारोपः सावकाशी भवति, अघटस्य सत्यारोपे निषेधलक्षणोपोहनव्यापारः—इति तदनुप्राणिता विकल्परूपता घट इत्येतस्य निश्चयस्य, ...न च यत्प्रकाशेन कर्तव्यं तदप्रकाशस्य कदाचित् दृष्टं ....अतः प्रकाशतुल्यस्यान्यस्याप्रकाशरूपस्य भेदिनस्तत्तुल्यकक्षस्यापोहनात्मकभेदनव्यापारासहिष्णोरवभासनमेव नास्ति, तदभावे कस्यपोहनम् ? .... यस्मात् एवं, ततो द्वयाभावादपोहासंभवे विकल्परूपत्वाभावात् चिन्मात्रे परामर्शात्मनि अहमिति प्रत्यवमर्श एव, न तु विकल्पः । *Pv i, 242-43*

तदतत्प्रतिभाभाजा मात्रैवातद्व्यपोहनात् ।
तन्निश्चयनमुक्तो हि विकल्पो घट इत्ययम् ॥३॥

योजना :—'तद्'-'अतत्'-प्रतिभा-भाजा[1] (अन्तर्लीन तद-अतत्-अर्थाभासः यस्मिन् तेन।) मात्रा (प्रमात्रा) एव 'अतद्' वि-अपोहनात् (वि-अपोहनेन) 'तत्' निश्चयनम् 'अयं घटः' इति विकल्पः हि—उक्तः [2]

The subject, who experiences both the manifestations of 'this' and 'not-this' (with respect to one and the same object) (*tad-atat-pratibhā-bhājā mātrā*), feels the certainity of this (*tan-niścayanam*) by rejecting 'not-this' (*atad-vyapohanāt*), and that is spoken of as *Vikalpa* (the determinate cognition as is denoted by the expression 'this is jar' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ iti*).

When the determinate knowledge of *ghaṭa* arises, i.e. when an object, say 'jar', is perceived with certainity, it serves some practical purpose (*vyavahāra*). The term "*a-ghaṭa*" denotes various and numerous cognitions of different objects, which are rejected in the act of differentiation to get the determinate knowledge (*vikalpa*) of a particular object "*ghaṭa*". On the other hand, in the state of indeterminacy (*avikalpa-daśāyam*), the object "*ghaṭa*", in its nature of *Cit* (consciousness), remains as one with the Universal Consciousness, and, as such, it serves no practical purpose of the world.

The Pūrvapakṣin questions here, why cannot the process of determinacy or differentiation apply to self-consciousness (*aham-vimarśa*), as, in this, the consciousness of the objects other than the Self (*an-aham-vimarśa*) gets negated ? The teacher replies :-

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K 3—1. तत्-प्रतिभां घटाभासं अतत्-प्रतिभां च अघटाभासं प्रमाता भजते सेवते (इति तेन)। *Pv, i, 244*

2. प्रमातुरेव स्वतन्त्रस्यान्तर्लीनतदर्थाभासस्यातद्व्यपोहनेन घट इति निश्चयो विकल्पो नाम व्यापारः। *Pvr*

एवं च तत्-प्रतिभां घटाभासम् अतत्प्रतिभां च अघटाभासं प्रमाता भजते-सेवते तावत्, ...तेनाघटस्यात्मनः पटादेश्चापोहनं क्रियते निषेधनरूपं, तदेव व्यपोहनमाश्रित्य तस्य घटस्य निश्चयनमुच्यते 'घट एव' इति -एतार्थस्य संभाव्यमानापरवस्तुनिषेधरूपत्वात्,......। *Pv, i, 244*

चित्तत्वं मायया हित्वा भिन्न एवावभाति यः ।
देहे बुद्धावथ प्राणे कल्पिते नभसीव वा ।।४।।
प्रमातृत्वेनाहमिति विमर्शोऽन्यव्यपोहनात् ।
विकल्प एव स पर-प्रतियोग्यवभासजः ।।५।।

योजना 4&5 :— चित्तत्त्वं (स्व) मायया हित्वा 'ग्रहम्' इति विमर्शः यः ग्रन्य-व्यपोहनात् (व्यपोहनेन) देहे बुद्धौ प्राणे ग्रथवा कल्पिते नभसि इव (एव) प्रमातृत्वेन भिन्न एव ग्रवभाति, स विकल्प एव, (यस्मात्-यतः) (स) पर-प्रतियोगि ग्रवभासजः (भवति) (ग्रर्थात्—यतः स प्रतियोगिनिषेधात् जायते)[1]

(Trans. (4) and (5)) The Self-consciousness (*aham-iti-vimarśaḥ*) that gives up its sentient nature by the power of obscuration (*cit-tattvam mayaya hitva*) and shines distinctly as limited subject (*pramātṛtvena-avabhāti yaḥ*) within the limitations of the body, the intellect, the vital airs or the supposed voidness (*dehe buddhav atha prane kalpite nabhasīva va*), is determinate cognition (*vikalpa*). It is because it differentiates itself from others (*anya-vyapohanat*). *Vikalpa* (determinacy) owes its being to the manifestation or awareness of another thing which is of opposite nature (*sa para pratiyogi-avabhasajaḥ*).

K—4&5 (1) चित्तत्वस्यैवेश्वरस्य माया-शक्त्या भेदावभासिनि शरीरे बुद्धावन्तरे स्पर्शे तदुत्तीर्णे वाकाशे इव शून्ये एव कल्पितेऽहमितिप्रमातृ-भावेन विमर्शः तत्तदाभासमानशरीरादिप्रतियोग्यपोहनकरणात् घटोऽयमितिवद्विकल्प एव । *Pvr*

ग्रहमित्यवमर्शोद्विधा—शुद्धो मायीयश्च, तत्र शुद्धो यः संविन्मात्रे ...। ग्रशुद्धस्तु वेद्यरूपे शरीरादौ । तत्र शुद्धऽहं-प्रत्यवमर्शे प्रतियोगी न कश्चिदपोहितव्यः सभवति .. । ग्रशुद्धस्तु वेद्यरूपे शरीरादौ ग्रन्यस्माद् देहादेर्घटादेश्च व्यवच्छेदेन भवन् विकल्प एव—इति वाक्यार्थः । *Pv, i, 247-48*

... ...तथा च देहाभिमान-भूमिकायां स्थिताश्चार्वाकाः 'चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुषः' इति कायमेव प्रधान्येनाहुः ... ... । ततोऽपि विवेकवन्तः ... ... प्राणमेवात्मानं केचन श्रुत्यन्तविदो मन्यन्ते । ततोऽपि समधिकविवेकभाजः... ... ज्ञानसुखाद्याश्रयभूतां बुद्धिमेव काणादप्रभृतय ग्रात्मानमाहुः । ग्रपरे तु... ... यन्न-किंचिद्रूप सकलवेद्यराशिविनिर्मुक्त शून्यत्वान्नभस्तुल्यं न तु महाभूताकाशस्वभावं प्रमातृतत्त्वं शून्यब्रह्मवादिनः सांख्यप्रभृतयः ग्राहुः... ... ... तथात्वाभिमानमात्र—देहादिः प्रमातेति, संकोचमात्ररूप चित्तत्त्वं... ... । ग्रमी एव भूमिकाविशेषा उत्तरोत्तरमारोहतां योगिनां ... ... तत्स्थितम—ग्रशुद्धः 'ग्रहम' इत्यवमर्शो विकल्प एव ।

Pv, I, 249-54

Aham-vimarśa (Self-consciousness) has two aspects, the pure and the impure *Aham-vimarśa*, in its pure aspect, viz., the ultimate nature of the perceiving Self characterised by pure light (*Prakāśa*), does not imply determinacy, as it is not subject to the process of differentiation from its opposite entity *an-aham-vimarśa*. The impure aspect of *aham-vimarśa* is that which relates to the Self that comprises the body (*śarīra*), the mind (*buddhi*), the vital airs (*prāṇa*) and the void (*śūnya*), according to four different schools of thought. The differentiation can apply to this aspect of *aham-vimarśa*, i. e., that relating to the body, the mind, the vital airs or the void, since their corresponding opposite entities are also manifest, which can therefore be rejected in the proess of differentiation.

The Pūrvapakṣin doubts that, in the case of impure *aham-vimarśa*, in which there is the unification (*anusaṁdhāna*) of the consciousness of the body, etc., with the pure self-consciousness, the direct experience (that is, *anubhava-mātra-rūpa*) relating to the Self may not be taken as Vikalpa (determinate knowledge). To this objection, the teacher replies :—

कादाचित्कावभासे या पूर्वाभासादियोजना ।
संस्कारात्कल्पना प्रोक्ता सापि भिन्नावभासिनि ॥६॥

योजना :— कादाचित्क-अवभासे संस्कारात् (पूर्व-अवभास-स्थिति-लक्षण-संस्कार-आश्रिता) या पूर्व-आभासादि योजना, सापि कल्पना (प्रत्यभिज्ञाख्या) प्रोक्ता, (यतः सा) भिन्न-अवभासिनि (विषये) वर्तते[1] ।

K 6—1 विच्छिन्नविच्छिन्नेषु शून्यदेहाद्याभासभेदेषु पूर्वाभासाख्याहंकाराणामैक्य-योजनान्तः पूर्वावभासस्थितिलक्षण-संस्काराश्रिता प्रमातृव्यापार-रूपा कल्पनैव प्रत्यभिज्ञाख्या । *Pvr*

देह इत्यादि... तत्र या पूर्वाभासेन बालादिशरीरावभासेन योजना 'योऽहं बालः' स एवाद्य 'युवा' इत्यनुसंधानम्, आदिग्रहणादुत्तरेण भाविना आभासेन सह योजना 'स्थविरो भवितास्मि' इति सा योजना सर्वा कल्पना विकल्प एव, न तु शुद्धः प्रत्यवमर्शः । ......भिन्ने हि कथमनुसंधानम् ? इति चेदाह 'संस्कारात्'—प्राक्तनानुभवकृतवासनाप्रबोधजस्मृतिवशात् इति यावत्, प्राणे बलाबलवशादनुसंधिः, बुद्धौ ज्ञानसुखादितारतम्यात्, शून्ये वैतत्यावैतत्ययोगात्, अयमपि विकल्प एव, ...
Pv, i,256-57

The association of a distinct cognition, at any time, with the previous one (*kādācitka-avabhāse yā pūrva-ābhāsādi-yojanā*), which takes place due to the past impressions (*saṁskārāt*) (in the case of a limited subject), is also called *Kalpanā* (determinate knowledge) (particularly named *Pratyabhijñā*), because it is also related to that (body, etc.,), which shines separately as limited subject (*sāpi bhinnāvabhāsini*).

The experience *pratyabhijñā* is, therefore, a form of determinate knowledge (*kalpanā*), which is the result of process of differentiation, because, although in it there is unification of the present cognition with the former resting in the self-luminous *Cit* owing to past impression (*saṁskāra*), it relates to the objective or limited self, the body, etc.

The teacher now arrives at his main doctrine :—

तदेवं व्यवहारेऽपि प्रभुर्देहादिमाविशन् ।
भान्तमेवान्तरर्थौघमिच्छया भासयेद्बहिः ॥७॥

योजना :— तद् (ततः, तस्मात्) व्यवहारेऽपि प्रभुर् (महेश्वरः, प्रमाता) (मायाशक्त्या) देहादिम् आविशन् अन्तर्-भान्तम् अर्थ-ओघम् इच्छया (कर्तृशक्त्या) बहिर् भासयेत् (आभासयति)[1] ।

Therefore we must admit that, even in practical life (*vyavahāre, pi*), the Lord (*prabhu*), one Supreme Perceiver, having entered into body, etc , as individual subject (*dehādim-āviśan*) by His free will (*icchayā*), manifests

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K 7—1 आदिसर्गे वा व्यवहारकालेऽपि वा महेश्वरो मायाशक्त्या देहादिमात्मत्वेनाभिनिविश्य प्रमातारं कुर्वन्नन्तःस्थितं विभान्तमेव तत्तदर्थं क्रमेण बहीरूपं कर्तृशक्त्याभासयति। यथावभासनमेवापूर्वमेवोत्पादनमस्य, देहाद्यनाविष्टस्य तु स्वतो युगपदहमिदमिति सर्वार्थप्रकाशः ।

Pv

यदि व्यवहारे मायापदे देहप्राणादिमपि प्रभुरेव प्रकाशपरमार्थ इच्छया—मायाशक्तिरूपया, आविशन्—देहप्राणादिप्राधान्येन स्वरूपं प्रदर्शयन्, अन्तः—संविन्मात्रे, भान्तम्—अहमित्येवंरूपम् अर्थौघम् इच्छयैव बहिः इदमिति भासयति तत् एतदुपपद्यते ।......... 'व्यवहारकाले'—क्रयविक्रयप्रेक्षाव्याख्यादौ ....तेन न केवलं महासृष्टिषु महास्थितिषु महाप्रलयेषु प्रकोपतिरोधानेषु दीक्षाज्ञानाद्यनुग्रहेषु भगवतः कृत्य-पंचक-योगः यावत् सततमेव व्यवहारेऽपि ।......... *Pv*, I, 259-62

externally (*bhasayet bahih*) (by his power of action) the mass of objects, which shines within Him (*bhāntam antara-arthaugham*).

Ultimately, all this universe comprising the experiences of the limited perceivers, the body, the mind, etc., are illuminated by the light of consciousness (*samvid-prakāśa*), the self-luminous Universal Perceiver, Who does not need another higher perceiver for His illumination. So we must admit one and only one Perceiver, the Supreme Perceiver, who, identifying Himself with the bodies and the vital airs, etc., of the limited perceivers, say Caitra, Maitra, etc., manifests externally, as separate from one another, all the objects which shine within Him. This internality or the identity of the external objects with the Supreme Consciousness remains ultimately unbroken. In this manner, the Lord, not only performs His five great functions, *Mahasṛṣti* (great creation), etc., but also performs the acts of ordinary living beings

Concluding the subject, the teacher says :—

एवं स्मृतौ विकल्पे वा-प्यपोहनपरायणे ।
ज्ञाने वाप्यन्तराभासः स्थित एवेति निश्चितम् ।८॥

योजना :—एवं स्मृतौ ज्ञाने वा अपोहन-परायणे विकल्पे वा-अपि अन्तर्-आभासः (प्रमातृ संलीनतया अवभासः) स्थित एव-इति निश्चितम् (नात्र संशयः कश्चित्)' ।

It is thus established (*iti niścitam*) that everything shines within the Self (*antar-ābhasaḥ sthitaḥ eva*) in all experiences like remembrance (*smṛtau*) or perception (*jñane*) and in determinate knowledge which depends upon differentiation (*apohana-parayane vikalpe vā*).

K 8—1 सर्वसंवित्सु सर्वार्थविभासः प्रमातृसंलीनश्चितत्त्ववदानुपूर्व्येण प्रकाशमानः सदा स्थित एव । *Pvr*

प्रकाशात्मा परमेश्वर एव यतो देहादिप्रमाततााभिमानदशायामपि वस्तुतः प्रमाता, एवम् इति (प्रकाशात्मा परमेश्वर एव, यतः सर्वस्य जीवितं.........) अतो हेतोः इदं सिद्धं भवति–स्मरणे अपोहनजीविते च विकल्पे अनुभवज्ञाने च अन्तराभासः (प्रमातृ-संलीनतयावभासः) प्रकाशविश्रान्तः स्थित एव, (अर्थात्) नात्र संशयः कश्चित्,... ...

Pv, i, 264-5

Antarabhāsaḥ here implies the internal luminousness of the Self, the Supreme Consciousness, which is the real *Pramātā* (Perceiver), within which rest all the limited subjects and objects.

किन्तु नैसर्गिको ज्ञाने बहिराभासनात्मनि ।
पूर्वानुभवरूपस्तु स्थितः स स्मरणादिषु ॥९॥

योजना :— किन्तु तद्-अन्तराभासः (चित्तत्त्वस्यान्तरावभासः) बहिराभासनात्मनि ज्ञाने नैसर्गिकः (सहज एव) स्थितः, स्मरणादिषु स पूर्व-अनुभव-रूपस् तु (पूर्वानुभवात्मा) (अत एव स्मृतिः संस्कारजोच्यते)[1] ।

But (*kintu*), in perception (*jñāne*), in which the objects are externally manifest (*bahir ābhāsanātmani*), the external manifestation of that which is internal (*tad-antarābhāsaḥ*) is natural (*naisargikaḥ—sahaja-eva sthitaḥ*), i.e., is due to his own *svātantrya* (self-dependent power), and in remembrance, etc, (*smaranādiṣu*), the manifestations arise from (the residual traces of) the former perception (*pūrvānubhava-rūpastu*).

Perception is a direct experience independent of any other experience, unlike remembrance, etc, which depend upon other experiences (viz., the former perceptions, etc.) In the latter, the manifestations arise from the residual traces of the previous perceptions. Hence, in the case of perception, the manifestation is distinct (*sphuṭa*) and, in the case of remembrance, etc., it is indistinct (*asphuṭa*). In perception, the senses come in direct contact with the external objects, hence its manifestation is distinctly visible (*sphuṭa*) and natural (*naisargikaḥ*). It is not so in remembrance

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K 9—1 ज्ञाने बहिराभासनरूपे सहज एव चित्तत्त्वस्यान्तरर्थावभासः स्मृत्यादौ तु पूर्वानुभवात्माऽत एव स्मृतिः संस्कारजोच्यते ।

Pvr

अनुभवज्ञानस्य इदं नोलम्' इति अन्तराभासं बहिराभासयतः सोऽन्तर्भावाभासो नैसर्गिको—निसृष्टेः स्वातन्त्र्यात् (अनन्य-शरणतयैव) आयातो न तु स्मरणादेरिव अन्यज्ञानकृतवासनादिबलात्, स्मरणे उत्प्रेक्षणे ....नासौ स्वात्मीयः (स्मरणकालीनः) अपि तु पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारजोऽसौ. .. ...। एतदेव अस्फुटत्वम् (अनुभवज्ञानस्य स्फुटत्वम्)

Pv, i, 267-8

स नैसर्गिक एवास्ति विकल्पे स्वैरचारिणि।
यथाभिमतसंस्थानाभासनाद्बुद्धिगोचरे ।।१०।।

योजना :— बुद्धिगोचरे यथाभिमत-संस्थान-आभासनाद् (स्वतन्त्रस्तु विकल्पः), स्वैरचारिणि विकल्पे स (अन्तराभासः) नैसर्गिक एव[1] ।

In the determinate cognition (*vikalpa*) also, which is free in its working (*svairacarine*), because it can manifest anything in any desired order or position within the range of the Buddhi (*buddhi-gocare-yathābhimata samsthanābhasanat*), that external manifestation is natural (viz , is self-dependent or independent of any other experience) (*sa naisargika eva*).

In *vikalpa*, i. e., imagery, etc , the manifestation is inborn in the internal mind and is thus independent of anything else like external objects, hence it is *svatantra* (self-dependent) and *svaira-carina* (free in its working). It is urged or stimulated by itself to work in any desired direction, and remains confined within the mirror of the *Buddhi* (mind).

अत एव यथाभीष्ट-समुल्लेखावभासनात् ।
ज्ञानक्रिये स्फुटे एव सिद्धे सर्वस्य जीवतः ।।११।।

K 10—1 स्वतन्त्रस्तु विकल्पश्चक्षुराद्यगोचरमपि बुद्धिविषयतापादनेन यथारुचि पूर्वानुभूतत्वाविमर्शनेन नवमेव तं तमर्थमाभासयति सन्निवेशविशेषं च, तत्रासावर्थः सहज एवास्ति । *Pvr*

स (सः—अन्तराभासः), नैसर्गिकः (अन्योपायानपेक्षः स्वभावसिद्धः) (*Pv, i*, 269, *fn*), यः प्रत्यक्षव्यापारम् अनुपजीवन् (अनपेक्षकः) व्याक्षेपसारतया (मनसः) मनोराज्यसंकल्पादिविकल्पः स स्वैरं कृत्वा—स्वप्रेरणेन परप्रेरणनैरपेक्ष्येण स्वातन्त्र्येण चरति उदेति व्ययते च, तत्र यो बहिरवभासो नीलादेःअन्तराभासमयस्य स नैसर्गिक एव,.........। *Pv, i, 270*

योजना :—(विकल्पस्य) यथा-अभीष्ट-समुल्लेख-अवभासनात् (अपूर्व-अर्थ-निर्माण-ज्ञान-सामर्थ्यात्), (अत एव) सर्वस्य जीवतः ज्ञानक्रिये स्फुटे एव सिद्धे (सर्वस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वकर्तृत्वं च स्फुटम्[1]।

For this very reason, i e., as *Vikalpa* has the capacity to manifest all that is desired to be manifested (*yathā-abhīṣṭa-samullekhāvabhāsanāt*), it is clearly established that all living beings are endowed with the powers of knowledge and action (sarvasya-jivataḥ jñāna-kriye sphute eva siddhe).

In reality, every determinate cognition (*vikalpa*) is innate in Ātman (soul) which possesses the potential powers of *jñāna* (knowledge) and *kriyā* (action). The *Jñāna-Śakti* is that which 'manifests' (*avabhāsana-rūpaḥ*) and *Kriyā-Śakti* is that which 'evolves' (*ullekhana-rūpaḥ*). The former relates to the experiences in the internal consciousness and the latter refers to the evolution of manifestations of the external objects

It is thus established that *Jñātratva-Śakti* (the Cognitive Power) of the Supreme Self (*Svātman*) functions in three distinct forms, as the powers of Remembrance, Knowledge and Differentiation, in the whole creation from *Brahmā* (the highest sentient being) to an insignificant insect.

K 11—1 अपूर्वार्थनिर्माणज्ञान-सामर्थ्याच्च विकल्प एव सर्वस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वकर्तृत्वं च स्फुटम्।

Pvr

यत् इदं यथाभीष्टस्य बहिरसत्त्वात् अननुभूतस्यापि सम्यक् उल्लेखनम्, अव-भासनं च विकल्पस्य प्रसङ्गात् दर्शितम्। *Pv, i, 272*

See Kaw, R. K., *The Doctrine of Recognition*, pp 159 ff.

एकाश्रय-निरूपणम् (प्रत्यभिज्ञा-कारिकायां ज्ञानाधिकारे सप्तममाह्निकम्)

Substratum of the said three powers—One Supreme Consciousness (Lord, *Maheśvara*), the Self :-

The powers of Remembrance, Knowledge and Differentiation, inherent in the Self, have exactly been defined in the preceding Ahnikas The present Ahnika establishes that the underlying basis of these three powers is One, the great Lord (*Maheśvara*), the Supreme Perceiver, who is free (*svatantra*) to bring about the union or separation of these powers, unlike an insentient thing, say fire, which is the substratum of the powers of burning, emitting heat and light, etc, but lacks the freedom of will (faculty of consciousness) in making use of its powers itself.[1]

In the Kārikā 1, the teacher first defines the perceiving subject, the Self (*Pramātā*), as follows :-

या चैषा प्रतिभा तत्तत् पदार्थक्रमरूषिता ।
अक्रमानन्तचिद्रूपः प्रमाता स महेश्वरः ॥१॥

योजना :— तत्तत्-पदार्थक्रमरूषिता (तत्तद्-विषय-उपश्लिष्टा, अथवा, तत्तत् विषयक्रमे उपरक्ता), या एषा प्रतिभा (संवेदनम्—संवित्तिः), स अक्रम-अनन्त-चिद्रूपः महेश्वरः प्रमाता[1] ।

K 1—1 तत्तत्पदार्थक्रमाच्छुरितश्चैषोऽन्तःस्थित एवाभासः सर्वसंवित्कालव्याप्य-क्रमानन्तचिन्मय आत्मसंज्ञः प्रमाता स्वाङ्गभूते प्रमेये निर्मातृतया महेश्वरश्च । *Pvr*

'प्रतिभा'—संवेदनम्, 'प्रतिभाति घटः' इति यद्यपि विषयोपश्लिष्टमेव प्रतिभान भाति तथापि न तद्विषयस्य स्वकं वपुः, अपि तु संवेदनमेव तत् तथा चकास्ति 'मां प्रति भाति' इति प्रमातृलग्नत्वात् (प्रमातृ-निष्टतयैव स्फुरणात्) । 'क्रमः'—देश-कालपरिपाटी, तेन रूषिता—प्रतिबिम्ब-कल्पतया उपरक्ता, या प्रतिभा उक्ता ....सैव महेश्वरः.........*Pv, i, 277-79*

अधुना तु तासां शक्तीनाम् एक आश्रयः, स च तच्छक्तिसंयोजन-वियोजनादि-स्वाच्छन्द्य-योगात् महेश्वरः न तु जड-स्वरूप-वह्न्यादिवत् दाहक-पाचकादि-शक्त्याश्रयमात्रम् । *Pv, i, 275*

This consciousness (*yā ca eṣā pratibhā*), which manifests itself in variety of forms of diverse objects (*tat-tat-padārtha-krama-rūṣita*) is the perceiving subject (*Pramātā*), the great Lord (*Maheśvara*), whose essential nature is unchanging, and endless knowledge (*akrama-ananta-cidrūpaḥ*).

The teacher is now going to prove that, were there no conscious entity as the One perceiving Self, there would be no relationship in objects, sentient or insentient, but all would either be a dead lump, or haphazard and mechanical ; nothing would penetrate or relate wirh another. Thus there would be no order and system, and hence no cosmos, but absolute chaos in nature.

तत्तद्विभिन्नसंवित्तिमुखैरेकप्रमातरि ।
प्रतितिष्ठत्सु भावेषु ज्ञातेयमुपपद्यते ॥२॥

योजना :– तत्तद विभिन्ना (अनेका) संवित्तिः (संवित् स्रोतो) मुखैर (तास्ताः विभिन्ना संविदः तानि एव मुखानि द्वराणि तैः) एकप्रमातरि प्रतितिष्ठत्सु (प्रमातृ-सिन्धुम् उपलीय सत्सु) भावेषु ज्ञातेयम् (कार्यकारणतादि-व्यवहार समन्वयः) उपपद्यते[1] ।

The mutual relationship of objects is possible (*bhāveṣu jñāteyam upapadyate*) only, because they rest together in the One subject (*eka-pramātari pratitiṣṭhatsu*) facing one another (entering in it) through the channels (*dvārai tair eva mukhair*) of different cognitions (just as various streams enter into the ocean and rest in it all together) (*tat-tad-vibhinna-samvitti-mukhair eka pramātari-pramātṛ-sindhvm·upalīya satsu*).

K 2–1 अनेकसंवित्स्रोतोमुखैरेकप्रमातृसिन्धुमुपलीय भावभेदाः कार्यकारणतादि व्यवहारसमन्वयं भजन्ते ।

Pvr

.........तास्ता विभिन्नाः संविदो निश्चयरूपाः प्रमात्मानो याः तानि एव मुखानि द्वाराणि उपाया मार्गाः तैः मुखैः नदीस्रोतःस्थानीयैः यदि अमी भावा नीलसुखादय ऊह्यमाना एकस्मिन् 'अहम् इति' प्रमातृरूपे महासंवित्समुद्रे प्रतितिष्ठन्ति—आभिमुख्येन विश्रान्तिं भजन्ते, तत् एषु (नीलसुखादिभावेषु) परस्परं समन्वयरूपं यत् ज्ञातेयं तत् उपपत्त्या घटते । ....अन्योन्ययोगक्षेमोद्वहनात्मकं ज्ञातेयम्,......न जडानां स्वतः समन्वयः कदाचिदपि..........

Pv, i, 281-82

Mutual relation of objects rests in Subject

The insetient objects do not have mutual connection in themselves, except through their knowledge inherent in the subject, which is the common ground or attribute of all of them. This is what the teacher states in the following Kārikā :-

देशकालक्रमजुषामर्थानां स्वसमापिनाम् ।
सकृदाभाससाध्योऽसावन्यथा कः समन्वयः ॥३॥

योजना :— अन्यथा, देशकालक्रमजुषाम् स्वसमापिनाम् (स्वात्मपरिनिष्ठितमेव स्वरूपम् अवभासनम् एषां भावानां, अथवा, स्वरूपमात्र प्रतिष्ठानाम्) अर्थानाम् कः समन्वयः ? (एषाम्) असौ (समन्वयः) सकृद्-आभास-साध्यः (भवति) (युगपद् एकाभास निबन्धश्च एषां समन्वयः सोऽभिन्नः प्रमातृलीनतया कल्पते)[1]

Otherwise, how can mutual relation of objects, which are connected with different temporal and spatial orders and are self-confined, be possible? *(anyathā, deśa-kāla-krama-juṣām sva-samāpinām arthānām kaḥ samanvayaḥ).* It (i.e., their, mutual relationship) is established by their shining simultaneously in the subject *(asau samanvayaḥ sakṛd-ābhāsa-sādhyaḥ).*

The teacher now explains the possible cause of the mutual connection of different things. It is their knowledge or awareness resting in the consciousness (subject) that brings about their mutual relation. He says, according to the Naiyāyikas, the general relalion of cause and effect in different things is established in five possible ways, viz., by means of two perceptions and three non-perceptions *(pratyakṣa and anupālambha)*, which are stated in the technical language of the Indian logic as : (1) *agni pratyakṣa* (a person perceives fire), (2) ***dhūma*** *anupālambhaḥ* (he does not see smoke), (3) *dhūma pratyakṣa* (he directly perceives smoke), (4) *vyatireke agni anupālambhaḥ* (if he does not see fire), and (5) *vyatireke dhūma anupālambhaḥ* (then

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K3—1 स्वस्वरूपमवभासनं च भावानां स्वात्मपरिनिष्ठतमेव–युगपदेकाभासनिबन्धनश्चषां समन्वयः सोऽभिन्नः प्रमातृलीनतया कल्पते । *Pvṛ*

अर्थानां (नीलसुखादीनां) जडानां, तज्ज्ञानानां तद्विकल्पानां तन्निश्चयानां च देशक्रमं कालक्रमं च अत्यजतां, स्वसमापिनां–स्वरूपमात्रप्रतिष्ठानां, (अन्यथा) कः समन्वयः––न कश्चित् इत्यर्थः *Pv, i, 283*

he does not find smoke also). All these five means are in themselves confined to their respective spheres; but, since they rest together in one self-consciousness, the perceiving subject *(Pramātā)*, so the causal relation between things can be established by means of these five. It is only when the knowledge of the five premises, 'fire', 'absence of smoke', 'smoke', 'absence of fire', and 'absence of smoke' enter through five channels of perception and non-perception into one self-conciouness, the subject (*samvid*), as it were the sea, then resting in it together as unified, they become dependent upon one another, in causal relation, through power of freedom *(svātantrya)* of the Self, otherwise they will remain unrelated like jar and cloth. The teacher states the same idea in the following Kārikā :-

प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भानां तत्तद्भिन्नांशपातिनाम् ।
कार्यकारणता-सिद्धि-हेतुतैकप्रमातृजा ॥४॥

योजना :– प्रत्यक्ष-अनुपालम्मानां (प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भस्रोतपञ्चकः) तत् तद् भिन्नांशपाति-नाम् (क्रमिकस्वविषयमात्रज्ञापनक्षीणा नान्योन्यापेक्षोपलक्षणक्षमाः) (तेषां) कार्यकारणता सिद्धिहेतुता एकप्रमातृजा (तैः एकप्रमातृमुखेन समन्वयमागत्य एव उपपद्यते)[1] ।

As perceptions and non-perceptions remain exclusively confined to their respective spheres, being different from one another (*pratyakṣa-anupālambhānām tat-tad-bhinnamśa-pātinām*), the establishment of the relation of cause and effect, therefore, results from oneness of the subject (*kārya-kāranatā siddhi-hetutā eka-pramātrjā*).

K4—1 कार्यकारणभाव इव तत्सिद्धिरपि प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भैरेकप्रमातृमुखेन समन्वयमागत्य समन्विता, प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भा क्रमिकस्वविषयमात्रज्ञापनक्षीणा नान्योन्यापेक्षोप-लक्षणक्षमाः ।

Pvr

इह अग्नौ प्रत्यक्षे धूमं न उपलभते, ततो धूमं प्रत्यक्षेण पश्यति, अग्निं तु यदि न उपलभते धूममपि न उपलभते—इति प्रत्यक्षाभ्याम् अनुपालम्भैश्च इति पञ्चकात् 'कार्यकारणभावो धूमाग्नयोः सिद्धयति..............

Pv, i, 284-5

यदा तु प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भस्रोतः–पञ्चकेन तानि पञ्च वस्तूनि एक-संवित्समुद्रविश्रान्तानि कृतानि तदा एकीभूतानि प्रमात्रा स्वतन्त्रतया अन्योन्यसापेक्षाणि न तु घटपटादिवत् भास्यन्ते स एव एक आभासः कार्यकारणभाववभास इति । ....

Pv, i, 286

The Naiyayikas assert that the causal relation between fire and smoke is established thus by means of the five premises, viz. two perceptions and three non-perceptions :- When (1) a person perceives fire, (2) he does not see smoke, then (3) he directly perceives smoke. If (4) he does not see fire, (5) he does not find smoke also.

But,..........., when through five channels of perception and non-perception those five things enter into one sea, then coming together they are manifested by the subject through his power of freedom, as unified with and dependent upon each other, but not otherwise, (unrelated) like jar and cloth. The single manifestation of interdependence is the relation of cause and effect. *Bhā, III, 101*

The pūrvapakṣin questions, the causal relation in different things is established by remembrance, how do you say, then, that it depends on the oneness of the subject *(Pramātā)* ? The teacher replies this question as follows :

स्मृतौ यैव स्वसंवित्तिः प्रमाणं स्वात्मसंभवे ।
पूर्वानुभव सद्भावे साधनं सैव नापरम् ॥५॥

योजना :– यैव स्वसंवित्तिः स्मृतौ स्वात्मसंभवे प्रमाणं, सैव पूर्वानुभव सद्भावे (अपि) साधनं, अपरं न (यदेव स्मृति स्वसंवेदनम्, तदेव अनुभवस्य स्वसंवेदनम्, न तु अपरं स्वसंवेदन-व्यतिरिक्तम्)[1] ।

K5—1 पूर्वानुभवस्वसंवेदनस्याभावात् स्मृतिस्वसंवेदनमेवात्रैकार्थाभासमयप्रमातृरूपं स्मृति-स्वरूपे इव प्रमाणं स्मृतेः पूर्वानुभवाभासाभावे कार्यकारणभावासिद्धेर्न कार्यलिङ्गता ।

Pvr

इह अनुभूतो विषयः प्रकाशते स्मृतौ, तत्र विषयस्य सा स्मृतिः न नूतनः प्रकाशः अपि तु अस्य स प्राच्य एव अनुभवप्रकाशः...........तस्मात् एतत् एवमुपपद्यते, यदेव स्मृतिस्वसंवेदनम्, तदेव अनुभवस्य स्वसंवेदनम्, न तु अपरं स्वसंवेदन-व्यतिरिक्तम् ।

Pv, i, 288-9

स्मृतौ यैव स्वसंविति :– सारभूतं स्वसंवेदनम्, स्वात्मसंभवेस्मृत्याख्यनिजस्वरूपस्य प्रकाशने भरणे च प्रमाणं भवति, सैव स्वसंवित्तिः पूर्वानुभवस्य सद्भावे पूर्वानुभवस्य प्रकाशने भरणे च साधनं प्रमाणम् आसीत्, अपरम् अन्यत् प्रत्यक्षादिकं नासीत्, तस्य तत्राशक्तत्वात्, तथा च स्वसंवेदनाख्यैक-प्रमातृसिद्धिरितिभावः ।

Bhā I, 364

The same self-consciousness (*sva-saṁvitti*), which is itself the proof of its own existence in remembrance (*yaiva sva-samvittiḥ smṛtau svātma-sambhave pramāṇam*), is also itself, and no other, the means of establishing existence of former perception (*saiva pūrvānubhava-sadbhāve api sādhanam, aparam na*).

The self-consicousness of the later remembrance is not different from that of the former perception. It is one and the same consciousness that existed before and experienced the former perception, and which gives rise to the later remembrance. That same self-consciousness is the subject (*Pramātā*) on which depends the establishment of the causal relation between two things. In the next Kārikā, the teacher further says that the relation of contraries is also possible for the same reason, i.e., depends upon the same self-consciousness (subject) :-

बाध्यबाधकभावोऽपि स्वात्मनिष्ठाविरोधिनाम् ।
ज्ञानानामुदियादेकप्रमातृपरिनिष्ठितेः ॥६॥

योजना :– बाध्यबाधकभावोऽपि स्वात्मनिष्ठाविरोधिनाम् (भिन्नस्वाभासमात्रनिष्ठानां-ज्ञानानां–अन्योन्यं विरोधस्य अभावात्, तेषां) ज्ञानानाम् एक-प्रमातृपरिनिष्ठितेः (विश्रान्तौ) उदियात् (उदयति-उपपद्यते-युक्तम्)[1]

The relation of contraries (*bādhyabādhaka-bhāvaḥ*) is also possible only because of the fact that all congnitions rest in one (permanent) subject (*jñānam eka-pramātṛ-pariniṣṭhiteḥ udiyāt*), while resting in themselves separately, the congitions cannot annul one another (*svātma-niṣṭhā-avirodhinām*).

K 6—1 भिन्नस्वाभासमात्रनिष्ठानां ज्ञानानां को विरोधस्ततकथं बाध्यबाधकत्वमेक प्रमातृविश्रान्तौ तु यक्तम् ।

(Contd.) *Pvṛ*

The relatian of contraries, as, for instance, between the cognition of a piece of mother-of-pearl and that of a piece of silver in place of one and the same object, cannot be established by these two opposite cognitions themselves, since the one cognition, that of the real piece of mother-of-pearl, as different from the other, i.e., the cognition of a piece of silver, is not potent to know the latter as unreal and reject the same Therefore, we have to admit the existence of one knower *(Pramātā)* who judges the essence of both the cognitions, accepts the correct cognition, and rejects the other.

विविक्त-भूतलज्ञानं घटाभावमतिर्यथा ।
तथा चेच्छुक्तिकाज्ञानं रूप्यज्ञानाप्रमात्ववित् ॥७॥

योजना :– विविक्तभूतलज्ञानं (शुद्धभूतलज्ञानं) यथा घटाभावमतिः (घटाभावज्ञानं) (वेदयति), तथा शुक्तिकाज्ञानं रूप्यज्ञानं अप्रमात्ववित् (रजतज्ञानस्य अप्रमात्वम्—अप्रमाण्यं) तथा (वेदयति) इतिचेत् ।[1]

अयं बाध्यबाधकभावः सत्यासत्यप्रविभाजनाय विश्वेषां व्यवहाराणां जीवितभूतो, न एकेन प्रमातृतत्त्वेन विना घटत इति ।

Pv, i, 290

शुक्तिज्ञानेन रजतज्ञानं बाध्यते इत्यपि न युक्तम्—स्वस्मिन विषये आत्मनि च स्वरूपे (स्वसंवेदने) द्वयोः ज्ञानयोः परिनिष्ठितयोः विश्रान्तयोः अन्योन्यं विरोधस्य अभावात् ।... एवमेकत्र प्रमातरि पूर्वज्ञानस्य (रजतज्ञानस्य) परिवर्जनेन यतो निश्चता (शुक्तिज्ञानस्य) स्थितिः, अतो बाध्य-बाधक-व्यवहार उपपन्नः, नीलादिवत् किल तानपि व्यवहारान् स एव परमेश्वरः स्वातन्त्र्यात् आभासयति तत् तेऽपि सत्या एवेति ।

Pv, i, 291-4

K7—1 इह भूतले घटो नास्तीति घटाभावज्ञानं केवलभूतलज्ञानमेव शून्यभूतलस्य घटाभावरूपत्वात् । तथैव यदि शुक्तिकारजतयोरपरस्परात्मत्वाच्छुक्तिकाज्ञानमिति प्रत्यक्षबाधकम् ।

शुद्धभूतलज्ञानमेव यथा घटाभावज्ञानं, तथैव शुक्तिज्ञानगत-यथार्थप्रकाशनलक्षणप्रामाण्य संवेदनमेव...... शुक्ति-विपरीतरजतज्ञानगता-ययार्थत्वस्वभावाप्रामाण्यसंवेदनं, स एव च बाध इति, किं तत्र प्रमात्रैक्येन इति परो ब्रूयादिति सूत्रार्थः । रूप्यज्ञानं, तस्य अप्रमात्वम्—अप्रामाण्यं, तस्य वित्—वेदनम्, ज्ञानस्याप्रमाण्यवेदनमितिभावः ।

Pv, i, 296, Fn,

The Pūrva-pakṣin questions here: But if you say that just as the consciousness of the absence of jar on the ground means the consciousness of voidness of the ground (viz. without anything lying on it) (*viviktabhūtala-jñānam yathā ghaṭābhāva-matiḥ vedayati*), so the real knowledge of mother-of-pearl is indicated by the consciousness of invalidity of the perception of piece of silver (*tathā śuktikā-jñānam rūpya-jñāna-apramatvavit; iti cet*).

नैवं शुद्धस्थलज्ञानात् सिद्ध्येत्तस्याघटात्मता ।
न तूपलब्धियोग्यस्याप्यत्राभावो घटात्मनः ॥८॥

योजना :– एवं न, शुद्धस्थलज्ञानात् तस्य (स्थलस्य) अघटात्मता सिद्धयेत् (सिद्ध-यति); न तु उपलब्धियोग्यस्य घटात्मनः अत्र अभावः (अस्ति) ।[1]

उपलब्धि-योग्यस्यापि—उपलब्धिलक्षणं प्राप्तस्यापि, घटात्मनः—घटस्वरूपस्य, अत्र भूतले इत्यपि-शब्दाभिप्रायः, अन्ये हि वादिनः उपलब्धि-योग्यस्य शुद्धभूतलज्ञानेन अभावं साधयन्त्येव, शुद्धस्थलज्ञानात् अभावः सिध्येत्, उपलब्धिलक्षणं प्राप्तस्य पिशाचादेरभावसिद्धौ का कथा अस्माकं तदपि नेष्टम् ।

Bhā I, 374

The teacher replies this objection as follows :-

It is not right (*naivam*); for, from the knowledge of the bare ground, the ground's existence as a separate entity apart from jar may be established (*śuddhasthala-jñānāt tasya sthalasya aghaṭātmatā siddhyet*), but certainly it cannot establish the absence of jar (on the ground) which is capable of being perceived (*na tu upalabdhi-yogyasya ghaṭātmanaḥ atra abhāvaḥ*).

K8 1 केवलभूतलज्ञानाद्भूतलस्याघटात्मता सिद्धयति न तु तत्राधारे भिन्नो दर्शनयोग्योऽपि घटो नास्तीति ।

Pvṛ

यो दृष्टान्त उक्तः स एव न, कुतः ? इति चेत उच्यते—इह भूतलं न घट इति तादात्म्येन अभावो व्यवहर्तव्यः कदाचित्; कदाचित् व्यतिरेकेन 'इह भूतले घटो न' इति । 'एवं हि पिशाचस्यापि व्यतिरेकेणाभावः सिद्ध्येत् अपिशाचतया भूतलस्य सिद्धिर्नैवं तदेव तत्रेति व्यवहर्तुमुचितं, सर्वदा वा तथा व्यवह्रियतां विशेषाभावादिति दृष्टान्त एवायमसङ्गत इति सूत्रार्थः ।

Pv,i, 297, also Fn

'We talk of two types of non-existence in our practical life. One is "*tādātmyābhāva*", i e., non-existence of a thing as identical with that wherein it is said to be non-existing, e. g., "the ground (*bhūtala*) is not jar" (*iha bhūtalam na ghaṭah*). The other is "*vyatirekābhāva*", i. e., non-existence, which denies separate possible existence of a thing at a particular time and place: "Here on this ground there is no jar" (*iha bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*). In the case of the first of these, transaction is based simply on the knowledge of the bare ground (*śuddha-bhūtala-jñanāt*) .... In the other case, i. e., in the case of "*vyatirekabhava*", direct perception is responsible for the idea of non-existence.
Bhā, [II, 105

विविक्तं भूतलं शश्वद्भावानां स्वात्मनिष्ठितेः ।
तत्कथं जातु तज्ज्ञानं भिन्नस्याभावसाधनम् ॥९॥

योजना :– भूतलं शश्वद् विविक्तिं (भवति); (यतः) भावानां स्वात्मनिष्ठितेः । तत्-ज्ञानं (भूतलज्ञानं) भिन्नस्य-अभाव-साधनम् जातु (कदाचित् भवति, कदाचित् न भवति); तत् कथम् ।[1]

(The case of *Vyatirekābāva* has the fault of having too wide a scope—*atiprasaṅga*).

The teacher says :- The ground is always separate from other things (*bhūtalam śaśvad viviktam);* because all objects have their separate and self-confined existence *(yataḥ bhāvānam svātma-niṣṭhiteḥ).* How then is it that the knowledge of the ground (*tajjñānam*) is the cause of the consciousness of the absence of other things at one time and not at another (*bhinnasya-abhāva-sādhanam jatu; tat katham*) ?

K9—1 भूतलमभूतलविविक्तं सदैव तत्कथं तज्ज्ञानं कदाचिदेव तत्र भिन्नघटाभावं साधयेत्, भिन्नघटविविक्तता च भूतलस्य कादाचित्कं रूपं स्याद्यदि घटसहिततापि कदाचित्स्वरूपं भवेन्नत्वेवं, पदार्थौं द्वावेव स्वात्मपरिनिष्ठितौ साहित्येन तदतिरिक्तमुभयात्मकमेकरूपं ज्ञानमेकं तूभयाभाससंसर्गात्मकमप्येकाभासं ज्ञानान्तराभावरूपं वस्तु पुनः स्वात्मनिष्ठमेव परिच्छिनत्तीति न वस्तुबलेन प्रदेशदर्शनात् प्रदेशसिद्धिवद्घटाभावसिद्धिरुभयाभासकै- (त्मकै) कज्ञानात्मक-कार्याभाववत्तु स्यात्, न चैवं व्यवधानेन प्रतीतिः प्रदेशदर्शनादेव तथा सिद्धेः ।
Pvr

एतेन (व्यतिरेकाभावेन) अत्र भूतले पिशाचो नास्ति इत्यपि स्यात् इति आपतितं मन्तव्यम् ।

Pv, i. 300

Thus *vyatirekābhāva* (according to the opponent's theory) should imply the absence of even *piśaca* (thief).

It is in certain special circumstances only, not always, that the knowledge of the bare ground will indicate the absence of any particular object, say a pot (*ghaṭa*), only and nothing else. But we know from the common experience of everyday life that the existence of one thing means the non-existence of another. This, however, would not mean that the knowledge of non-existence of anything on the bare ground indicates the idea of the absence of a particular object, say *ghaṭa* only, and not any other thing. This reasoning leads to the fact that it is the sentient subject who infers about the absence of a particular object (*ghaṭa*) only, the idea of which comes into his consciousness in some particular circumstances, and not the idea of any other thing, say *piśaca* (thief), which is not in his consciousness in those circumstances.

किं त्वालोकचयो-ऽन्धस्य स्पर्शो वोष्णादिको मृदुः ।
तत्रास्ति साधयेत्तस्य स्वज्ञानमघटात्मताम् ॥१०॥

योजना :– किंतु (सामान्य-मातुः) तत्र आलोकचयः (अस्ति); अन्धस्य (तत्र) उष्णादिकः मृदुः स्पर्शः (अस्ति); (तेन प्रकारेण) तस्य (भूतलस्य) अघटात्मताम् (अघट–रूपतां) स्वज्ञानं (स्वेनरूपेन ज्ञानं) साधयेत (साधयति) ।[1]

The teacher's new explanation in the matter (unknown to his predecssor) is given in this *kārikā*.

K.0–1 प्रदेशेष्वालोकप्रसरं सन्तमसे मृदुमुष्णादिकं स्पर्शं वा घटरूप-स्पर्शाभावात्मक-मनुभूयालोकादि घटाभावो ऽत्रास्ति घटो नास्तीति व्यवहर्तुं युक्तम् ।

Pvr

भूतले घटाभावो भूतले घटो नास्ति इति वा.........
तत्राह 'तत्र' भूतले 'आलोकचयः' तावत् अस्ति ज्ञेयः 'अन्धस्य उष्णादिकः स्पर्शः' अस्ति 'तस्य' आलोकचयस्य स्पर्शस्य वा यत् 'स्वज्ञानम्' अन्यघटादि-विविक्तेन स्वेन रूपेण ज्ञानं, तत् कर्तृ, 'तस्य' आलोकादेः अघट-रूपतां घटाभावरूपतां 'तत्र' भूतले साधयति इति शक्योऽयमर्थः ।

Pv, i,302-3

तत्तदभावोपलिप्सुः हि प्रयत्नेन तत्तदिन्द्रियाधिष्ठानं व्यापारयन् एव लक्ष्यते ।

Ibid 303-4

But there is the mass of light (*tatra āloka-cayaḥ*), in the case of one who can see, or touch (with the ground) (*sparśaḥ*), warm or soft, in the case of a blind man (*andhasya*), or in darkness, that establishes his cognition of the absence of a jar (*tasya aghatātmatām svajñānam sādhayet*). For, the person, who desires to find out not-being of a particular object, is found using the sense-organ, through which it can be perceived.

The absence of a particular object, say pot, is perceived by a person possessing normal eye-sight, with his eyes, as well as by a blind man, or by any person in darkness, by his sense of touch, feeling with his hand the cool plain ground and not the hard and round substance of the pot; in a similar manner, the absence of another object, say a thief *(piśāca)*, can also be known by one possessing eye-sight as well as by a blind man, or by any person in darkness. It is only the subject *(Pramātā, Ātman)* who ultimately gets the idea of the absence of a pot or a thief in special circumstances.

The next Sūtra shows that the absence of a jar—*aghatātmatā*—and non-existence of imperceptible *piśāca (bhūtale piśāco nāsti)* are not two analogous instances.

Although the latter is also an instance of *Vyatirekābhāva*, yet the difference between the two is due to certain conditions *(kasyāmcit-eva daśāyām)*. In the case of the non-existence of the imperceptible *piśaca*, there is the possibility of his remaining hidden anywhere. This is what the teacher means to say now :-

पिशाचः स्यादनालोको ऽप्यालोकाभ्यन्तरे यथा ।
अदृश्ययो भूतलस्यान्तर्न निषेध्यः स सर्वथा ॥११॥

योजना :- यथा अनालोकः पिशाचः (अदृश्यः) स्याद्; (स एव पिशाचः) आलोकाभ्यन्तरे (दृश्यः) अपि (स्यात्); अदृश्यः (सन्) भूतलस्य अन्तः सर्वथा स निषेध्यः न (भवति)[1]

K11—1 न चैवमालोकस्य पिशाचान्यत्वात्तत्रापि पिशाचनिषेधप्रसङ्गः सह्यदृश्योऽन्यत्रऽपि यथा भूगोलस्यान्तरनिवार्यंस्तथालोकस्यान्तरे, ततस्तस्यान्यमत इवास्मन्मतेऽपि नादृश्यत्वाभावसिद्धिः ।

(Contd.)

Pv:

Just as *piśāca* (thief, who remains hidden, hence imperceptible), though apart from light (i.e., in dark), can yet be within light itself *(yathā anālokaḥ piśācaḥ adṛyaḥ syād; ālokābhyantare draśyaḥ api syāt)*; and because of his being imperceptible *(adṛśyaḥ san)*, his existence within the ground cannot totally be denied *(bhūtalasya antar sarvathā sa niśedhyaḥ na bhavati)*.

Having explained the nature of not-being in practicle life (*abhāva-vyavahāra*), the author makes use of it now in the present context.

एवं रूप्यविदाभावरूपा शुक्तिमतिर्भवेत् ।
न त्वाद्यरजत-ज्ञप्तेः स्यादप्रामाण्यवेदिका ॥१२॥

योजना :– शुक्तिमतिः (शुक्तिज्ञानं) रूप्यविदाभावरूपा (रजतज्ञानाभावरूपा) (सिद्धयति); सा (शुक्तिमतिः) तु आद्यरजतज्ञप्तेः (तदानीन्तनरजतज्ञानस्य) अप्रमाणवेदिका (अप्रामाण्यज्ञापिका) न (भवति)

Thus the ascertainment of the real mother-of-pearl would mean its not being the cognition (knowledge) of silver (*śukti-matiḥ rūpya-vidābhāva-rūpā)*; but the cognition of mother-of-pearl cannot prove invalid the knowledge of silver, got on the former occasion (*sā tu ādya-rajata-jñapteḥ apramāṇya-vedikā* ***na*** *syāt*).

'Although *piśāca* is not-light, i. e., is different from light, yet, just as there is the possibility of his being within the ground unseen, so there is the possibility of his being within the mass of light also. Hence, although the identity of piśāca within the ground is denied, yet his being within the ground is not denied in every way.'

Bhā III, 107

K12—1 शुक्तिज्ञानमेव रजतज्ञानाभावरूपं सिद्धयति तदानीन्तन-शुक्तिज्ञानस्याप्रमाण्ये सा ।

Pvr

धर्म्यंसिद्धेरपि भवेद् बाधा नैवानुमानतः ।
स्वसंवेदनसिद्धा तु युक्ता सैकप्रमातृजा ॥१३॥

योजना :– (यतः शुक्तिकाज्ञानकाले) धर्मि (-णः) (पूर्वरजतज्ञानस्य) असिद्धिः; (तस्मात्) अनुमानतः अपि बाधा (बाध्यबाधकभावः) नैव भवेत; स (बाध्यबाधकभावः) तु एक प्रमातृजा (एकप्रमातृमयसंवेदने) युक्ता (सद्धयति); (यतः तत्) स्वसंवेदनसिद्धा (भवति)[1]।

As (at the time of the cognition of mother-of-pearl), the minor term (dharmi), i. e., the previous cognition of silver, is non-existent (*dharmyasiddher-api*), the relation of contraries (*bādhā—bādhya-bādhaka -bhāvaḥ*) cannot be maintained even by inference (*anumānataḥ api naiva bhavet*). It is possible only due to there being one subject (*sā tu eka pramātrjā yuktā*), because it is proved to be so by our personal experience (*sva-saṁvedana-siddhā*).

The teacher means to say that neither one particular cognition is potent itself to contradict the other, nor is their the possibility of inference to annul the false cognition of silver, owing to the absence of the minor term (*dharmī*) in the process of inference (*anumāna*).

K13—1 शुक्तिकाज्ञानकाले च न पूर्वं रजतज्ञानमस्ति ततः स धर्मी न सिद्ध इति नानुमानेन बाधा, एक प्रमातृमयसंवेदने त्वेकदेशावष्टम्भ्युभयज्ञानमसंबद्धं भासनात्सिद्धयति। पश्चात्ससंवादप्रत्यक्षे स्वसंवेदने पूर्वस्यापि तस्याभासनादेकं प्रमाणमितरदन्यथेति भवति संवादोऽप्येकप्रमातृकृतः । *Pvr*

न केवलं स्वसंवेदनात् (प्रत्यक्षानुभवात्) न सिद्धयति बाधा (बाध्यबाधकभाव), यावत् अनुमानतोऽपि न सिद्धयति—धर्मिणोऽसिद्धेः ......
Pv, i, 309

'The relation of contraries cannot be explained either in terms of direct perception or in those of inference, because the minor term itself is non-existent.'
Bhā III, 108

In the following Sūtra, the teacher concludes the present topic of discussion :-

इत्थमत्यर्थभिन्नार्थावभासखचिते विभौ ।
समलो विमलो वापि व्यवहारोऽनुभूयते ॥१४॥

योजना :– इत्थम् (अनुभव एव अत्र दृढतमंप्रमाणं यत्) अत्यर्थ-भिन्न-अर्थ-अवभास-खचिते (अत्यर्थभिन्नैः प्रतिबिम्बकल्पैः अर्थाभासैः खचिते-स्वरूपानन्याभावेन उपरक्ते) विभौ (प्रमातरि विश्रान्तः) समलो (अज्ञानिनां मलिनः), विमलो (ज्ञानिनां शुद्धः) (सर्वो) व्यवहारो अनुभूयते ।[1]

Thus it is experienced that all kinds of transactions, whether pure or impure, are held on the basis of one all-pervading Self (*Vibhau—pramatāri viśrāntaḥ*), in whom are massed together the manifestations of the objects, so very different from one another (*bhinnārthāvabhāsa khacite vibhau viśrāntaḥ*).

Not only the causal relation, remembrance, contradictions of false cognitions, etc., depend upon the existence of one parmanent perceiver, but also all the affairs of the world, including the inferior functions of buying and selling and the superior functions of learning and teaching, etc., can be possible as resting on the ultimate subject, the Self-Consciousness, the sole perceiver, which as Supreme Being ultimately remains One, in essence, while the objects of the world vary by the power of *Mayā*.

K14—1 माया-शक्त्या भेदविषयोऽयं सर्वो व्यवहारस्तथा ज्ञानिनां शुद्धोऽज्ञानिनां तु मलिनस्तत्तद्भिन्नार्थावभासभाजि भगवति संभाव्यतेऽनुभवेन । *Pvr*

......यत् विभौ देशकालानवच्छिन्ने, अत एव 'अत्यर्थभिन्नैः'—मायाबलात् भेदैकप्राणितैः नीलसुखाद्याभासैः प्रतिबिम्बकल्पैः अनतिरिक्ततया वर्तमानैः, 'खचिते'—स्वरूपानन्यथाभावेन उपरक्ते विश्रान्तः सर्वो व्यवहारोऽनुभूयते—अनुभव एव अत्र दृढतमं प्रमाणम् इति यावत् । *Pv, i, 313*

See Kaw, R. K., *The Doctrine of Recognition*, PP 166 ff.

माहेश्वर्य - निरूपणम् (प्रत्यभिज्ञा-कारिकायां ज्ञानाधिकारे अष्टममाह्निकम)

The Essential Nature of the Supreme Consciousness *(Māheśvarya)*, **viz. Sovereignty of the Great Lord** *(Maheśvara)*—**Self-over His powers of Remembrance, Knowledge and Differentiation which makes him potent to manifest externally the objects ever existing within Himself :-**

The present Ahnika is devoted to explain the essential nature of the one basis of the said three powers of Maheśvara, the Self. It is represented by the term *Māheśvarya* or *Svātantrya* which means the sovereignty of the Lord, viz. absolute liberty and autonomy of consciousness *(tan-māheśvaryam svātantrya-rūpam)*. By virtue of His *Māheśvarya*, the Lord *(Maheśvara)* is potent to manifest externally the world comprising a mass of objects which ever exist within Him. The objects are, therefore, named, in the system, *ābhāsas* (manifestations). The Lord has not only the potency of externalising infinite number of diverse manifestations forming various objects of the world by their association or combination with and separation from one another, but also the obsolute liberty to make use of His powers of Remembrance, knowledge and Differentiation with respect to these *ābhāsas*. Maheśvara has two aspects, *Prakāśa* (the light of consciousness) and *Vimarśa* (the power of manifesting itself in a concrete form), which correspond to his two primary powers, the power of Cognition (*Jñāna - Śakti*) and the power of Action (*Kriyā-Śakti*). *Māheśvarya*, the sovereignty of the Lord, with regard to His said powers, is also a form of His power of Action. All *ābhāsas* arise from the Lord's *Jñāna-Śakti*, while the Lord (being pure Self-Consciousness) remains uneffected by them.

The Doctrine of Manifestation (Abhasa-vada):- The teacher explains the nature and formation of *ābhāsas* in the following Kārikās:-

तात्कालिकाक्षसामक्ष्यसापेक्षाः केवलं क्वचित् ।
आभासा अन्यथान्यत्र त्वन्धान्धतमसादिषु ॥१॥

योजना :— आभासाः क्वचित् (कदाचित्) केवलं तात्कालिकं (तत्काल-भवं यत् सन्निहितं, निकटवर्ति) अक्ष्यसामक्ष्यं (बाह्येन्द्रिय-प्रत्यक्षत्वं यत्) तत्सापेक्षाः (तान् आभासान्तरान् अपेक्षन्ते); अन्यत्र (क्वचित्) तु अन्ध - (अथवा) अन्धतमसादिषु (ते -आभासाः) अन्यथा (भवन्ति) [1]

विशेषोऽर्थावभासस्य सत्तायां न पुनः क्वचित् ।
विकल्पेषु भवेद्भाविभवद्भूतार्थगामिषु ॥२॥

योजना :— भावि-भवद्-भूत-अर्थगामिषु विकल्पेषु (भविष्यनिष्ठा वा वर्तमाननिष्ठा वा अतीतवस्तु विश्रान्ता वा विकल्पाः तेषु) अर्थ-अवभासस्य सत्तायां न पुनः क्वचित् विशेषो भवेत् (भवति), (यस्मात् - स्वात्मनि आभासानाम् ऐकय भवति)[1]

क्वचिदाभासाः- नीलाद्याभासाः तज्ज्ञानाभासाश्च, अक्षसामक्ष्यसापेक्षाः केवलं भवन्ति, अन्यत्रान्धतमसादिषु अन्यथा भवन्ति । पुनः—पक्षान्तरे, अर्थावभासस्य सत्तायाम्, लक्षणया स्वरूपे, क्वचिद्विशेषो न भवति । केषु विकल्पेषु कीदृशेषु? "भावि भवत्" इति । *Bha I, 404-5*

K—1 आभासाः कदाचित् सन्निहितप्रत्यक्षाक्षिप्ता घटोयमिति व्यवहारहेतोरन्धतमसादौ तु पूर्वानुभवोत्थिताः ।
Pvr.

यत् अक्षसामक्ष्य —बाह्येन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षत्वं नाम आभासान्तरं पश्यामीत्येवंरूपम् तत्-सापेक्षाः (आभासान्तरसापेक्षाः) – तद्द्वयामिश्राः क्वचित् आभासा भवन्ति, यत्र स्फुटता-व्यवहारः, अन्धविषयः—अन्धकारस्थ-प्रमातृविषयः पुनः योऽन्यो व्यवहारोऽस्फुटतामयः तत्र ते आभासा अन्यथा (तात्कालिकाक्षसामक्ष्य-निरपेक्षा इत्यर्थः) *Pv, I, 321*

परमेश्वरस्वरूपान्तर्भूतत्वे पुनराभासानां न कुतश्चित् व्यवच्छेदः—न केनचित् व्यामिश्रणा इति ।
Ibid. 323

एव त्रैकालिक-व्यवहारवैचित्र्योपपत्तिः ।
Ibid

एष च स्फुटास्फुटतादिव्यवहारोऽपि सकलादिप्रमातृविश्रान्त एव न पुनः परमार्थप्रसारीत्याह परमेश्वरेति ।
Ibid Fn. 37

(I) The 'manifestations' (*ābhāsāḥ*) differ only inasmuch as that in some cases they depend upon immediate sense contact (*Kevalam tātkālikam-akṣyasāmakṣyam tat-sāpekṣāḥ kvacit*); and in other cases, as in the case of blind or in thick darkness, they do not depend upon that (viz. the immediate sense - contact) (*anyatra tu andha-andha-tamasādiṣu anyathā*) (2) But there is no distinction (*na punaḥ kvacit viśeṣo bhavet*) in the essential nature of the 'manifestations' of objects figuring in determinate cognitions (*vikalpeṣu arthāvabhāsasya sattāyām*) referring to the past, present or future objects (*bhāvi-bhavad-bhūtārthagāmiṣu*)

The commentator says that, in the case of perceivers with normal eye-sight, the manifestations are distinct *(sphuṭa)*, because they are perceived in the collocations of abhasā *(vyāmiśrāḥ)*. And in the case of the blind or in thick darkness, they are indistinct *(asphuṭa)*, as they are revived internally without recourse to senses (*asāpekṣā*) by remembrance arising from the residual traces (*saṁskāras*) of the past experiences. In the case of perceivers born blind, they arise from the residual traces of the perceptions of previous births. There is no difference in the constituent ābhāsa, as its essential nature remains one with the *Prakāśa* aspect of the Self. The difference or change refers to the combinations or collocations of ā*bhāsas*, in which each contituent ā*bhāsa* is a separate entity, as such it is ever the same. The constituent ā*bhāsas* associate in various ways to form collocations of ā*bhāsas*. The combination and the separation of ā*bhāsas* such as in the experiences "I see this object"

K—2 स्मृत्युत्प्रेक्षारूपेषु प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठपातिषु स्वतन्त्रेषु वा अन्येषु विकल्पेषु कालत्रय-विषयेष्वर्थावभासोऽन्तस्तुल्य एवावस्थित: । *Pvr.*

(प्रथमकारिकायाम्) आभासवैचित्र्यमुक्त्वा स्वात्मनि आभासैक्यमाह विशेष: इति ।
Pv 1, 320, Fn 19

(*nīlam-idam paśyāmi)*, "I imagine this" (*utprekṣe*), "I think determinately" (*sankalpayāmi*), "I remember" (*smrāmi*), "I do" (*karomi*), "I know." (*vedmi*), and so on, are made by the Self (*bhgavatā*), by his power of freedom (*svātantrena*), and thus they function distinctly or indistinctly. In this way the varying processes of ā*bhāsas* go on at all times, in the past, in the present and in future. The distinctness or otherwise of the manifestations depends only upon limited perceivers, in their special states of experiences.

The Purvapaksin questions, the difference is possible in the case of the collocations of ā*bhāsas* pertaining to external objects, in relation to which external senses operate, how do you account for the difference in the internal ā*bhāsas* of pain and pleasure, in relation to which external senses are not in operation? The teacher answers this question in the following *Kārikā* :-

सुखादिषु च सौख्यादि-हेतुष्वपि च वस्तुषु ।
अवभासस्य सद्भावेऽप्यतीतत्वात्तथा स्थितिः ॥३॥

योजना :- (यद्यपि) सुखादिषु च सौख्यादि हेतुषु वस्तुषु अपि च (अथावभासस्य सत्तायां न विशेषः भवति), (तथापि) अतीतत्वात् (अतीतवस्तु-विश्रांतत्वात्) अवभासस्य (सुखादि-अवभासस्य) सद्भावे (सत्तायां), तथा स्थितिः (न भवति इत्यर्थः) ;[1]

सुखादिषु सौख्यादिहेतुषु च वस्तुषु सत्स्वपि-स्मर्यमाणतया मनोराज्यविषयत्वेन च वर्तमानेष्वपि, तथा अवभासस्य-सुखावभासस्य तद्धेत्ववभासस्य च, सद्-भावेऽपि–स्मृति-रूपमनोराज्यरूपत्वाभ्यां सद्भावेऽपि सति, प्रमातुः अर्थात् तेषु, तथास्थिति :- तथा स्थितिर्न भवति, कुतः ? अतीतत्वात्, न हि अतीतं स्मर्यमाण सुखादि तद्धेतुर्वा तादृगवभासते तथा उपलक्षणत्वमाश्रित्य अनागतत्वात्, न हि मनोराज्य-लिखितं भावि-सुखं तद्धेतुर्वा तादृगवभासते इति । *Bha I, 406*

K—3 सुखदुःखाद्याभासास्तत्साधनाभासाश्च सदैवान्तःसन्तोऽपि न तथाह्लादादिमयीं स्थितिं कुर्वन्ति अतीतत्वात् बहिस्तदानीमभवात्, तदात्वविशिष्टानां च तथाकारित्वात् । *Pvr.*
'अवभासस्य सद्भावेऽपि' – यद्यपि आभासः स एव (एक एवेत्यर्थः:- *Bha I, 405*) (सदैवान्तः सन्तोऽपि, *Pvr*) अतीतत्वात् तथा स्थितिः (न भवति)—न तथाह्लादादि मयीं स्थितिं कुर्वन्ति अतीतत्वात् ।
Pvr.

Although manifestations, such as, of pleasure, etc., or of those things which are their causes, remain always the same, i. e. without any difference (*na viśeṣaḥ bhavati*), yet they do not shine in the same manner (as pleasure, etc.) (*tathā sthitiḥ na bhavati*), since they relate to the past (*atītatvāt*), viz. they depend upon the objects of the past (*atīta-vastu-viśrāntatvāt*). As such they are indistinct. In this case, they do not have deep effect on an individual.

गाढमुल्लिख्यमाने तु विकल्पेन सुखादिके ।
तथा स्थितिस्तथैव स्यात् स्फुटमस्योपलक्षणात् ॥४॥

योजना :- सुखादिके गाढम् विकल्पेन उल्लिख्यमाने (गाढं विमृशमाने) तु तथा स्थितिस्तथैव स्यात् (अत्यन्ताह्लादादिरूपतया सा तेनैव प्रकारेण - अर्थात् - सुखादिप्रकारेणैव भवति); (कस्मात् कारणात्?) अस्य (सुखस्य) स्फुटम् उपलक्षणात् (यतस्तदानीं स्फुटत्वाभासमिश्रं सुखाभासम् उपलक्षयति असौ)।

But when the manifestations of pleasure, etc., are deeply (*gāḍham*) and determinately (*vikalpena*) conceived (*ullikhyamāne*), they do shine as such (*tathā sthitiḥ*) (as extreme pleasure, etc), since they are observerved as being distinct (*asya sukhāsya sphuṭam upalaksanāt*). In this case, they have deep effect upon the individual.

The difference or varying nature (*vaicitryam*) of the internal *ābhāsas* is due to the association of the *ābhāsas* of the present feelings with the *ābhāsas* of the cognitions of the past or future perceptions of objects of both the kinds, those causing pleasure, such as fragrant garlands, sandal, etc., and those causing pain, as snakes, thorns, etc. The *ābhāsa* of the feeling is not so distinct or deep (*sphuṭa*) when the perceiver's thought is not fully engrossed in it. It, however, becomes distinct (*sphuṭa*) when he is deeply absorbed in thinking about the objects causing such feelings.

The Pūrvapakṣin now questions, - in the presence of external objects causing certain feelings of pleasure or pain, difference or va-

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K—4 कुतश्चित् प्रयत्नविशेषात् स्वतन्त्रविकल्पोल्लिखितं स्फुटमेव सुखादिजातं तथा विकासादि-हेतुः । *Pvr.*

'गाढम् उल्लिखति' – गाढं विमृशतीत्यर्थः । *Pv I. 325*

'तथा स्थितिस्तथैव स्यात्'—(तथा स्थितिः) अत्यन्ताह्लादादि-रूपतया सा (तथैव) तेनैव प्रकारेण (सुखादिप्रकारेणैव) भवति । *Ibid.*

riation *(vaicitryam)* in the collocations of *ābhāsas* can be possible, but, what reason have we to admit the same in the absence of external objects ? The teacher replies this question in the following Kārikā :-

भावाभावावभासानां बाह्यतोपाधिरिष्यते ।
नात्मा सत्ता ततस्तेषामान्तराणां सतां सदा ॥५॥

योजना :– भाव (सुखमस्ति मम इति) - अभाव (दुखं नास्ति मम इति) अवभासानां बाह्यता (-त्वं) उपाधिर् इष्यते (ज्ञायते अस्माभिः); न (तेषाम्) आत्मा (स्वरूपम) ; ततस् तेषाम् आन्तराणां सतां सत्ता सदा (भवति) ।[1]

पण्डितैः भावाभावावभासानां बाह्यता उपाधि :– विशेषको धर्म इष्यते, उत्पलस्येव नीलत्वम्, तैः पण्डितैः बाह्यता आत्मा स्वरूपं नेष्यते । ततः कारणात् तेषाम् भाव-अभावावभासानाम् आन्तराणां सतां सदा सत्ता भवति । ततश्च बाह्यत्वाभावे न तेषां सत्ताया अभावः । ततश्च तस्यां सत्तायां तेषां विशेष एवेति भावः इति । *Bha I, 410*

In the states of remembrance, etc., externality is merely an attribute (*upādhi*) of manifestations (*ābhasas*) which are of the nature of 'being' (*bhāva*) or those which are of the nature of 'not-being' (*abhāva*) ; it does not constitute their essential nature (*na teṣām ātmā*); therefore, they exist as ever-existing internally *(teṣām sattā āntarānām satām sattā eva sadā)*.

Externality is not the nature of *ābhāsas* of pleasure or pain or absence thereof. Every such feeling is always internal. Sometimes, by the sovereignty of his will, the perceiver experiences *ābhāsas* of certain feelings in association with the *ābhāsas* of different external objects. In such cases, the *ābhāsas* of feelings vary according to the reflections of *upādhis*, viz., external objects. This association of the *ābhāsas* of external objects with the *ābhāsas* of internal feelings does not cause any impurity (*mlānatā*) in the nature of the latter. It makes no difference in the internal *ābhāsa*

K—5 भावाभावावभासानां भावाभावविषयाणामबहीरूपत्वेऽपि सत्तास्त्येव स्मृत्यादौ बाह्यत्वं हि तेषामुपाधिर्न स्वरूपम्, अभावाभासस्यान्तः सतायामपि बहिरभावात्तथात्वम् ।
Pvr.

इह सुखमस्ति मम, दुखं नास्ति ममेति ये भावाभासा अभावाभासाश्च तेषां बाह्यत्वं नाम आत्मा—स्वरूपं न भवति......तत् (बाह्यत्वं) तस्य (सुखादेः) उपाधिरूपताम् उपरञ्जकतां विशेषणत्वं गच्छति,......इति आन्तराणां सदैव स्थितिः एषाम् । *Pv I, 326-327*
'सदैव आन्तराणां सत्ता इति । *Pv I, 332*

of blue lotus even in the absence of the *ābhāsa* of the external blue lotus, or in the internal *ābhāsa* of a particular man in the absence of the *ābhāsa* of the external king. Similarly, there is no difference in the internal *ābhāsa* of experiences of pleasure and pain felt from the union with and separation from one's beloved, even in the absence of the *ābhāsas* of external objects, viz., beloved, etc., which cause such feelings by their union or separation. It is thus clear that the absence of external objects does not affect the essential nature (viz. variety) of the internal feelings of pleasure or pain.

The state of internality of *ābhasas* of external objects lies in their being internal experiences in the mind (*antaḥ - karaṇa or Buddhi*) and their externality lies in their being objects of perceptions (*grāhyaḥ*) existing apart from the perceiver. Both these states of *ābhāsas*, viz. their internality and externality, have knowledge as their essence (*tattva*) or common characteristic which is internal and one with the *pramātā* (perceiver). The Pūrvapakṣin questions on this point ;— in such a state, why this intrinsic internal character of *ābhāsas* does not effect their causal efficiensy? In reply to this question, the teacher says :-

आन्तरत्वात्प्रमात्रैक्ये नैषां भेदनिबन्धना ।

अर्थक्रियापि बाह्यत्वे सा भिन्नाभास-भेदतः ॥६॥

योजना :- एषां (आभासानाम्) भेदनिबन्धना (कार्यकारणादिभेदाश्रया) अर्थक्रिया अपि आन्तरत्वात् न (नास्ति), (तेषाम् आन्तरत्वं) प्रमातृ-ऐक्ये (प्रमातृमात्ररूपत्वात्)(भवति); सा (अर्थकिया) (तेषां) बाह्यत्वे भिन्न-आभास-भेदतः (आभास-भेदात्) (भवति) ।[1]

They do not exercise their functional capacity (*artha - kriyā*), which depends upon their separateness (*bheda-nibandhanā*), owing

K—6 अन्तश्च सर्वेषामेव नीलसुखाद्याभासानां सदसत्त्वेऽपि प्रमातृमात्ररूपत्वात् कार्य-कारणादिभेदाश्रया नार्थक्रिया, प्रमातुर्भेदे हि बौद्धचाक्षुषत्वादिभेदेन आभासभेदादाभासाश्रितार्थकारितापि भिद्यते रूपादीनाम् । *Pvr*

प्रमात्रैक्य इति—तन्निमितकं यत् आन्तरत्वं तस्मात् हेतोः, एषाम् आभासानाम् अर्थक्रिया न काचिदस्ति, सा हि अर्थक्रिया भेदे सति भवति । *Pv I, 329*

to their internality (*āntaratvāt*), because of their oneness with the subject (*pramātraike*). Their functional capacity is due to their externality (*sā bāhyatve*), which arises from separateness of manifestations from one another and from the subject (*bhinna—ābhāsa bhedataḥ*).

The *ābhāsas* do not have any causal efficiency, because of their internality, as that is due to their identity with the Self—consciousness. Ābhāsa of causal efficiency, which is external, is another ābhāsa different from internal. Exercising of certain causal effi iency is not, therefore, the essential nature of object.

In the next Kārikā, the teacher states the essential nature of *ābhāsas* as follows :-

चिन्मयत्वेऽवभासानामन्तरेव स्थितिः सदा ।
मायया भासमानानां बाह्यत्वाद्बहिरप्यसौ ॥७॥

योजना :- अवभासानां चिन्मयत्वे (तेषां) स्थितिः सदैव अन्तर् (भवति); मायया भासमानानाम् (माया-शक्त्या बहिः प्रत्यक्षत्वेन प्रकाशमानानाम् अवभासानां) बाह्यत्वात् (तेषाम्) असौ (स्थितिः) बहिर अपि (अस्ति)।[1]

(उत्तरार्धे योजना) :-

मायया भासमानानाम्--भेदेन भासमानानाम्, अर्थात् एषामान्तराणां नीलाद्याभासानाम्, मायया बाह्यत्वात् - मायाकृतं बाह्यत्वमाश्रित्य, असौ स्थितिः बहिरपि भवति। 'अपि' शब्दः समुच्चये, काकाक्षिवत् । मायाशब्दस्योभयतो योजनेति । *Bha I, 416-17*

K 7 चित्स्वरूपत्वेनाभासानां सदान्तस्तत्त्व एव स्थितिः । मायाशक्त्या बहिः प्रत्यक्षत्वेन प्रकाशमानेषु भावेषु प्रकाशाव्यतिरिक्तेषु बहिराभास इत्युच्यते, तदापि तेषामान्तरत्वमेव सिसृक्षादौ तु भावानामपि । *Pvr.*

अवभासानां सदैव......अन्तरेव प्रमातृप्रकाश एव स्थितिः, यत् एते चिन्मयाः, यदा तु मायाशक्त्या विच्छेदनावभासन-स्वातन्त्र्यरूपय बाह्यत्वम् एषाम् आभास्यते तदा तत् (बाह्यत्वम्) अवलम्ब्य अवभासानाम् असौ स्थितिः बहिरपि अन्तरपि,

PV 1, 331

As the *ābhāsas* are essentially of the nature of *cit* or consciousness (*avabhāsānām cinmayatve*), so they always exist internally (*teṣam sthitiḥ sadaiva antar bhavati*). But when they are manifested externally by the Lord's power of *Māyā* (*māyayā bhāsamanānām*), they exist externally also (as material objects) (*bahyatvāt teṣām asau sthitiḥ bahir apiasti*).

The essence of *ābhāsas*, whether internal or external, is ultimately consciousness which is innate in the internal self-luminous subject (*Pramātā*). These *ābhāsas* become externally manifest as material objects, by means of *Māyā*, having freedom of power (*svātantrya - rūpayā - māyayā*). The internal *ābhāsa* (*antarābhāsaḥ*) is not incongruous with the external (*bāhyatva*). It is rather the underlying basis of all the external *ābhāsas* (*savābhāsa-bhitti-būto'sau*).

The Pūrvapakṣin questions again,—as has been said above, the causal efficiency of external objects is due to their externality, for instance, in the case of potters manufacturing pots; but how can we explain the causal efficiency of internal experiences, like the conceptions (*vikalpa-jñānāni*) of external objects, such as one's beloved or a thief, which cause pleasure or fear, although the objects giving rise to such feelings are not actually present externally? In reply to this question, the teacher says:-

विकल्पे योऽयमुल्लेख: सोऽपि बाह्य: पृथक्-प्रथ: ।
प्रमात्रैकात्म्यमान्तर्यं ततो भेदो हि बाह्यता ॥८।

याजना :- विकल्पे (विकल्पज्ञाने) यो पृथक्-प्रथ: (प्रमातृसकाशात् पथगेव प्रथते यो स:) अयम् उल्लेख: (उत्प्रेक्षया लिख्यमान:) सोऽपि बाह्य: (भवति); आन्तर्यं प्रमातृ-एकात्म्यम्; बाह्यता हि ततो भेद: ।[1]

K—8 विकल्पे घटाद्युल्लेखश्चक्षुराद्यगौचरोऽपि पृथगाभासाद् बाह्य एव अहविमर्शो हि आन्तरत्वमिद ममिति तु बाह्यता । एवं घटादीनामुभयी बाह्यान्त: करणद्वयीवेद्यता, सुखादेस्त्वेकान्त:करणवेद्यतैव । *Pvr*

'विकल्पज्ञान' इति, विकल्पो द्विधा स्वतन्त्रोऽनुभवोपजीवो च तत्र द्वयमपीह निर्दिष्टं बोध्यम्, उल्लिख्यमान:—उत्प्रेक्षया लिख्यमान: । *Pv I, 333 Fn*

विकल्पज्ञाने य उल्लिख्यमान: कान्ताचोरादि: अर्थ: (आकार:) सोऽपि बाह्य:, ...यस्मात् सोऽपि प्रमातु सकाशात् पृथगेव प्रथते 'अयमिति', यच्च प्रमातरि अहमित्येव विश्रान्तत्व तत् आन्तरत्वम्...... । *Pv I 333*

That which is conceived in imagination (*vikalpe ayam ullekhaḥ*) is also external (*so'pi bāhyaḥ bhavati*), because it shines as separate from the subject (*pṛthak prathaḥ*) (viz. as 'this' and not as 'I'). Internality is oneness with the subject (*āntaryam pramātṛ aikātmyam*), and externality consists of separateness from the subject (*tato bhedo hi bahyatā*).

The conceptions of objects, though internal experiences, are also to be treated as external *ābhāsas* like those of the actual objects, such as one's beloved or a thief, etc., since the combinations of such *ābhāsas*, causing pleasure or pain, operate in their separation (*bheda*) from the perceiver, though in respect of their pure knowledge they are one with the subject.

The teacher now explains the cause of externality of internal feelings of pleasure or fear, which are caused by the mere conceptions (thought) of objects like one's beloved or thief. He says :-

उल्लेखस्य सुखादेश्च प्रकाशो बहिरात्मना ।
इच्छातो भर्तुरध्यक्षरूपोऽक्षादिभुवां यथा ॥९॥

योजना :– अक्षादिभुवां (विषयाणाम्) (प्रकाशः) अध्यक्षरूपः (मायीयात् प्रमातुः विच्छिन्नरूपेण बाह्यत्वेन भासते) यथा, (तथा) उल्लेखस्य (सांकल्पिकानामपि) सुखादेश्च वहिरात्मना प्रकाशः, (स) भर्तुर (परमेश्वरस्य) इच्छातः (इच्छावशात्) भवति ।[1]

It is by the will of the Lord, the perceiver (*sa bhartur icchāto bhavati*), that what is conceived in imagination as well as pleasure, etc.. (*ullekhasya sukhādeśca*) shines externally (*bahirātmanāḥ prakāśaḥ*), exactly as do the objects of sense-perception, etc., (*akṣādibhuvām viṣayāṇām prakāśaḥ yathā*), which are directly perceptible (*adhyakṣa rūpaḥ*).

K—9 उल्लेखस्य सुखदुःखादीनां चेश्वरस्य साक्षात्काररूपो बौद्धः प्रकाशः । *Pvr.*

अक्षादिभुवां—विषयाणाम् यथा–प्रकाश इति शेषः *Pv I, 334 Fn*

यथा ईश्वरेच्छया प्रकाशात् अबहिर्भूता अपि नीलाद्या बाह्यकरणगोचरीभूता कल्पितात् प्रमातुः (मायीयात्) विच्छिन्नरूपेण बाह्यत्वेन भासन्ते, तथा अन्तःकरणगोचरीभूता अपि—इति को विशेषः । सुखदुःखप्रायास्तु......रतिनिर्वेदादयः......बहिरात्मना भान्ति..., तस्मात् सांकल्पिकानामपि बहिर्भावे परमेश्वरेच्छैव हेतुः—इति सिद्धान्तः । *Pv I, 335-36*

Or; As the manifestations of objects of sense—perception are directly perceptible (as separate from the subject) by the will of the Lord, so do exactly shine externally what is couceived in imagination as well as pleasure, etc.

The externality of the internal feelings can, therefore, be accounted for as due to the absolute liberty and autonomy of consciousness, (*Svātantrya of Ātman*). The internal luminousness, or the light of consciousness, by its intrinsic power of freedom (*Svātantrya*), produces externally all the internal *ābhāsas*, whether those of actual objects or of conceptions of such objects causing internal feelings of pleasure or fear. Thus also are externally manifested, by the perceiver's power of will (*svātantrya, Icchā - śakti*), all kinds of feelings, such as permanent feelings (*sthāyī - bhāvas*), transitory feelings (*vyabhicāri - bhāvas*), etc., of pleasure or pain, love or hatered, which remain confind within the range of the internal organ (*antaḥ-karaṇaika-gocaraḥ*). Concluding the subject, the teacher says :-

तदैक्येन विना न स्यात्—संविदां लोकपद्धतिः ।

प्रकाशैक्यात्तदेकत्वं मातैकः स इति स्थितम् ॥१०॥

योजना :- संविदां (तत्तद्विच्छिन्न-भिन्न-संविदाम्) लोकपद्धतिः (व्यवहार) तदैक्येन (तेषां संविदाम् ऐक्येन) विना न स्यात् (भवति); तद् एकत्व (तेषां संविदाम् एकत्वम्) प्रकाशः (प्रमातुः प्रकाशः)-ऐक्यात् (भवति); स (प्रकाशः) एक माता (प्रमाता) इति स्थितम् (इति सिद्धान्तः) ।[1]

Therefore, wordly affairs cannot be possible (*loka-paddhatiḥ na syāt*) without the unification of cognitions (*samvidām aikena vinā*). Their unification is due to their oneness with the light of consciousness (*prakāśaikyāt tadekatvam*). And 'that' (light) is the one subject - Perceiver (*pramātaikaḥ sa*), this is established (*iti sthitam*).

K—10 तत्तद्विच्छिन्नसंविदनुसंधानेन व्यवहार एक एव प्रकाशात्मा तदनुसंधानरूपः स एवैकः प्रमाता परमात्मसंज्ञः । *Pvr*

विषयप्रकाश एव संवित् उच्यते, केवलं विषयोपरागमहिम्ना बहिर्मुखतया नीलप्रकाशोऽन्यः, पीतप्रकाशश्चान्यः, परमार्थस्तु प्रकाशस्य देशकालाकारसंकोचवैकल्यात् एकत्वमेव इति एक एव प्रकाशोऽन्तर्विश्रान्तः (अहमिति), स (प्रकाशः) एव च प्रमाता उच्यते इति......... । *Pv I, 337*

स एव विमृशत्वेन नियतेन महेश्वरः ।
विमर्श एव देवस्य शुद्धे ज्ञानक्रिये यतः ॥११॥

योजना :- स (प्रमाता) नियतेन विमृशत्वेन (सदैव विमृश्यमान - रूपः) महेश्वर एव; यतः (अस्य) देवस्य (क्रीडादिमयस्य) विमर्शः (स्वातन्त्र्यात्मा विमर्शः) शुद्धे (पारमार्थिक्यौ) ज्ञानक्रिये एव ।[1]

That very subject (*pramātā*) is the highest Lord (*maheśvaraḥ*), because of His ever-existing *Vimarśa* of free nature (*svātantryātmā*) (*niyatena vimarśatvena*); and this *Vimarśa* is nothing but the sportive Lords' transcendental powers of knowledge and action (*krīḍādimayasya devasya śuddhe jñāna - kriye yataḥ vimarśa eva*). All this is estalished.

Unless we assert the ultimate unity in the diversity of cognitions, everything will be in a state of chaos. Their unity is due to their identity with the the light of consciousness, the perciever (*pramātā*). Although variety (*vaicitryam*) is the nature of external objects, yet their manifestation is, in essence, one with the light of the subject. *Pramātā* (the subject) is, therfore, called the illuminator of cogniions (*devaḥ*)or maker of variety of manifestations (*citrābhāsa - kṛta prabhuḥ*). He is called *Maheśvara* (the great Lord), because of his *Vimarśa* (i e , the power of externalising Himself in the concrete from of objects), and *Deva*, since he indulges himself in the sport of carrying on various worldly activities by his powers of knowledge and action which arise from his *Vimarśa*. It is from the *Vimarśa* aspect of the Supreme Lord (*Maheśvara*) that all pure and impure creation from the *Śiva Tattva* upto the earth emanates, as will be explained in the following *Adhikāras* (books) *

K—11 स परमात्मा चिद्रूपो विमर्शाख्येनैव मुख्यस्वभावेनाव्यभिचारिणा महेश्वरचित्तत्वस्य विश्वात्मनः शिवसंज्ञस्याहविमर्शनमेव शुद्धे ज्ञान-क्रिये, भिन्नाभिन्नज्ञेयकार्यगते त्वीश्वरस्य शुद्धाशुद्धे, भिन्नार्थविषयत्वे पुंसः सत्त्वरजोवृत्तिरूपे प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिसंज्ञे तमसा संकुचिते अशुद्धे एव । *Pvr.*

स (प्रमाता) एव......सदैव विमृश्यमानरूपः, इतिविमृशद्रूपत्वम्—अनवच्छिन्नविमर्शता अनन्योन्मुखत्वम् आनन्दैकघनत्वमेव अस्य माहेश्वर्यम् स एव हि अहंभावात्मा विमर्शो, देवस्य–क्रीडादि–मयस्य, शुद्धे–पारमार्थिक्यौ ज्ञानक्रिये, प्रकाशरूपता ज्ञानं, तत्रैव स्वातन्त्र्यात्मा विमर्शः क्रिया, विमर्शश्च अन्तःकृतप्रकाशः इति विमर्श एव परावस्थायां (परमशिवावस्थायाम्) ज्ञानक्रिये,......सर्वथा तु विमर्श एव ज्ञानं, तेन विना हि जडभावोऽस्य (प्रकाशस्य) स्यात् इति उक्तम् 'स एव च क्रिया' इति — *Pv I, 338-39*

* (See, Kaw, R K., "The Doctrine of Recognition" PP 173 ff.)

CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY

Preamble; Evolution of the Studies of the Pratyabhijna Literature; Glimpses of the present study.

Preamble

The attention of modern scholars was drawn to what is known as the "*Pratyabhijna System of Philosophy*" very late in the annals of Indological research. Before the literature on the subject, distinguished as "*Pratyabhijna Literature,*" was discovered in Kashmir by Dr. G. Buhlar in 1876 A. D., the system had remained sealed in manuscripts or in the hearts of a few traditional Pandits, and was studied but little by modern scholars till very recent times. Among the students of this system of philosophy, J. C. Chatterji, P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar, L. D. Barnett, Reo Emil Baer (German Indologist) and his English translater, F. Kurt Leidecker (American Scholar) and K. C. Pandey get the credit of setting out earlier on their literary expedition and discovering new coasts of knowledge in this domain of study. The information given by these noted scholars, the pioneers of this branch of study serves as beacon-light in the present study.

Evolution of the study of the Pratyabhijna literature

The first notice of Pratyabhijna: We get the earliest notice about the Pratyabhijna Shastra in the well-known publication, Sarvadarshana Samgraha of Madhavacharya, a collection of all the systems of Philosophy, edited by Pt. Ishvarachandra Vidyasagara and published for the first time in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1858 A. D. It reviews, perhaps in the gradually ascending order of importance from the Vedanta point of view, the sixteen most Important philosophical systems, including the three Shaiva systems, Nakulisha-Pashupata, the Shaiva system and the Pratyabhijna Darsha[illegible] current in Southern India in the 14th century A. D. Though not of much importance in itself, it aroused interest among the modern scholars in the so-called minor systems of thought and was translated into English by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough. In this work, the Pratyabhijna System appears as the eighth [illegible]stem and the Vedanta system of Shankaracharya as the sixteenth o[illegible] final system. [illegible] Vedan[illegible]

is thus given the highest place among the sixteen systems described.

Discovery of Pratyabhijna literature by Dr. Buhlar Nevertheless, until about the year 1876 A. D. the Pratyabhijna Shastra remained unknown to the modern scholars. In the year 1875 A. D., however, Dr. G. Buhlar who proceeded under the orders of the Government of India on a tour to Kashmir, Rajputana and Central Asia in search of Sanskrit manuscripts discovered in Kashmir the works composed by Kashmiris under the general name "Shaiva Shastra". He collected a number of manuscripts and divided some portions of these referring to the Philosophy of the Shaivas into two classes according to the two great Shaiva Schools of Kashmir: Spanda Shastra of Vasugupta and the Pratyabhijna Shastra of Somananda and Utpaladeva. Dr. Buhlar points out in his Report that the Pratyabhijna system "appears to be pure idealism and an application of Shankaracharya's principles to the Shaiva phliosophy." He further brings to notice the remarks of Prof. Gough in his prefatory note to the translation of the Shaiva-dharshana in Sarvadarshana Samgraha, "Prof. Gough has shown that the Kashmirian Shaiva philosophy bears the close resemblence to the Shaivism of the Southern India."

Publication of the 'Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies': The first impluse to the study of the Pratyabhijna literature was given by the publication of "Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies" started by the Kashmir Research Department early in the present century, from 1902 when its activities began. The literature of Kashmir pertaining to the Shaiva School particularly attracted the notice of J. C. Chatterji, the first Director of the Department, who was the foremost scholar to devote himself to its study from 1904. He brought to notice in his first report that 'There is a rich literature in Kashmir belonging to the Shaiva School of Philosophy of which very little is known to the outsider. It is a most interesting school. ...Manuscripts of this school should be made public by the Department.' Accordingly the Department carried on the editing and publishing of the Shaiva literature and during the period of the last half century brought out 89 volumes of "Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies", which include almost the whole of Shaiva literature. Among the works published by the Department, the following comprise the Pratyabhijna Shastra:- *Shivadrshti of Somananda*, the first and the basic work on the system *by its originator; Ishvara Pratyabhijna Sutras* (or Karikas) by Utpaldeva,

the systematiser of the philosophy, with short Commentary called Vimarshini; by Abhinavagupta, the expounder of the system, in two parts: Part 1 and Part 2; a long Commentary on Pratyabhijna Sutras called Vivratti-Vimarshini by Abhinavagupta, in three volumes: Vol. I, Vol. II and Vol. III; Pratyabhijna Hrdaya; Siddhitrayi and Pratyabhijna Karika-vrtti. In addition to these works, the below-mentioned works contain the tenets of the Pratpabhijna school, embedded in a mass of other matters of Kashmir Shaiva cult:- Shiva-sutra-vimarshini by Vasugupta with Commentry by Kshemaraja; Tantraloka, a comprehensive work on diverse subjects pertaining to Tantra Shastra (the scriptures of Shaivas) by Abhinavagupta, with commentary, in several volumes; and Parmarthasara of Abhinavagupta.

Pioneering Studies: This literature began to attract the attention of scholars early in the present Century. In the year 1910 there appeared the Paramarthasara of Abhinavagupta (Sanskrit text and English translation) by L. D. Barnett in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (PP. 707-747) in which we, for the first time, find an English presentation of the principles of Shaiva school of Kashmir. Dr. Barnett observes, in his Introduction to this work, 'In my "Notes on the Shaiva Siddhantam" published last year (in 1909) in Le museam, I called attention to the fact that the living faith of the majority of modern Tamils is in almost every respect, and certainly in all essentials, the same doctrine that was taught in Kashmir about the beginning of the eleventh century by Abhinavagupta; and I endeavoured to indicate what, in my opinion, the links are which join the modern theology of the South to the ancient teachings of the North, and ultimately to the school which is represented by the Shvetashvatara Upanisada. In further illustration of this view I now present the Parmarthasara of Abhinavagupta."

In the year 1912 was published the translation of Shiva Sutra Vimarshini by P. T. Srinivasa Ayangar. This important work, in the early days of the studies of Kashmir Shaiva Shastra, acquainted the scholars with the system of Shaivism as a form of the Yogic system. In his introduction to the work the scholar calls attention to the fact that Shiva Sutras do not represent any manual of philosophy, since they merely deal with certain forms of Yoga and propound a Tantric creed.

The work, namely 'Kashmir Shaivim' (in English), being a brief

introduction to the history, literature and doctrines of the Advaita Shaiva Philosophy of Kashmir, by J. C. Chatterji, appeared in the 'Kashmir Series of Texts and Studics' in the year 1914. J. C. Chatterji is well known as the author of 'Indian Realism' and 'India's Outlook on Life.' In Kashmir Shaivism, the learned scholar distinguishes the Shaiva Philosophy from a system of Shaiva faith. He writes - 'While Kallata may be said to have handed down the doctrines as a system of religion, Somananda supplied the logical reasoning in their support and made a system of Advaita Philosophy of what was at first taught as a system of faith and thus founded Pratyabhijna Shastra...which is so named after the Pratyabhijna Sutras...'

In the year 1936 appeared the work namely 'Abhinavagupta'—An Historical and Philosophical Study (Ph. D. thesis) by Dr. K. C. Pandy, which gives a brief presentation of the various doctrines of Pratyabhijna Philosophy as expounded by Abhinavagupta in his two commentaries on Ishwara Pratyabhijna Karikas and his other works on the subject. Mention may also be made of the publication of Bhaskari, Vols. I and II, a Commentary on the Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini of Abhinavagupta, edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer and Dr. K. C. Pandey. This work was greatly needed for the proper understanding of abstruse text and the polemics of abhinavagupta in his Vimarhsini, and the credit of discovering this important commentary in Kashmir and getting it published under very difficult circumstances goes entirely to Dr. Pandey. Bhaskaracharya, the author of the commentary lived by about the 18th century, being six generations ahead of his present successor. As regards the Abhinavagupta's contribution to this philosophy, Dr. Pandy remarks in his work mentioned above, "The Philosophical system of Kashmir, with Abhinava's contribution to it, left out of consideration, loses most of its importance ...It is not possible for us to attribute the authorship of any particular theory to Abhinava as we can do to Kant or Hegel." Among all the scholars of this line, Dr. Pandey has devoted himself entirely to the study of Abhinavagupta's Philosophy and Rhetoric. In his scholarly introductions to Bhaskari Vols. I and II, he has taken great pains to bring out some outstanding points of Pratyabhijna philosophy. Volume III of Bhaskari, presenting an English Translation of the Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini in the light of the Bhaskari (Commentary), with an outline of History of Shaiva Philosophy, by K. C. Pandey, also appeared in the year 1954.

Another work namely 'The Secret of Recognition,' viz. Pratyabhi-

jna Hrdaya, translated into English by Kurt F. Leideckar from its original translation in German by Reo Emil Baer, was published in the year 1938 in Adyar Series No. 18. It contains in its introductory pages a note by S. S. Suryanarayan Shastri on the comparative study of the Pratyabhijna system and the Shaiva Siddhanta of South India. As regards the origin of this line of philosophy in Kashmir the scholar produces the following evidence in his Note No. 36 (in his work): "We might make mention of the tradition according to which Shankara in his travels came near Kashmir. The activity of this greatest of India's monists falls into the first half of the ninth century and comes, therefore, at the same time as the appearance of Vasuguupta (cf. Chatterji, K. Sh. P. 23). Hence it is not *improbable* that he imparted the impetus to the monistic movement in Kashmir (cf. Farquhar, O. R, L. I., P. 198)."

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan devotes a chapter (No. 10) in his 'Indian Philosophy,' Vol II, to the Pratyabhijna system. It is clear that this eminent scholar noticed this as one of the notable doctrines. He remarks that 'the development of Shaivism in the extreme south of the country as well as in the extreme north, that is in Kashmir, is a wonderful example of India's cultural unity'.

In addition to the work done by scholars mentioned above, we cannot afford to ignore the important contributions made to the study of this subject by some writers on Indian philosophy, as for instance, M. M. Gopi Nath Kaviraja who has contributed a few articles on the subject in some leading papers, Prof. Lachhmi Dhar gives a brief description of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy in his book namely, The Birith place of Kalidasa.' C. Hayavadana Rao makes casual remark about some of the doctrines of this system in his Introductory Vol. I of the Srikara Bhashya of the Vedanta Sutras.

Object of the present study. It is apparant from the above that the subject has been studied by so many scholars heretofore, but so far no attention seems to have been devoted to a serious study of the origin and development of this system of Philosophy. It is the first attempt to trace the origin of the various doctrines of this school from the philosophic ideas in the Vedic hymns and the Upanishadas and the Buddhist sources. These studies have revealed that the system has evolved, of course, from the same fountain-head where all other schools of Indian Philosophy, the Sankhya, the Vaisheshika, the Vaiyakarana, the Vedanta, and so on. had their origin. With the ex-

ception of its specific differences in some view points from the Buddhist and the Vedanta systems, some additions and alterations made in certain theories existing in the older systems and some tenets and technical expressions derived from the Shaivagamas (scriptures of the Shaiva school), the system is not fundamentally different from the Vedanta.

The earlier studies do not differentiate the philosophical content from the theology or dogmas of the Shaiva School. Attempt has been made for the first time to treat of the philosophical content (or Philosophy proper) of the Pratyabhijna system almost apart from the dogmas of the Shaiva cult. It appears that the system of Philosophy presented in the Pratyabhijna literature has not so far been understood in its proper context. In the present study the various tenets of the system have been properly co-ordinated with great fidelity to the original. In these studies the two lines of development of the system have been noticed, one, the earlier stage represented by the work of Somananada, known as the founder of the school, The second, the later stage as represented by the doctrines taught by Utpaladeva, the disciple of Somananda, and further elaborated by Abhinavagupta.

An attempt has been made to review in brief all the allied philosophic movements in the East and the West, making comparison and contrast of the various doctrines of the Pratyabhijna School with the allied doctrines of other systems to arrive at a clear position which this system of thought occupies in the domaine of Indian and Western Philosophy. It has been brought out that the system has indeed made a radical revision or reorientation of Indian and Western systems of Philosophy.

From the earlier studies it has been noticed that some of the opinions of scholars do not accord with facts. It is not possible to agree with Doctor Pandey in holding that the great Shankaracharya, the expounder of the Vedanta system, had any share in the preaching or practice of Tantric Philosophy; not to speak of its having an influence on the Pratyabhijna system. The statement of Dr. Paranjyoti that Shankaracharya was an adherent of the Shakta sect or that his Advaita system is influenced by Tantric theory is far from true. The view held by Dr. Lachmi Dhar that the Pratyabhjna system was known to Kalidasa and that Abhijnana Shakuntala is an allegorical representation of this philosophy has no bearing on the facts. The attempt made by the learned scholor in attaching philosophical

significance to some common words and ideas occurring in Kalidasa's Shakuntala is rather far-fetched. It has been established on textual evidence that the Pratyabhijna system of philosophy originated in the ninth century A. D., which is, beyond any doubt, posterior to Kalidasa's date by a period of four centuries. All such controvertial view points have been discussed at proper places in this work.

And lastly, the writer has also sought to understand the scientific values of the Pratyabhijna metaphysics which, in its essense, is a deep study of man possessing highest potentialities and supreme inheritence. Human soul (Atman), according to the Pratyabhijna system, is endowed with creative power, viz. powers of comprehension and action and sovereignty of will. It is absolutely free (Svatantra) in creating a world for itself. The system does not only interpret the world as it is, as all other systems of philosophy generally do, bnt its point is to change it and to change it into a new world, a better and happier world for mankind. It has laid an emphasis on the need of "recognition" (Pratyabhijna) of 'Self' (Atman), viz. the surpreme inheritence of man. The more we realise in ourselves the supreme and free nature of 'Self' (Atman), by taking aid of certain processes of intuition, moral discipline and spiritual training in addition to experience and reason, the more powers of knowledge and action (Jnana Shakti and Kriya Shakti) we manifest and exercise through our mind and body. The necessity of supersensuous experience for Self-realization is recognised owing to the limitations of man's sense and reason. The modern pychologists have also admitted: "the conscious Self of each of us...does not comprise the whole of consciousness or of the faculty within us. There exists a more comprehensive consciousness, a profounder faculty within us, which for the most part remains potential only." (Human Personality, by F. W. H Myers P. 13). According to the system, Prataybhijna, 'recognition' of Self-the profounder faculty within us, is prscribed for the service of man as a means of attaining all that is of highest value"........................

जनस्याप्युपकारमिच्छन्। समस्तसंपत्समवाप्तिहेतुं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञामुपपादयामि"

(Ishvara Pratyabhijna Sutras—I, i).

Thus the system lays down the psychological basis for the elevation of human personalety.

Pratyabhijna Philosophy has also been understood as a correct interpretation of the Indian Philosophy, or in other words, a proper

evaluation of Indian culture. It will be noticed that Indian culture is indeed human culture. The Pratyabhijna system has laid a great emphasis on "Freedom" (Svatantrya) of man, and "Freedom" and human culture are considered one and the same thing. It has revealed the law of humanity and the essentials of human society, viz. Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. The doctrine of human equality and universal brotherhood has originated from all the religious schools. The Christian doctrine basis its ethics on the notion: 'God is the father of human race, men his children, owe Him an account of their acts... Love of God, the father of all men, is to be translated into the accomplishment of the law of neighbourly love, that is to say, the love of all men.' Likewise the Muslim doctrine teaches the universal brotherhood and the love of ones's fellow men. The same doctrine of universal brotherhood and world peace is taught in the Sikh religion. Buddhism has its dogma of universal love, altruism and non-violence. The Pratyabhijna Philosophy, which is indeed a revaluation of Indian Philosophy, has also recognised universal brotherhood and equality of all men, as it has aptly established the fact that it is one Universal Soul which lives in all mankind. These truths are now admitted as the essentials of human culture. The highest objective of the Indian Philosophy is the peaceful existence and welfare of the whole human race. This is best expressed in the Ishavasyopanishada 6 & 7:

यस्तु सर्वाणि भूतान्यात्मन्येवानु पश्यति। सर्वभूतेषु चात्मानं ततो न विजुगुप्सते।"
यस्मिन्सर्वाणि भूतान्यात्मैवाभूद्विजानतः। तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः।

(He who sees all creatures in himself, himself in all creatures, does not show abhorrence to any one 6.) (Knowing all living beings to be one's own self, seeing the unity of mankind, how can there be delusion, suffering or sorrow? 7). Lasting peace of mankind (Vishva-shanti) is the *summum bonum* of the Upanishadas which is also the aim of every religious doctrine. In the words of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, what we need is "a recognition of those supreme ends of life to which science and organization, discipline and obedience are to be harnessed." Human culture that the Indian philosophy teaches is 'an evolution of man towards his emancipation, his liberation from material dangers, his advance to a state in which all the sublime germs of which he is the chosen vessel may develop — Art, Science, the social idea, the philosophic idea ......' It is therefore a mistake to suppose that Indian Philosophy is in contradiction with all the causes of human progress, Science, Technology and the idea of Society. The recent events have sho[illegible]

Philosophy or Indian culture has done the greatest service to mankind otherwise all humanity would have been menaced with destruction. It is, in fact, leading the world to real peace and progress.

The major part of this work is primarily based on the direct study of the texts on the subject. The earlier works by various scholars have been drawn upon firstly for supplying the needs of the general readers and secondly for a critical and comparative examination of different views held.

Glimpses of the present Study :—The main body of the treatise is divided into three parts, Part I—"Origin and Development of the Pratyabhijna System", Part II—"Exposition of its doctrines" and Part III—"Its place in Indian and Western systems of Philosophy."

Part I (Origin and Development) :—At the very outset of this part, the controvertial view points of some scholars are discussed with reference to (1) the name of the system, (2) the time of the existence of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy, according to Dr. K. C. Pandey, (3) the time of the existence of the system, according to Dr. Lachhmi Dhar, (4) The connection of this Philosophy with Shankaracharya's school of Vedanta and (5) a tradition in Kashmir about the differences between the Pratyabhijna Philosophy and the Vedanta system. All these discussions bring out the following results :—

(*i*) **The name of the system** :—Dr. Pandey prefers to call this system 'Trika' as he says, in his book "Abhinavagupta" (An Historical and Philosophical Study), "It is a misnomer to call this system of Philosophy 'Pratyabhijna' or 'Spanda' as much as it would be to call India 'Calcutta' or 'Bombay'." Dr. Pandey does not seem to be differentiating the 'Pratyabhijna' as 'Philosophy proper of the Trika system' (as Pt. Madhusudan Koul puts it in his perface to Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini Vol. I); Trika is the name of the non-dualistic system of Shaiva cult of which 'Pratyabhijna' is the Philosophical part. It is the latter part only which can be called the "Pratyabhijna Philosophy," but the whole Trika system cannot be called the "Trika Philosophy," Sixty four systems of the Shaiva cult have been enumerated in the Shaiva scriptures which include Trika as one of them. These are all the religious systems but not the philosophical schools. Praytabhijna is the name given by Utpaladeva to this philosophical system which is treated of by him in his work *"Ishvara Pratyabhijna Karikas* (Sutras)." But before Utpaladeva

gave this name to the system, it appears to be called "Shaiva Darshana" as is apparent from the title of the Somananda's work "Shivadrshti." This system must have been known as Pratyabhijna system in the later ages as it is so called by Madhavacharya in his Sarvadarshana Samgraha in the 14th century A. D. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan also calls it the Pratyabhijna system in his 'Indian Philosophy' (Vol, II) for the said reason. Dr. Pandey brings to notice elsewhere that the system is also known as Svatantraya-vada and Abhasavada, but these are the names of the various doctrines of the system and as such can not be the names of the whole system. The system is also generally called "Kashmir Shaivism", the name given to it by J. C. Chatterji, because all writers on it belonged to Kashmir. It is however, concluded that the system, which we mean a philosophic system, cannot be called by any other name, Trika, Spanda, Svatantryavada or Abhasada or a more general name Shaiva system, except the Pratyabhijna system.

(ii) **Emergence of Pratyabhijna School** :—The Pratyabhijna system arose in Kashmir in the second half of the ninth century A. D. Somananda was the founder of this school, as he, for the first time, briefly laid down its main doctrines in his work 'Shivadrshti.' Utpaladeva, the disciple of Somananda, who lived in the tenth century A. D., was the systematiser of the Philosophy. He formulated the doctrines taught by his teacher in his Ishvara Pratyabhijna Karikas (or Sutras). The well-known Abhinavagupta, who flourished towards the eleventh Century A. D., made this philosophy intellegible in his two commentaries (one short an d the other long) on Pratyabhijna Karikas, namely the Vimarshini and the Vivrti-vimarshini. He, therefore, occupies the same position in this realm of thought as the expounder of the system like the great Shankaracharya in the domain of Vedanta.

(iii) **Its connecton with other systems of Indian Philosophy** :- The Kashmir Shaivas claim that the system, which they generally call by the name "Trika" is the highest monistic system based throughout on the sacred authority of Shaivagamas, to which they ascribe divine origin and eternal existence. They do not at all recognise the authority of the Vedic scriptures ; but they aim at refuting the view points of the Vedanta and other systems evolved from the Vedic sources. They assign superiority to the Pratyabhijna system which, in their view, is the only perfect and correct sytem transcending all other systems of philosophy, It will be clear from the following pages that in its main doctrins the Pratyabhijna

system is not fundamentally different from the Vedanta, as initially set forth in the Upanishadas, which are the fountain-head of all the systems of thought in India, the Sankhya, the Vaisheshika, the Vaiyakarana (the Gremmarians' School), the Buddhist, and the Vedanta and so on. It will be observed that there is a common theme in all these philosophical systems in India. The same is the central theme in the Pratyabhijna system, or, as a matter of fact, of any other Shaiva system in India. These systems, however, differ from one another in holding different points of view, in propounding some new doctrines of their own and also adopting different nomenclature, viz. technical terms. The Shaivaists, the originators of the system, have incorporated most of the ideas from the Sankhya, the Vaiyakarana, the Buddhist and the Vedanta systems and have presented their various doctrines in a technique of their own, based upon certain tenets derived from Shaivagamas. which distinguish the Pratyabhijna system from the other systems.

Religious and Philosophical Background :- Part I of the work further gives a study of the religious and philosophic background which brought about the emergence of Pratyabhijna school in Kashmir. The evidences show that there existed in Kashmir in very ancient times a polytheistic religion, which included, among many other primitive types of worships, the worship of the aboriginal deities such as God Shiva, Vinayaka, Various Vedic and Puranic Gods, and even the worship of the Buddha as an Autar. We learn that Shiva worship occupied the first place among the Hindu cults of the valley from the earliest times. While a number of old cults and religious practices flourished in Kashmir, at times, various religious and philosophical doctrines reached there from outside its boundaries. Buddhism, a historic movement, spreading far and wide, was also welcomed by Kashmiris near about the time of Ashoka (273-232 B. C.). Kashmiris became active partici. pants in the Buddhist idealogy since that time. Nagasen (150 B.C.), the reputed author of Milinda-Panha, is said to be a Kashmirian. Kumaralabdha, one of the four luminaries of Buddhism, is also known to be a Kashmiri. Nagarjuna, a native of Berar, stayed to study in Kashmir for long. 'Ashvagosha is said to have been brought by Kanishka (78-102 A. C.) from Patliputra to Kashmir to function as the Vice-President of the Great Buddhist Council held in the Kundala-Vana-Vihara (near about the present Harwan water reservoir) in Kasmir.' (Research-I P. 4). Dr. Pandey writes that 'Buddhism had a strong-hold in Kashmir since the time of Ashoka. It was in Kasmira that Kanishka

convoked an assembly of the Buddhist theologians......Its existence was particularly felt by the Shaivas when Kanishka made a gift of Kasmira (Kanishka-puram) to Buddhist church and Nagarjuna came to power and began to spread Buddhism. The aggressive attitude of Nagarjuna is referred to by Kalhana and by Varadaraja in his Shiva-sutra-vartika.' (History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, Vol. I, Chapter by Dr. Pandey, P. 381) Buddhism and Brahmanic cults, however, existed peacefully side by side in Kashmir for centuries before Kalhana's time (cf. Chronicle of the Kings of Kashmir, Introduction P. 9). Heun Tsang who, visited Kashmir during the years 630-645 A.D., and Ou-Kong, who visited the valley during 759-763 A. D. witnessed Buddhism flourishing in the country and being patronised by the rulers. Inspite of the phenominal success which Buddhism had in Kashmir, Shaivism continued to be a vital force from the past. A revival of Shaivism, however, came in Kashmir from the seventh century A. D. Shankaracharya (780-812 A. D.) is said to have visited Kashmir to give a final blow to Buddhism there. Eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian era seem to have witnessed a religious upheaval in the valley of Kashmir (Introduction to Ishvara-Pratyabhijna Vimarshini, P. I.), as a result of which Buddhism appears to be disappearing and the old Hinduism, particularly Shaivism, taking hold of the people. Consequently, Kashmir was the meeting-ground of the various philosophical currents at the time of the rise of the monistic Shaivism (History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, Vol, I, P. 381, Chapter by Dr. Pandey). In the ninth century A. D., there existed a concourse of various religious and philosophical ideas as professed by Buddhists and the followers of other orthodox creeds : the Vaidyakas, the Shaivas, the Shaktas, the Vaiyakaranas (Grammarians), the Sankhyas, the Naiyayikas, the Vedantins and upholders of the Yoga systems. It was from all these prevailing ideas that the Pratyabhijna system of Philosophy emerged in the Shaiva-fold in the valley of Kashmir. The work further gives a brief survey of the earlier speculations and philosophical doctrines in the Vedas, the Upanishadas and the Buddhist sources and also in the various systems of philosophy prevailing in the valley before the emergence of the Pratyabhijna school. From these studies it is concluded that the origination of the Pratabhijna school was, in fact, nothing new but only a logical development of the philosophic and religious ideas already existing in Kashmir.

Development of the Pratyabhijna system :- Part I of the work *further* gives a brief history of the development of the Pratyabhi-

jna system on the basis of the Shaiva literature. It distinguishes the two stages of its development viz., (1) the earlier stage as revealed in the teachings of Somananda in his work Shivadrshti, (The name of the Somananda's *system appears to be still* "Shiva Dharshana" by which any *Shaiva* System was generally called in ancient days. Somananda refutes all the older systems, not only of Vaidyakas but also different schools of Shaivas and Shaktas and introduces in his work new trends of thought and view-points which were later on systematised by his pupil Utpaladeva.) and (2) The later stage of its development in the final form as formulated by Utpaladeva in his work, the Ishvara Pratyabhijna *Karikas* or Sutras. These were expounded by Abhinavagupta in his two commentaries, one short, called Vimarshini, and the other long, called *Vivrtti Vimarshini. At the later* stage Utpaladeva evidently names the system as the "Pratyabhijna Darshana" indicated by the title of his work "Ishvara Pratyabhijna Sutras." The work gives next a brief history of the pioneers of the system and their attainments and works.

Part II "Expostion of its Doctrines":- In this part attempt is made to expound the various tenets of Pratyabhijna system from the first-hand study of the original texts. The doctrines of the system in the earlier and the later stages of development are separately treated in two different sections. A free translation of the ideas given in the relevant texts, Shivadrshti and Ishvara Pratyabhijna Karikas and Vimarshini, etc. has been given in proper context for a faithful representation of various doctrines of the system. All these doctrines are put together in the present work in such a manner as to form a compact whole of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy. No attempt has been made to give the literal translation of the Sutras or the commentaries. On the other hand, clear exposition of the doctrines is aimed at by interpreting as much of the comprehensive and difficult texts as possible. It may be stated here for the information of the readers that the English translation of the Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini by Dr. K C. Pandey has already appeared in "The Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhawana Texts." (as No. 48)

Brief idea of Somananda's doctrines:- Somananda's work Shivadrshti consists of 7 chapters (Ahnikas), the purport of which is as follows :- Chapter I of the work explains why and how the Ultimate Cause Shiva materializes in a concrete form of the universe consisting of diverse

animate and inanimate objects. Shiva constitutes the 'essence and identity' (Self) of every being ; He abounds in bliss and consciousness and is all-pervasive. (आत्मैव सर्वभावेषु स्फुरन्निर्वृ तचिद्विभुः ।) He is an unrestrained stream of 'Will' (free will) and a spontaneous flow of 'Cognition' and 'Activity'. (अनिरुद्धेच्छाप्रसरः प्रसरद् दृक् क्रियः शिवः) (Shivadrshti—1, 2) This benign principle - Shiva-Tattva, the Ultimate Reality, is eternal and endless. (शिवतत्त्वं नित्यमनन्तकम) From his native characteristics bliss (Nirvrti) and consciousness (Chit). comprising his transcendental state, stream forth sovereignty of 'will' and powers of 'knowledge' and Action', (Iccha shakti, jnana shakti and kriya shakti), From them emanate thirty six Tattvas (the principles of creation) from which evolves the whole universe consisting of diverse creation. Somananda, like Schopenhauer, the German Voluntarist, postulates the doctrine of "Will as the (first) cause of everything", 'Will' as a force of spontaniety (urgency), instinct and spring of life. Power of 'Will' (iccha shakti) is the initial or the basic power, the root cause of all creation. Schopenhauer holds that the chief place in Philosophy belongs not to the intellect, but to the 'will'—

"A motion and spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thoughts,
And rolls through all things,"

In this doctrine of 'sovereignty of will' Somananda represents the voluntaristic tendency of thought. The teacher next explains Shiva's *Transcendence* and *Immanence*. His Transcendence, called *Para* or *Annutara dasha*, is that state in which He exists in the plenitude of his powers (shaktis) of will, cognition and action. His immanence, called *Apara dasha*, is that state in which He transforms Himself in diverse limited objects of the universe. Somananda further describes the first process of creation and its subsequent processes and the final process of diversified creations. In this doctrine a controversy is raised and Somananda answers all the objections.

In Chapter II of the work, Somananda enunciates and refutes the theory of Vaiyakaranas (Grammarians) according to which the Pashyanti Vak (the Transcendental word) is the ultimate cause of the universe. This chapter gives a long controversy with the Grammarians regarding this doctrine in which are brought out the essential characteristics of the Ultimate Cause, viz. the powers of will, knowledge

and action, which make it potent to evolve the creation. The Grammarians' theory, Shabdbrahmavada, is thus refuted. According to Somanada, the Para, the primordial state of Pashyanti Vak is the Ultimate.

In Chapter III of Shivadrshti is rejected the view upheld by the Shaktas viz. Shaktyadvayavada, according to which Shakti (Power) independent of Shiva as Shaktiman (One possessing Power) is the Supreme Cause. Attacks are also directed against Dualistic Shaivas and the followers of Yoga Philosophy. In Chapter IV of his work Somananda criticises summarily a number of other systems, such as, the various schools of Buddhism and the monistic Vedanta, the Jainism, the Sankhya, the Nyaya, the Vaishehika and so on. He thus distinctly refers to the various schools of thought prevailing in his time, all of which he considers illogical and unsound, and makes a rationalistic approach to the problem concerning the Ultimate Reality according to the points of view of the School of the Monistic Shaivas which he represents. In Chapter V, Somananda demonstrates the identity in nature of all animate and inanimate objects in this diverse world and gives proofs in support of the Monistic doctrine. Somananda brings here a controvesy. An objection is raised : if we admit all that exists is one Shiva, there arise the impossiblities of practical life. Somananda explains that, notwithstanding every thing in nature being identical, all the acts of practical life are real since they proceed from the self-dependent power (Svatantrya Shakti) of the Ultimate Being (Lord) who materialises himeslf in the form of all the created beings. There arises no question of violating the practice of the world and our duties with regard to it. It cannot, therefore, be assumed that virtue (dharma) and vice (adharma) cannot affect pure Shiva in the form of Jiva; the books and teachers are not necessary for imparting knowledge to omniscient Shiva in the form of a disciple ; and so on. All these essentials of practical life are real and not useless (Shivadrsti III). Just as a Yogin does not get himself divided in the various bodies created by him by his power of Tapas, the Lord does not undergo division by the various objects of superior, middle and inferior classes created by him like an ocean by ripples and waves (Shivadrshi III 36 & 37). In canto VI of the work Somananda considers all other systems objectionable, being faulty or deficient. In the last Chapter of his work, he gives the summum bonum of his system, stating that Recognitive realization (Pratyabhijna) only enables a person to attain extraordinary powers and ultimately

leads him to final beatitude. The Recognition is the means of realizing Shiva as immanent in the universe by the process of simultaneously perceiving (drashta) and recalling (smarna) the characteristics existing eternally in Him and not unrealised before (Nananubhutah) (Ibid. IV, 118, 119 & 120,)

Somananda says, whether Shiva is realized or unrealized, there is no cessation of His nature. Whether fire is known or not known, it will not cease to give light and heat; if a piece of gold remains unknown, it will not change into a piece of stone. (Shivadrshiti VII,1—2) But if the nature of fire is known that it gives light and heat, its knowledge enables us to make proper use of it for lighting our houses and other purposes. वह्नियद्यपि विज्ञातः प्रकाशादि करोत्यसौ तथापि योजितो युक्त्या प्रकाशमधिकं गृहे । (Ibid. 10-11.) Similarly by knowing the value and the qualities of the gold we can make proper use of it. Thus if the nature of Shiva-Atman (Self) is known, proper use of His powers—iccha, jnana and kriya—will enable us to accomplish our desired objects. According to Somananda, in the words of Dr. Pandey, the realization consists 'not in the actualization of the potential ; nor in the attainment of something new ; nor in knowing what was unknown before ; but in penetrating through the veil, that makes the Maheshvara appear as the individual, of which every one is immediately aware, and in recognising the Maheshvara in the individual. He holds that the individual is essentially free; freedom is the inner being of the individual. But it is hidden by the veil of ignorance. The ignorance has to be removed to recognise it, to realise it as identical with the Reality, (Dr. Pandey, Introduction to Bhaskari, Vol. II pp. v and vi)

Utpaladeva's approach to the Pratyabhijna Philosophy : Utpaladeva's work—Ishvara Pratyabhijna Karikas (Sutras)—is divided into four sections —Adhikaras. The first section—Jnanadhikara deals with Cognition ; the second section—Kriyadhikara treats of Activity ; the third section—Agamadhikara discusses the 36 principles (Tattvas) of Shaiva school ; and the fourth section - Tattvarthasamgraha-dhikara relates to the essential nature of the Supreme Being and recapitulates the doctrines expounded in the foregoing Adhikaras. In all 16 Ahnikas (cantos) of the work cover all the four sections.

In Ahnika I of Section I of the work, Utpaladeva follows his teacher in attributing the powers of Action and Cognition, or the same

in reverse order, to the Self, the Ultimate Cause (called in his system Meheshvara) as His two primary powers. Later he assigns the Sovereignty of Will (माहेश्वर्य) also as another primary power to the Ultimate Cause. All creation from an atom to a mountain, all that lives or can be said to exist in any form, in the form of sentient or insentient object, microcosm or macrocosm, is endowed with these two characteristics (यो हि जानाति च करोति च सजीवति) In the Introductory verse (I, 1) of his work Utpaladeva says, "...Wishing to help men I set forth the Pratyabhijna Philosophy which is the means of attaining all that is of highest value". (The original line is quoted on P. 7) On this point the teacher introduces a discussion. The Purvapakshin questions, when Atman (Self) is the self-luminous Maheshvara, the Ultimate Being, Actor and the Knower, where arises the occasion for His Recognition or realisation ? All talk of establishing or rejecting the existence of such an eternal and conscious Being is in vain. (कर्तरि ज्ञातरि स्वात्मन्यादिसिद्धे महेश्वरे। अजडात्मा निषेधं वा सिद्धिं वा विदधीतकः 1, 2.) The Uttarapakshin, the teacher, answers the question: although Atman is self-luminous, yet His real nature is not manifest due to His own deluding power (माया विमोहिनी शक्ति). It, however, becomes manifest by his own perceiving power (दृक्क्रियात्मिका शक्ति) which remains hidden from awareness due to his innate delusion. It is the Recognitive insight (Pratyabhijna) which revives this perceiving power. (किंतु मोहवशादस्मिन्दृष्टेऽप्यनुपलक्षिते। शक्त्याविष्करणेनेयं प्रत्यभिज्ञोपदर्श्यते 1 3 .) The Purvapakshin questions again, the perceiving power can be possible with regard to sentient beings only ; how is it to be assigned to insentient objects ? The teacher answers the question : the existence of insentient objects depends upon sentient beings, for it is an admitted fact that the life of all living things comprises 'Knowledge' and 'Action.' Thus in their very manifestation the insentient objects are also endowed with these two characteristics. Again, the Purvapakshin questions, how is the existence of Knowledge and Action as two primary powers of Atman to be proved ? The teacher says, Out of these two, Knowledge is self-established (स्वतः सिद्धम्) whereas Action (which is also self-establised स्वतः सिद्धा) is associated with a body (क्रिया–कायाश्रितासती) and is thus perceptible to other perceivers ; and it is through Action that others' Knowledge can be inferred. In this

manner all the objections with regard to Recognition are waived. (Ref. Pratyabhijna Sutras 1, 4 and 5.)

In the next two Ahnikas (Cantos 2 & 3) the teacher introduces another discussion to refute the theory of Buddhist Saugatas, according to which the perceiving Self is not a permanent being. The theory of the Saugates is based on their doctrine of Genearl Momentariness. Utpaladeva rejects the theory mainly on the ground of the phenomena of remembrance, and establishes the existence of permanent Self. He says, if we do not admit a persisting Self, the settled order of the world will not be possible. In the state of General Momentariness, even perception is impossible, since the three notions occuring in this experience viz. 'I', 'awareness' and the 'object', belonglng to three different moments of time, can not be joined together in one identical relation. The Buddhists have no reason to suppose that these three notions do not involve three successive stages. On the other hand, we are conscious of our identity that we persist in all our changing states of consciousness, and though our ideas are continuously changing with the changing objects, we remain unchanged all the same, and this shows that in knowing ourselves as pure 'awareness', we are successively connected with the changing objects. The existence of a permanent entity persisting in the changing states of consciousness is established as a matter of our common experience, as it is this persisting entity Self which, in the later state of remembrance, remembers an object which he perceives in the previous state. On this point the Purvapakshin states that 'it is the residual trace or impression (Samskar) that causes remembrance. Therefore, it is unnecessary to assume the existence of another superfluous entity, Atman'. Utpaladeva replies this point saying that one perception, say, the perception of sight differes from another, say, the perception of taste. As stated by the Purvapakshin (Bauddha), remembrance of previous perception arises from the residual trace or impression (Samskar) which is supposed to be the common ground of perceptions without recourse to a persisting self. By such an assumption it follows that one impression (Samskar), say, the impression of sight-perception shonld cause the remembrance of a differnt perception, say, taste-perception and vice versa. This evidently leads us to impossibilities, unless we admit the existence of a persisting Self Who experiences different states of consciousness.

After proving the existence of a permanent Self (Atman), called

Mahesvara, Utpaladeva states that He is endowed with three powers, viz. the power of Remembrance (Smarana Shakti), the power of Knowledge (Jnana shakti) and the power of Differentiation (Apohana shakti) which are the three forms of Cognitive Power (Jnatratva shakti), the first Primary power assigned to the Self. The Power of Remembrance (Smarana Shakti) is that power by virtue of which Atman who experiences the perception of an object in one state, remembers the same in another state. In the latter state the Self is rememberer (smarata). In the absence of remembrance also the self still exists possessing the power of Remembrance (Smarana shakti), as one of his powers or faculties. The power of remembrance is fully discussed in Ahnika 4. The power of Knowledge (Jnana shakti) functions in making objects manifest externally in the form of their perceptions which existed within in the form of self-consciousness. By virtue of this power the Self takes out for separate manifestation only certain things from the unlimited mass which lies merged in it (स्वरूपादुन्मग्नमाभासयति). The real nature of objects, according to the system, is Prakasha (manifestation) (प्रकाश एव अर्थानां स्वरूपम) which is innate in Jnana shakti. From this point of view objects are real against the Vijnana-vadin's theory that they are the transformation of our Vasana (desires) and do not have separate real existence. The processes (Vrtis) of mind (Antah Karana) viz. will (iccha), Knowledge (Jnana) and action (Kriya) function by the power of Knowledge (Jnana shakti). The power of Knowledge is explained in detail in Ahnika 5. The power of Differentiation (Apohana shakti) is that power of Self which enables Him to manifest one object, say, a jar (ghata) different from any other object, non-jar (aghta), or the appearance (Prakasha) of an object different from its disappearance (Aprakasha). The doctrine concerning the power of differentiation is expounded in Ahnika 6. After explaining the functions of these three powers, Utpaladeva proves that they rest in one substratum, the lasting Self (Atman), the Maheshvara. This is established on logical grounds in Ahnika 7. Maheshvara is assigned the sovereignty of will (माहेश्वर्य) or Volitional power (Iccha shakti) as its another Primary power. Somananda has treated this as the first or basic power in Shivadrshti I. This power, माहेश्वर्य, is explaind by Utpaladeva in Pratyabhijna Sutras (Ahnika 8) in a novel way. Here he introduces two new theories, (1) Svatantrya-vada and (2)Abhasavada which are explaind elsewhere in this chapter.

Section 2 (Kriyadhikara) of the work deals with Kriya-shakti (the power of physical Activity), the secend primary power of the Ultimate Reality. The whole creation or, in other words, manifestation is the result of the Kriya shakti ; as under the operation of its three laws, viz. the law of Divison (भेदाभेद), the law of perception (मान तत्फल मेय) and the law of Causation (कार्य कारण) it turns into a constituent power (निर्माण शक्ति) which brings into existence the whole cosmos. In section I of Kriyadhikara, Utpaladeva discusses the nature of Kriya-shakti. In regard to this, the Purvapakshin questions : Kriya involves succession (krama) causing plurality which is contrary to the nature of Self Who is, in essence, devoid of plurality, according to the Monistic Doctrine of Shaivas. The Uttrapakshin, teacher, answers as follows :—Action (Kriya) involves plurality on account of the function of काल शक्ति (principle of time). Plurality is the result of pereception of an object at differnt moments of time :— कालः सूर्यादि संचारस्तत्तत्पुष्पादि जन्म वा। शीतोष्ण वाथ तल्लक्ष्यः क्रम एव सत्त्वतः। Self possessing the Kriya-shakti as one of His primary powers is uneffected by Kala-Shakti and is thus free from the nature of plurality. The teacher explains plurality also by the theory of Manifestation (Abhasa-vada), which is a quite new theory in the Praytabhijna Philosophy. According to thiis theory, Atman or Maheshvara (Lord) is the Manifester of diverse manifestations (चित्राभासकृत· प्रभो) in the form of various objects of this universe. The Kala Shakti of this Lord (Atman) differentiates various manifestations at different moments of time as distinct entities. By this theory of manifestation (Abhasavada) are also explained the relations of Plurality and Unity (Bhedabheda), the relation of 'Subject,' 'awarenes' and the 'object' (Pramata, Pramana and Prameya) and the relation of Cause and Effect (Karana karaya), in conformity with the doctrine of Monism (Advaita). Ultimately there exists Unity in Plurality (Bhedabheda). This is the first or the fundamental law of Kriya Shakti of which the other two laws, the law of Perception and the law of Causation, are derivatives or corallaries. These three laws are comprehensively discussed, in three separate sections of Kriyadhikara, in Utpaladeva's work. Thus in this system One Lord is both the Manifester subject (Aham) and the manifested object (Idam). The manifested world is analysed into thirty-six Categories (or principles of Creation) called Tattvas, from Shiva, the highest principle, to the earth, the principle of solidity.

Part III, Agamadhikara, of Utpaladeva's work treats of different supernatural elements as derived from the dogmas of the Agama-shastra. After describing the thirty-six Categories of Abhasa-vada, it gives the pure and impure creation of perceivers (Pramatas); the bondage (Samsara) and freedom (Svatantrya); the impurities (Malas)—Anava (the innate impurity), Mayiya (the impurity caused by the principle of limitation—Maya) and Karmiya (impurity in the shape of lack of knowledge of right and wrong actions); the different states of perceivers, viz. Jagarat (waking), Svapana (dreaming), Sushupti (dreamless sleep), Turya (fourth state) and Turyatita (beyond the fourth state); released souls (Pati) and the other perceivers (Pasu); common creation; the two classes of Samsarins (worldly men); four methods of realisation for liberation (freedom), Shambhavopaya, Shaktopaya, Anavopaya and Anupaya and so on. (The fourth and fifth states given above are those of the Yogin's intuition).

Part IV, Tattva-samgrahadhikara, the last part of the Utpaladeva's work, recapitulates all the important doctrines of the Praytabhijna system as discussed in the first three parts of the work and explains further the essential nature of the Highest Being which is the Self of all living beings (स्वात्मैव सर्वे जन्तूनामेक एव महेश्वरः) The *summum bonum* of this system is to 'recognise' the supreme and free nature of Self realizing that all this world is one's own creation (सर्वो ममायं विभव इत्येवं परिजानतः). Thus fully kowing one's Self and its hightest potential powers of Cognition and Action, one thinks and acts in a right manner to see all his desired objects accomplised. (एवमात्मानमेतस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानक्रिये तथा। जानन्यथेप्सितान्पश्यञ्जानाति च करोति च ॥) (Ishara Pratyabhijna Sutras IV, 1.) The gratification one feels by realizing one's self as supreme and free soul is best described by Utpaladeva by the example of the proverbial maiden (in Ahnika IV, 2) of the work: 'A certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular gallant, fell in love with him and agitated by her passion and unable to suffer the pain caused by his absence from her, wrote to him a love letter describing her condition. He at once came to her; but when she saw him, she did not recognise in him the qualities she had heard about; he appeared much the same as any other person and she found no gratification in his society. Soon, however, as she recognised those qualities (in him) as her companian now pointed them out, she was fully graitfied. Similarly one cannot get

the real happiness unless one recognises the nature of Supreme Self in one's individual self.' (तैस्तैरप्युपयाचितैरुपनतस्तन्व्याः स्थितोऽप्यन्तिके । कान्तो लोकसमान एवमपरिज्ञातो न रन्तं यथा । लोकस्यैष तथा...) When one recognises one's profounder Self, he feels that he has attained what is of highest value, as he will not be wanting anything because of his former inferiority complex, since he finds that his own profounder faculties, now-recognised, are there to provide him what he wants and to lead him to final beatitude. Utpaladeva says, at the end, that he has set forth this Ishvara Pratyabhijna "in order that comman man may have the transcendental power (Siddhi) without much effort." (जनस्यायत्नसिद्ध्यर्थम्......इश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञेयमुत्पलेनोपपादिता)

Part III "Place of Pratyabhijna in Indian and Western systems of Philosophy":- This part of the work reviews the allied philosophical movements in India and the West as represented by (1) the Shaiva systems of India; (2) The Vedic and Buddhist Systems of Indian Philosophy; and (3) the Western Schools of Philosophy. A comparison and contrast is made between the various doctrines of the Pratyabhijna system and the allied doctrines of other schools to indicate the distinctive features of this system and in what respects it transcends the other systems.

Philosophic Movements in India and the West :- In the development of philosophical thought in India there arose two main movements, the Vedic and the non-Vedic. The Vedic movement grew within the ambit of Vedic scriptures and the non-Vedic movement developed from the Shaivagamas, Shaiva scriptures. The former movement started sometime between second and third millinium B.C. when Aryans settled in this country and produced their literature, known as the Vedic literature. Some hymns of the Rig-veda, the oldest of the Vedas, and the later Vedic literature the Upanishadas indicate that various speculations were held by the Vedic Indians regarding the origin and nature of creation. The Shaiva movement in India dates from centuries earlier than the Vedic movement. The inscriptions of Mohenjo-daro and Harappa have revealed that the Shaiva cult was in vogue as far back as 3000 B.C. Sir John Marshall says, "Amongst the many revelations that Mohenjo-daro and Harappa have had in store for us, none perhaps is more remarkable than the discovery that Shaivism had a history going back to the Chalcolithic age or perhaps even farther still. The philosophical specula-

tions seem to have also been growing among the Shaivas who lived side by side with Vaidyakas and Bauddhas long before the Christian era. In Europe, the philosophic conceptions started in Greece with the question 'what constitutes the primordial natural force-principle,' from about 600 B. C., when Thales declared water to be the first principle—the Universal Substratum, Prima Materia of all things, of which the other bodies are mere modifications." Thales was followed by other Greek philosophers, Anaximender, Anaximenes, Pythagoras and so on who in the beginnig held materialistic conception of the Universal Substratum or the Prima Materia of all things. It is said that Philosophy has its origin in the Greek race; but the Greeks themselves supposed their early teachers to have imbibed wisdon at the eastern fount.

Indian Philosophy (Vedic and Buddhist) :- It is difficult to indicate with any degree of certainity the different stages in the development of thought in India. But it is certain that long before the composition of the hymns of the Rig-veda, Indo-Aryans had outstripped the primitive simplicity of thought and had developed the conception of gods as forces behind the natural phenomena. From the cosmogonic hymns, or the hymns of creation, which we find in the tenth Mandala of the Rig-veda, it is evident that the Vedic Indians producud deep philosophical lucubrations expressing their growing curiosity to know the origin and nature of creation. N. Mukharji, the auther of "A Study of Shankara" is justified to state, "It is therefore that the question that man has asked in all ages and in every clime, has found expression in the hymns of the Rig-veda not in its primitive simplicity but with timeless and universal moulding that the vision of a poet or seer could give it." In the words of the Vedic seer को अद्धा वेद क इह प्रवोचत् कुतः आजाता कुत इयं विसृष्टिः (Who knows truly ? Who shall here declars, whence it has been produced; whence is this creation ?) we find the primitive inquiries made in the hoary ages regarding the Ultimate Cause of this creation, which are indeed the beginnings of the phliosophical thinking in India. In the Vedic movement, in fact, various tendencies or currents of thought appear growing and changing, Naturalism, Anthropomorphism, Monotheism and finally Monism. The Vedic thinkers were led to suppose that there is one divinity, one superior power, which they called by various names and spoke in various ways: इन्द्रं मित्रं वरुणमग्निमाहुरथो दिव्यः ससुपर्णो गुरुत्मान्। एकं सद्विप्रा बहुधा वदन्त्यग्निं यमं

मातरिश्वानमाहु । "Such monotheistic ideas later gave rise to various speculations about the nature of this divinity or Godhead, the Ultimate cause of life and existence in an individual (microcosm) and in the universe (macrocosm) around, as we find in the upanishadas, the later literary product of the Vedic age, which are the fountain-head of the Monistic doctrines. It is from this ultimate source that Shankara'a system of Vedanta and the Pratyabhijna Philosophy developed in the Vedic and non-vedic folds respectively.

It is said that the philosophic spirit grew in India from the age of the Buddha, before the country had developed any philosophy proper on rational basis ; It is, however, apparent that Philosophical speculations had already grown in the Vedic age as indicated by some philosophic hymns in the Rig Veda and the Upanishadas. Rational thinking originated when Buddhists questioned about the different speculations of the Vaidyakas. The earliest philosophic doctrines, such as Vijnana-vada and Kshanika-vada evolved from Buddhists. Later on the speculations of the Upanishadas assumed different forms in various systems of philosophy which developed in post-Vedic ages. Definite doctrines and different philosophic theories evolved from various schools of thought, such as, Dvaita (Dualism), Advaita (non-dualism), Vishishtadvaita (modified non-dualism) and Dvaitadvaita (Unity in difference). The last theory ultimately culminated in the non- dualistic doctrine of Shankra-charya.

Shaivistic Philosophy : It has been stated above that the Shaiva cult was in vogue as far back as 3000 B. C,, centuries earlier than the Vedic age. The history of Shiva-worship in India shows that it is of pre-Aryan origin. There are numerous references in Vedic literature which show that worship of Shiva was in vogue in the country in the Vedic age. Some of the references clearly indicate that this form of worship was gradually borrowed by Aryans from non-Aryans. Round this Shiva- worship there grew a mass of literature belonging to Shiva-shakti cults, which is known as "Agamas and Tantras". It developed through ages side by side with and possibly independent of the Vedic scriptures. Shaivas seem to have borrowed most of the ideas from the scriptures of the Vaidyakas. Consequently, in a place like India, where different school's of thought had grown in the Vedic fold, development of similar schools within the ambit of Shaiva fold was but inevitable. Shri S. G. Sakharpekar mentions, in his address on "Shaivagama"

delivered in the Seventh All-India Oriental Conference (1933), that before the arrival of Shankaracharya on the religious stage, the Agama-vadins of the Shaiva School were separated into different schools, viz. Maha-pashupatas, Shaiva Siddhanta, Nipala-Pashupatas, Kashmira Shaivas and Vira Shaivas. These different Shaiva sects also held varied philosopical theories, such as Dvaita (Dualism), Advaita (Non-dualism), Dvaita-dvaita. (Dualism-cum-monism) and so on, like the similar schools of the Vedic fold. The non-dualistic trend of thought in the Shaiva movement finally culminated in the from of the Monistic System of Pratyabhijna Philosophy.

Western Philosophy:- The earliest Greek speculators, like the first Indian thinkers, were the physical philosophers, who assigned the Cause of the universe to various original substances like elemental water, air, fire, or all the four elements, or atoms. Some assigned it to abstractions like numbers or 'One' as the beginning of all things, or one God or one Finite or Infinite being and so on. Various other schools conceived the Ultimate Cause as pure Being, the one universal essence ; subjective conception ; or the totality of thought. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel finally represent the three idealistic movements of the later Western Philosophy. Fichte's Subjective Ideaism explains that the object-tree and its image is the modification of my mind ; Schelling's Objective Idealism states that both the ego and object (tree) are existences equally real but they are nothing less than manifestations of the Absolute ; and lastly Hegel's Absolute Idealism explains that the only thing really existing is the idea—the relation. The ego and object (tree) are but two terms of the relation and owe their reality to it. These idealistic trends in the Western philosophy were followed by the later rationalistic speculations and gradually the Schools of Positive Philosophy and the Scientific Philosophy came into existence, The criterion of philosophical quests was realized as is put in the words : "Knowledge of the lowest kind is the ununified knowledge ; Science is partially-unified knowlege ; Philosophy is completely-unified knowledge." In this conception, philosophy is the 'kowledge of the highest degree of generality' which is its definition in the simplest and the clearest form. The end of Philosophy was thus understood the achievement of the unification of knowledge. Further scientific inquiry into various physical

phenomena revealed certain primary truths, or general laws of nature, such as, 'the Indestructibility of Matter', 'the Continuity of Motion' and 'the Persistence of Force' of which the last is the Ultimate and the others derivative. The truth that force can neither arise out of nothing nor lapse into nothing was also observed and it was found that all phenominal changes are direct or indirect results of the 'Persistence of Force'. But this truth can never be more than partially proved. Herbert Spencer who represents this trend of thought in the Western Philosophy, however, felt the existence of some Unknown Reality of which Matter, Motion, and Force are but symbols. The force was ultimately accepted as the beginning and the first cause of things, the matter and motion being the other symbols of the same Unknown Reality. Why he names this as some Unknown Reality, it is because of this deepest, widest and most certain of all facts—that the power which the universe manifests to us is inscrutable. While generalising all phenominal changes under one 'Unknown Reality', he thinks that Spirit and Matter are its two aspects. He says, "... though the reality of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of spirit and matter, the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the Unknown Reality which underlies both". According to him 'the universe, whether physical or psychical, whether as mind or matter, is a play of force ; mind, life and matter being each varying aspects of the one cosmic process from the first cause'. Thus we find, in the Western Philosophy, two contending problems, the Idealism and the Realism, the earlier and the later trends in the Philosophy.

Pratyabhijna's Approach to the problem of the Ultimate Cause :— As stated above the monistic currents of thought grew in India from the Vedic movement. The doctrine of Monism is for the first time established beyond any dispute in the principal Upanishadas, which are agreed to one root Principle Brahman. Though absolute unity was aimed at in them in a general way, there was difference of opinion as to the nature of this one Ultimate Reality. It was difficult to grasp the real idea of unity in view of all our knowledge of the universe resting on duality in opposition to unity. But this universe was viewed in three different standards by three classes of philosophers who followed different schools of thought in the later ages. In the technical terms used by J. C. Chatterji in his "Indian Realism", the

Nyaya-Vaisheshika systems viewed it in the 'Realistic Standard', the Sankhya-Yoga systems in the 'Psycho-dynamic Standard' and the Shankara's School of Vedanta in the 'Polyo-nymic Standard'. While the first two classes of philosophers represented the two stages of realistic thought, the third school followed the idealistic philosophy of ever-changing names and forms. The first class of thinkers was that of physical philosophers like Gotama and Kanada, similar to those we meet in the Western philosophy in Thales, Anaximenes and Leucipus ; and the second class is that of practical psychologists like Kapila and Patanjali. The first class believed in the existence of external realities constituting the universe and the second named the Conscious and Dynamic principles as 'Purusha' and 'Prkrti' from which all creation is evolved. The third class of philosophers which is represented by Shankaracharya aimed at the Upanishadic Monism by teaching absolute Idealism. They attempted to identify subject and object and prove the phenominal character of the world thus reducing the facts of life to unreal manifestations. Corresponding to this thought in the Indian Philosophy we have the School of Neo-Platonists in the Western Philosophy. It is first from Kashmir that opposition was levelled against Shankara's Idealism or Illusionism. The Pratyabhijna Philosophy set out to correct the irrational tendency of Shankara's Philosophy by uprooting its cause in the earlier doctrines of the Buddhist systems, like Kshanika-vada and Vijnana-vada. In this school the conception of the Ultimate Reality, Maheshvara, changed from that of Brahman of Vedantins symbolising only pure Universal Consciousness. The Ulimate Reality in the Pratyabhijna System included Prakasha and Vimarsha as its two aspects, which symbolise respectively the Universal Consciousness and Physical or Material Activity. In the Spinoza's system in the Western Philosophy, there is but one infinite substance that is God, 'the cause of all things'. Viewed under the attributes of infinite substance, God is "*natura naturans*" ; viewed as a manifestation, as the modes under which his attributes appear, He is "*natura naturata*". He has two infinite attributes 'extension' and 'thought'. Extension is visible thought and thought is invisible extension. They are the objective and the subjective phases of which God is the identity. Everything is a mode of God's attribute of extension ; every 'thought', wish, or feeling, a mode of His attribute of thought. Prakasha and Vimarsa represent in the Pratyabhijna Philosophy the

two aspects of the Ultimate Reality symbolised in Spinoza's system in terms of thought and extension. Thus to translate the Ultimate Reality called Maheshvara in terms of 'Universal Consciousness', as Dr. K. C Pandey has done, is not correct, as it denotes only one of its two aspects—Spirit or Subject, but not the other—Matter or Object. The Pratyabhijna conception of the Absolute Reality is that which includes both Subject and Object or Spirit and Matter. The various animate and inanimate beings, subjects and objects, thought and physical activity, mind and body, and the world around us are all real in the Ultimate Being. Shankara's system is not realistic in regard to the physical aspect of this universe which he declares as unreal or illusive, admitting pure Consciousness (Chit) alone to be real. The Pratyabhijna system transcends the earlier systems in making distinction between subjects and objects as two kinds of sentient and insentient waves in the ocean of the Ulitmate Reality.

Specific doctrines of Pratyabhijna :- Svatantrya-vada or the Universal Voluntarism is the chief doctrine of the Pratyabhijna system. It means the doctrine of 'self-dependence' or the 'sovereignty of Lord's will' which 'imparts the impetus to the process of the world'. In the earlier systems three main theories are propounded to account for the process of the creation, viz. (1) the Realistic or Creationist view (Arambhavada), (2) the theory of transformation (Parinama-vada) and (3) the theory of Manifestation (Vivarta-vada). The Pratyabhijna Philosophy proves them unsound. According to the first theory there exist nine classes of realities out of which everything in the universe is formed. It does not give any reason how Effect comes out of the cause in which the former does not exist before it comes into existence. According to the second view Cause brings out Effect, after it undergoes complete destruction. For instance, milk is transformed into curds after it no longer exists in that form. Seed changes into plant after it is completely merged in the soil. Milk is the transformation of the grass consumed by cattle. But when the Parinama-vada strictly postulates that Effect appears only after the destruction of its Cause, it has failed to explain the following instances. The birth of a babe takes place not after the destruction of its Cause, the parent; the creation and multiplication of bacteria do not involve the destruction of the former bacterium. According to the third theory, Vivarta-vada,

which is upheld by Shankaracharya, all effects are the product of Maya, the Nescience, and not real. On the basis of this theory, the world is superimposed on the only Reality which is Brahman, and is thus supposed to be phenomenal, illusive and dreamlike in character. According to the Pratyabhijna Philosophy, the theory is the result of irrational and unscientific thinking. It is absurd to think all the facts of experience as the product of the fictitious principle, Maya. Pratyabhijna, it may be remarked here, vehemently argues against the Shankara's theory of Mayavada (Idealism or Illusionism) and holds it fallacious. Pratyabhijna makes a realistic and rational approach to the problem and postulates a new theory Svatantrya-vada to replace the earlier theories which are held all objectionable. On the basis of this new theory it is due to the sovereignty of the Lord's *Will that* Effect evolves from Cause. It is the Lord's Self-dependent Power (*Svatantrya-shakti*) that multiplies effects from a single cause without destroying itself (the cause). The production of species from parents, expansion and growth of cells from a single cell, creation and multiplication of bacteria from the first bacterium,—all these are examples of the Svatantrya-shakti of the Supreme Cause. The Universal Voluntarism is the only explanation that rational thinking can give to the wonderous creative power in Nature. It may be pointed out that Fichte's idealism in the West is, in the first instance, distinctly marked by the doctrine of Will. By this doctrine Fichte sought to convince Germans that in will lay man's divinity. Schopenhauer's doctrine of "Will as the cause of everything"—Will as a force of spontaniety and sense of effort, an impulse, instinct and spring of life, a supernatural power, however, exactly corresponds to Svatantryavada of the Pratyabhijna system,

Another theory the Abhasavada, the theory of Manifestation, allied to the Svatantryavada, has also been coined in this system for the explanation of the Doctrine of Monism. This is not in fact much different from Shankaracharya's Vivarta-vada. Almost similar to Vivartavada, Abhasavada also holds the world-objects as manifestations or Abhasas. The only difference between the two theories lies in the point that the Abhasas in the Pratyabhijna Philosophy are real in nature, whereas those in the Shankara's System are fictitious and illusive or dreamlike and hence unreal. The system holds that it is the very nature of Parama Shiva, the Supreme Cause, to manifest Himself in

diverse forms of the universe. We cannot question why the fire burns. To burn is the very nature of fire. So we cannot question why Shiva manifests himself in the form of the universe. It is incorrect to say that the Lord transforms Himself into various objects of the world, for such an assumption involves the division of the Lord into parts which leads to many objections. So the theory of Manifestation (Abhasa-vada) postulates that as to burn is the very nature of fire, so to manifest externally what lies within is the very nature of the Self. The manifested objects are real as they exist in the Supreme Reality. The manifested world appears on the background of Self (Svatmabhitti). Thus we have two aspects of the Supreme Self, Prakasha and Vimarsha. The one stands as the substratum of the manifestations and the other is the process of manifestations going upon this substratum. The latter aspect is also known as Svatantrya Shakti because it does not depend upon anything else, but represents the principal power of the Supreme Self (Parama Shiva). The change in the Ultimate Reality is a different arrangement of the ever-existing material in the Self. The transcendental state (Para or Annuttara avastha) of the Supreme Self is pure Con-sciousness uneffected by material change and his immanent state (Apara-avastha) is that which is visible in the changing world : (विश्वमयः प्रसरः विश्वतीर्णश्च संवित्). Abhasa-vada (the theory of Manifestation) appears as one of the elaborate doctrines having its own specific features in the Utpaladeva's system, similar to Vivarta-vada in the Shankar's system. Both the theories are the later development in the Indian philosophy. It will be observed that Bhadarayana, the author of the Vedanta Sutras, as well as Somananda, who were the original thinkers, made a realistic approach to the problem of the universe. Both of them prove the world to be the actual transformation of the Supreme Reality (Maheshvara or Brahman) by instances like clay changing into pots or gold into ornaments and so on. Another example of the creation of the world like the creation of a Yogin or an individual in dreams, as pro-duced in both the systems of Somananda and Bhadarayana to illustrate the emanation of the universe from the Absolute Reality, cannot prove that idealism is first thaught in them. It simply illustrates that the Ultimate Being possessing wonderous powers undergoes change in various ways and yet remains one changeless and eternal Supreme principle. The idealism is the later growth in the Vedanta system and the

Pratyabhijna Philosophy, as Shankaracharya as well as Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta appear to have been under the influence of the Buddhist Phenomenalism. It may be possible that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta were directly under the influence of Shankara's philosophy as has been noticed hy Dr. Buhlar and Dr. Gough.

Bhadarayana and Somananda, the founders of the earlier Vedanta and Pratyabhijna systems, even admit the diversity (Bheda-bhava) in the nature in respect of diverse objects, sentient and insentient, as well as the absence of diversity - non-dualism (Abheda-bhava) - in relation to One Ultimate Reality being the only principle of life and growth in all the created beings. The Upanishadas which are admittedly the common reservoir of both the systems impress this very fact that one Universal Self is immanent in the cosmos consisting of great elements, luminous planets, etc. and in every form of life and growth and the subtle powers of seeing, hearing and so on.

The doctrine of Tattvas is another important doctrine which occurs in the Pratyabhijna System. It is given also in other forms of Shaivism with slight variations in its interpretation. As already stated above the earlier systems of thought in India, like the Sankhya, the Vaisheshika and the Yoga systems made a realistic approach to the problem of the Universe, The Sankhya system enumerates twenty-five Tattvas, categories of creation. These are, of course, mentioned originally in scattered forms in the various Upanishadas and are picked out by the Sankhya philo. sophers and put in a connected system. These are incorporatod in total by the Shaivas in their system, who further added eleven more Tattvas to bring the total number of Tattvas to thirty-six. This is the advance that Shaivas have made in inventing all the essential principles of creation. The atomic theory of the Vaisheshika System is the result of a still deeper analytical treatment of the objective reality, the matter, the grosser Tattva. On the other hand the Yoga School pursued its explorations in the direction of the study of the nature of the Spirit.

The doctrine of Tattvas is one of the interesting doctrines of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy, which is concerned with the ultimate constitu. tion of this universe. The Parama Shiva (the Ultimate Reality) stands above all the categories (Tattvas). It is the Transcendental state of the Ultimate, the Supreme Consciousness (Para samvit), free from qualities

(Nirguna) and beyond all the categories (Tattvatita). It contains in itself the power of Manifestation (Its Prakasha aspect) in which state it is called *Shiva Tattva*. The whole universe from microcosm to macrocosm imbibes the Cognitive power (Jnana Shakti or Jnatratva Shakti) from the Prakasha aspect of the Parama shiva or the Shiva Tattva. It also contains in itself the power of Perception. (Its Vimarsa aspect) in which state it is called *Shakti Tattva*. This Tattva implies the Power principle or Energy which transforms into matter. The universe imbibes the power of physical activity (Kriya shakti or Kartratva Shakti) from the Vimarsha aspect of the Parama Shiva or the Shakti Tattva. In the third Tattva, the *Sadashiva Tattva*, the internal state of pure knowledge (Jnana) is manifest in predominance without any taint of activity and change (Kriya). This Tattva represents the Satta aspect of Shiva, hence also it is called Sadakhya Tattva. In the fourth Tattva, called the *Ishvara Tattva*, the external state of Kriya Shakti (power of activity) becomes predominant. Ishvara Tattva implies the 'opening out' (bahir unmesha). It is called Unmesha as the world evolves from it, i.e. becomes externally manifest while the Sada-shiva Tattva represents the 'closing in' (Nimesha), i. e. in which the universe dissolves itself, or in which all manifestations merge. The fifth Tattva, the *Shudavidya Tattva* (True or pure Knowledge) is the principle of correlation in the universal experience. It is in essence the state of pure knowlege in which there is no distinction between subject and object. This state of experience is also called Parapara, i. e. the state of unity of the Transcendental (Para) and non-Transcendental (Apara) states (Parapara dasha). These five Tattvas are known as the five principles of subject object.

The next Tattva is called the *Maya Tattva*, the principle of Limitatation and Differentiation. The Maya Shakti dissolves Prakasha and Vimarsha aspects of the Parama Shiva and the perception of the world now becomes distinct in the process of evolution. The Maya Tattva represents the experience or power that differentiate objects from subjects. The next five Tattvas which are the offshoots of Maya Tattva, are called respectively *Kala* (कला), *Vidya*, *Raga*, *Niyati* and *Kala* (काल) which cause limitation to the universality of action, Knowledge, interest, place and time in relation to various jivas (individulas). The Maya Tattva is in itself the connecting link between Omnipotence and limited action, Omniscience and limited knowledge, perfection and limited interest, Omnipresence and

limited place, and eternity and limited time. Thus Kala (कला) represents in various limited beings (individuals) the limitation in regard to authorship, or the faculty of doing things, or accomplishing arts ; Vidya the limitation with regard to knowledge of particular objects (faculty of Knowing and thinking of objects) ; Raga the limitation in regard to interest, that which attributes qualities to perceivers (Pramatas) and objects perceived (Prameya); Niyati the limitation in regard to presence in space, that which causes restriction by confining a perceiver to a particlur space; and Kala (काल) the limitation in regard to presence in time, that which fixes the durations in the acts of perceivers.

The following twenty-five Tattvas are those which are given in the Sankhya system. *Purusha* and *Pradhana* (प्रकृति) are respectively the individual subject and the limited individual object. The latter is the root cause of all subsequent division into capacities (Karanas) and objects (Karyas). The thirteen capacities (Karanas) consist of the three capacities of mental operation - *Undetermined thought* (मन), *Determined thought* (बुद्धि) and *Self-arrogation* (अहंकार) ; the five powers of sense preception - *Hearing* (श्रोत्रम्), *Feeling of touch* (त्वक्), *Sight* (चक्षु), *Taste* (रसना) and *Smell* (घ्राणम्) ; and five capacities of Action - *Expression* (वाक्), *Handling* (पाणि), *Locomotion* (पाद), *Rejecting refuse* (पायु) and *Sexual function* (उपस्थ). The ten Karyas are the ten material elements which consist of five physical factors or great elements namely : *Vacuity* (आकाश), *Air* (वायु), *Fire* (अग्नि), *Water* (जल) and *Earth* (पृथ्वी) and the five subtle elements (तनमात्रा) - Sound (शब्द), Touch feeling (स्पर्श), Colour (रूप), Flavour (रस) and Odour (गंध).

From the above it is clear that the doctrine of Tattvas gives an elaborate analysis of the Universal Energy, "Primordial natural force-principle" or the Prima Materia of all things which is transformed into various principles (Tattvas) that bring about the whole creation. This is indeed a definite advancement in the Scientific Philosophy of the West as represented by Herbert Spencer. V. S. Naravane has, in one of his articles on the subject in the Monthly "Kashmir", pointed out that 'the list of categories may not sound very convincing now, in the light of modern scientific advances. But the entire conception

is highly dramatic'. Reference is invited to the chart facing P. 35 for the easy grasp of the doctrine of Tattvas.

The Pratyabhijna, a Monistic system, is indeed a realistic school of thought as it has condemned outright the Shankara's idealism and the nihilistic doctrines of Bauddhas and all such theories in the various forms of escapism and negation. Dr. K. C. Pandey brings into notice (in his Introduction to Bhaskari Vol II) that the system is the synthesis of the realistic, idealistic, voluntaristic, absolutistic and mystic currents of thought then prevailing in Kashmir. This diverse approach emphasizes that Reality is many-sided. Why so many approaches are made to understand the underlying principle of life is because the problem baffles the thought of the man as he tries to know more of it. N. Mukherji explains, in the Introduction to his work "A Study of Shankara", why it is necessary to study the problem as a whole from various points of view, "The life or the universe is synthesis and any comprehensive view of either must be in the form of a synthesis. The Darshanas, therefore, attempted to understand the nature of man and his relation to the universe as a whole and accepted no arbitrary, conventional or limited application. Again, the whole is not a mere mathematical aggregate of parts and it is not possible to have a conception of the whole merely by knowing the separate parts. In the case of the universe, even the parts can never be known exhaustively. If, however, the whole is comprehended, the parts are comprehended. If [illegible] concept of man is comprehended, each individual man is compre[illegible]ed. To know the whole truth about the smallest atom of matter [illegible]he scientist must know the infinite self in whom all things eternally are. To know the whole truth about the subjective self the philosopher must [illegible]now the objective world as it is in itself. To know the whole truth about the Infinite self the acclesiast must comprehend the Finite in whom the Infinite finds his expression. In fact Sc[illegible] Philosophy and Religion are three phases of fundamentally [illegible]vely human thought and experience. For Truth is the fun[illegible] [illegible]mitation to by Science, Philosophy or Religion from its particular sta[illegible] [illegible]n relation same in every case, so that one form of truth cannot be antago[illegible] another without stultifying itself.. Darshana a term more comprehensive than philosophy - implies a search for the deepest truth - an inquiry after the permanent underlying reality of all phenomena...".

To sum up, the Indian Philosophy has not been understood in its true sense owing to the predominance of the idealistic trend of thought later on introduced into it by Shankara's school of Vedants. But it can be undestood correctly, as a realistic branch of Philosophy, in the light of the Pratyabhijna system which is indeed free from any irrational thinking like Mayavada or Adhyasavada (Illusionism).

A birds'-eye view of pratyabhijna metaphysics :- The chart facing this page gives a graphic representation of the central doctrine of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy, the whole cosmogonic theory taught in the system, bringing its scientific value to a pointed notice. In this the Maheshvara—Supreme Being, the Ultimate Cause, is compared with nutritional fluid in the earth which transforms itself into the tree of cosmos and which runs as sap through its every branch, leaf, flower, fruit, etc. This is called Shiva-rasa or Chit-rasa. And what makes it to grow into this Cosmos ? Pratyabhijna gives the answer :- It grows by the 'Sovereignty of His will', technically called Maheshvarya (माहेश्वर्य) or Svatantrya Shakti, which is the force that impels, the force of spontaneity (urgency), instinct and spring of life. The Creative power of Maheshvara has a two-fold nature,—Prakasha, the power of manifestation, and Vimarsha, the power of perception. Prakasha, represented by Shiva, and Vimarsha, represented by Shakti, constituting two-fold nature in Shiva-rasa, shoot forth first into a common stalk and further sprout into two branches, the former growing into the branch of Cognitional power (Jnatratva Shakti) and the latter into that of power of Action (Kartratva Shakti). [illegible] two branches distinguish one as subjective branch, perceiving or [illegible]king subject and the other as objective branch, what is external to the mind. These two branches correspond respectively with Universal Consciousness and Universal Energy in the univere around us. The subjective branch [illegible] Cognitional power (Jnatratva Shakti) further shoots forth into three [illegible]anches, one the power of Remembrance (Smarna shakti), [illegible] of Knowledge (Jnana shakti) and third the [illegible]tiation (Apohana shakti). This gives the psychological ex[illegible] Jnatratva Shakti of Maheshvara, viz. the Universal Consciousness.

The objective branch, the power of action (Kartratva Shakti), is operated upon or governed by three laws of Relation,—one the Law of

Division, the relation of Plurality and Unity (Bhedabheda), second the Law of Perception, the relation of Perceiver, 'awareness' and the object perceived (Mana tat phala meya) and third the Law of Causation, the relation of Cause and Effect (Karya Karana). The power of Action (Kartratva shakti or Kriya Shakti) now turns into Constituent power (Nirmana shakti). The Division in Kriya shakti is caused by the time factor (कालशक्ति) which is also one of the powers of Maheshvara. The objective branch, having grown into Constituent power (Nirmana Shakti), now shoots forth thirty six branches i. e. Tattvas (categories) or principles of creation. All these have already been explained in the foregoing pages. This gives the Physical expansion of Shakti or Kriya Shakti of Maheshvara, the Universal Energy. From these evolved Tattvas emanate the whole universe consisting of innumerable subjects and objects, sentient and insentient beings, suns and moons, stars and planets, rivers and mountains, trees and plants, flowers and fruits, and what not. This emanation of the Universal Being (Maheshvara) into the cosmos is the function of His power of Will (Tat samarthyam svatantryam). It is this image, visible body of the Lord Maheshvara, Bhairava (formidable) having wonderous powers, as represented by the chart, which the Shaiva adorer worships in the following verse: आश्रयाणं चिद्रसस्यौघं साकारत्व-मुपागतम्। जगत रूपतया वन्दे प्रतिद्वं भैरवं वपु।

Turning away first from the macrocosm to look at the microcosm, which exists everywhere around us and within us, there exists a permanent Self (Atman), or soul, in every individual being which is endowed with the three potential powers (Shaktis) of will, cognition and action (इच्छा, ज्ञान and क्रिया). The first power is technically called Svatantrya Shakti (Sovereignty of his Wíll) which is the impetus behind all his creative thought and activity. The soul is also the substratum of the powers of Remembrance (Smarna shakti), Knowledge (Jnana-shakti) and Differentiation (Apohana shakti). All these powers in man collectively comprise human personality; and all human progress depends upon the elevation of human personality in respect of the said powers.

In relation to the macrocosm, i. e. the universe around the individual beings, the said powers are indispensable to all creative activity in Nature outside. This creative activity on the part of the Universal Being permeating the universe, accounts for the emanation of infinite sentient

and insentient beings from its two aspects, Shiva (the Supreme Consciousness) and Shakti (the Universal Activity, force or energy). The latter materialises in the form of the Ultimate Substance of which the physical universe is constituted. And this emanation is explained as due to the Sovereignty of Will attributed to the Supreme Being, known technically as Maheshvarya (माहेश्वर्य), which in relation to an individual being is generally called Svatantrya Shakti. The Pratyabhijna assumes all volitional, cognitive and conscious-physical acts at the empirical level as essential for the existence of the universe. It will thus be seen that the conception of the macrcosm in the system is based on a very deep study of the microcosm.

It is evident f m the above that the position of Pratyabhijna is perhaps unique in the treatment of spirit and matter as two distinct realities presenting in the universe in innumerable forms of animate and inanimate objects or, in other words, sentient and insentient entities. These two realities, however, ultimately unify and resort to a single Reality, the Absolute Being (Maheshvara), of which these are two aspects. Thus the diversity in the cosmos as emanating from unity is apt to fit in with this Monistic system. Spirit and matter are both dynamic in this system, as the spirit is characterised by knowledge and matter by activity or presentment of force (Kriya or Shakti). Will is the static centre of all activity of the soul, while intellection and physical activity are its dynamic aspects.

The Pratyabhijna Philosophy, it may be remarked, probes deeply into the nature of things in the universe both in regard to its psychological and physical aspects. It has gone to the extent of establishing not only that plants and trees are endowed with life just like all kinds of living beings, but soil and water out of which they grow, nay even all kinds of matter, which according to the modern science are but unconscious and dead, also possess a continuous life-force or conscious life-activity. The valuable studies of astronomers, mathematicians and physicists have revealed the foundation stones and the dimensions of the universe and have thus enriched mankind by their demonstration of the power and sweep of the human intellect. But all such scientific investigations have remained practically wanting in this aspect of study—the study of life in the universe. It is only recently that attempts have been made to explain 'life'. The main emphasis of science is now changing from

the study of the elementary forces and simple particles to the complexities of living textures. The Philosophy started its quest mainly in the direction of the study of life. While tracing the beginning of Philosophy (in the Introduction to the History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western) Maulana Azad has brilliantly explained the objective for which the Philosophy has stood from time immemorial. He says, 'Philosophy is the quest for finding out the meaning of life and existence'. He further adds, 'Two questions arose in the mind of man, as soon as he began to think, what is the meaning of his life ; and what is the nature of the universe he sees all around. The beginning of systematic speculation marked the birth of philosophy. The pilgrims of philosophy did not succeed in securing the object of their quest but they have in the course of their journey obtained something else of great value : in their search for philosophy they discovered science. Science has brought to man new power but has not given him peace...' The Maulana, therefore, suggests : 'The time has now come when philosphy should turn its attention towards the problems of human peace.' It will, however, be noticed that Indian Philosophy, if properly understood in the light of Pratyabhijna system, has already revealed a knowledge of paramount importance conducive to the human peace and progress. A proper study of the Pratyabhijna system will perhaps lead to a better understanding of 'man's nature' or, in other words, revaluation of man's estimate of himself.

Human values and cardinal virtues according to Pratyabhijna :— Pratyabhijna is mainly a school of Spiritual Pragmatism which has seriously taken up the cause of the mental, moral and spiritual elevation of humanity. All its doctrines - spiritual, epistemological, ethical and moral - have a practical bearing upon human interests. It has also *in a way* sought the material advancement of human beings with the sole objective of making them prosperous and happier. It has taught, on such a rational and scientific basis, *the unity of life in the universe, the unity of all living beings* and *the unity of mankind* (स्वात्मैव सर्वजन्तूनामेक एव महेश्वरः). It has laid emphasis on *equality and universal brotherhood of mankind*, irrespective of diversity of caste, creed, colour and nationality and has recognised *'freedom'* (Svatantrya) and *superiority and dignity of human being*. All these essentials are indeed the ideal of a modern democratic society. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has brought to

pointed notice the fact that 'our religions have proclaimed from the very beginning that *each human individual is to be regarded as a spark of the divine*'. This is mainly the teaching of the Upanishadas as well as the sermons taught by the Buddha.

The Pratyabhijna is ultimately a means of accomplishing the fulfilment of one's all the desired objects. Man's desires are different ; one aspires to higher things in his life, other to purely spiritual satisfaction and raptures. There are still others whose sole ambition in life is to attain what is of highest value to man. The Partyabhijna is meant for all. "Svatantrya" (freedom) in the system is the sole avenue to all those things, viz. the fulfilment of all the aspirations of man. Partyabhijna, however, lays stress on the awareness of the highest ideal or real progress a man should seek to attain, the ignorance of which is indeed the main cause of human misery and suffering. We are often mistaking what is really not progress, for progress. To quote the words of our saint Rashtrapati Dr. Rajendra Prasad : 'We are apt to be carried away by many things...on account of their glamour and their shine. And we are very often misled into thinking that all that glitters is gold. But that is not always so. I believe we have really to define what is progress, and I personally do not always feel that what we call progress is always progress. I sometimes wonder if in speaking of progress, we are not mistaking what is really not progress, for progress". Pratyabhijna reveals what is of highest value to man ; and *what is of highest value to man is what is condusive to the good and benefit of one and all.*

The ideal of liberation in the system is quite different from that of other Indian systems ; to a Pratyabhijna philosopher it means 'freedom' (Svatantrya) : '*The individual is essentially free, freedom is the inner being of the individual*'. So also does the law of Karma play a different role in the Pratyabhijna ethics, as the school has recognised 'Sovereignty of Will' (Iccha shakti) and 'Action' (Kriya shakti) as means of accomplishing all the desired objects. It does not believe in the fate of man being rigid and unchangeable. It condemns those who do not stir to bring a change in their lot for better and happier life. It does not recognise disinterested action (nishkama karma) as a way or aim and object of Self-realization, as it denotes 'want of will' which is contrary to success. The *philosophy of 'action*' taught in the system, which parhaps *accords with*

the Socialist idea af "action", is unique in the whole domain of Indian Philosophy. In accordance with the Western ideal, it does not also recognise a life of non-attachment to or renunciation of the world as it is considered to be too ascetic and other-worldly to be of any good to humanity.

The system believes in some ethical matters like non-violence or non-injury (Ahimsa). The supreme value and importance of non-violence for our moral life have of-course been insisted upon in the same strain as has been done in other Indian systems of thought. Ahimsa is one of the basic principles of fellow-feeling and reciprocity on which morality must be based. Of all the vices that may pollute the life of a man, cruelty and killing are perhaps the worst. The sooner this fact is admitted and Ahimsa recognised as a cardinal virtue by people all the world over, the better for mankind. From the days of Upanishadas our country not only taught the essentials of human culture, like liberty, equality and fraternity of all mankind, but also recognised *non-violence* (Ahimsa) as its first essential. Buddhism preached Ahimsa as the highest virtue. *Any kind of exploitation of man by man, treated as himsa, is condemned by the system as a sin.* To exploit others is, in its view, to exploit one's own self.

Though Pratyabhijna believes in the unity and equality of human beings, it is equally conscious not only of their inequalities but also of their limitations and infirmities. Men are not all equally intelligent, or equally good, or equally trustworthy. Men have limitations of sense and reason and suffer from inferiority complex. Their infirmities are not few but many, such as 'injustice, intemperance, cowardice and ignorance' (as is pointed out by Plato) and all kinds of wickedness and baseness,—"vileness, wildness and cussedness in the nature of man" as Dr. S. Radhakrishnan points out, which bring about their destruction. Pratyabhijna brings into awareness these limitations and infirmities of man (Pashubhava), which it calls the *man's fetters* (Pashas) *or impurities* (Malas) to bring him to the path of righteousness by absolving himself from these which is, in its view, the way to immortality and liberation. Pratyabhijna has recognised 'the supremacy of the moral law, the law of truth and love' (in the Gandhji's words). The world stands in need of a soothing philosophy like Pratyabhijna, in these days of material crisis; for, in the prophetic words of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, "... within each incarnate soul dwells the good-conscious-

ness which we must seek out and awaken. When mankind awakes to the truth, universal brotherhood will follow,...One whose life is rooted in the experience of the Supreme, spontaneously develops love for all creation. He will be free from hatred for any man...He will boldly work for a society in which man can be free and fearless...He will oppose terror and cruelty...He will give voice to those who have no voice... " At another place Dr. Radhakrishnan says, "Men must use the instruments of science for the improvement of the conditions of life, for the fault is not in science aud technology. What is demoniac is in the nature of man. If we wish to cure this element of vileness, wildness, cussedness, in the nature of man, it is essential for us to mobilze the great spiritual resources of mankind. The cure for that is to restore the truths of the spirit to the central place in the minds of men. Let those truths of the spirit sway the minds of men, transform the lives of men. *The truths of the spirit are liberality, understanding, freedom.* ... Let us, therefore, send out...a message to this groping, uncertain, discontented world : that *love and not hatred, that freedom and not fear, that faith and not doubt*, have in them the healing of the nations. If we carry out these principles in our daily life and in our international relations, out of the anguish of the world will be born a *new unity of mankind*, a unity in which the ideals of the spirit will find safety and security." *Pratyabhijna has indeed shown to* mankind *a new way* (*Navo-margo*) *to human peace and freedom.*

Role of Religion and supernatural in Pratyabhijna :- The West has its philosophy almost distinct from its religion, while in India we do not have philosophy separate from theology. Zeller says, " Indian Philosophy never lost contact with religion and never became independent". In this country religion has led to philosophy, and for this reason the technical terms employed for metaphysical principles are the words which are commonly used in religious literature as names of gods and goddesses. *Shaivism* or *Shaiva Darshana*(Shaiva Philosophy) as the very word indicates, is an outgrowth of Shaiva religion which recognised Shiva as the highest God. It will be admitted that the originators of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy were the devotees of God Shiva (Maheshvara) and his concert Shakti and naturally they employed the various names of these divinities to represent the different metaphysical principles in the Pratyabhijna system. Thus, we find the term *Maheshvara* applied for the

Ultimate Reality, *Maheshvarya* for 'the Sovereignty of Will' ascribed to the Ultimate Being (Maheshvara), *Shiva* stands for the Cognitive Power and *Shakti* for the power of action and so on. It may also be noticed that in the Vedanta system the Ultimate Reality is named *Brahman* by the originators of the school, since they were the worshippers of God Brahma, the creator or the God of Knowledge (Vedas). The word Brahman is used by the Vedantins for the Ultimate Reality in the neuter gender, while the Shaivas use the word Maheshvara for the same principle in the masculine gender. This system of nomenclature in any school of Indian Philosophy is unlike that in the Western Science or Metaphysics in which we find the technical terms often used after the names of the scientists who discovered certain scientific principles and laws of nature. For instance, in Electrical Science, the terms: *volt* for an unit of electro-motive-force, *ampere* for unit quantity of electrical energy flowing in an electrical circuit, *watt* for the unit of power, *ohm* for the unit of resistence in any medium and so on are used after the names of the scientists conspicuous for their discoveries in this branch of Science. There is, of course, a number of other technical terms employed in the system taken from a stock of common words, not necessarily used in religious nomenclature. For instance, *Prakasha* is used in the particular philosophic sense as Self-manifestation or Self-consciousness in which the objects are merged in Self and *Vimarsha* as power of perception in which objects have distinct reality of their own.

Although it is not possible to set any form of Indian Philosophy free from the dogmas of religion, in the pratyabhijna system metaphysics plays a primary role, and theology or religion is relegated to a subordinate position. It may, therefore, be pointed out that though the Pratyabhijna system is a purely philosopical system founded on reason and scientific values, it has not totally divorsed itself from theological matter The main work on the System entitled "the Pratyabhijna - Sutras" includes one Section, Section III Agamadhikara, which deals with the dogmatic and theological matters of the Trika cult, such as pure and impure creations, devine hierarchy, bondage and release, impurities (Malas), common creation, creations called Vijnanakevala, Pralayakala, Sakala, Vidheshvaras, two classes of Samsarins, the different states and mystical methods of liberation (Shambhavopaya etc.) (see below) and so on as incorporated in the sytem from Agama Shastra. It will, however, be noticed that

philosophical interpretations have been given in the system to these supernatural matters.

The Shaiva Yoga :- According to the metaphysical point of view the *Pratyabhijna* (Recognition) leads a person to become aware again of the fact that the individual being (Pashu) is identical with the Universal Being (Pati, Shiva or Maheshvara) or, in other words, to know the supreme nature of ' self '. In the Vedanta and other schools of Indian Philosophy knowledge (Jnana) of the identity of the individual soul (Atman) and the Universal Soul (Brahman) is generally considered the highest ideal. In the Pratyabhijna system Parama-shiva, the Ultimate Being, who is aware of His Transcendental nature in that state, while adopting the limited form of an individual being (Pashu-bhava) by the sovereignty of His will (Satantrya Shaki), forgets (loses the awareness of) His real nature by His own deluding power (Maya Vimohini Shakti) and becomes limited in his powers of thought and action thus turning into an inferior being (Pashu). The Pratyabhijna enables him to recognise his own supreme nature already known to him before his individuation and thus restores in him his higher and deeper powers already innate in him. *"Recognition"* (Pratyabhijna) is distinguished from *"knowledge"* (Jnana) in the sense that in the former state the identity of the individual being and the Supreme Being (or, in other words, the knowledge of the supreme nature of 'self') is not, in reality, unrealised before (Nananubhutah) but is only forgotten ; and this is revived in the state of *"Recognition"*; while realization in the form of mere *" knowledge "* (Jnana), according to the point of view of the Vedanta system, is lacking before its attainment. This is one important point of difference between the Pratyabhijna and the Vedanta system.

The state of realization said above, according to the point of view of the Trika system, of which the Pratyabhijna Shastra is a manual of Philosophy, cannot be achieved without recourse to a supernatural process (experience) known in the system by a general name the "Shaiva Yoga" or "Shaiva Samavesha." Trika system prescribes various Yogic methods of Samyama (intuition) i. e. 'intense concentration, contemplation and meditation' to attain the ' Pratyabhijna ' realization or the 'Recognitive' insight which is the means of all the highest human achievements (समस्त संपत समवाप्ति-हेतम) These are variously called

Shambhavopaya(or Icchopaya), Shaktopaya (or Jnanopaya) and Anavopaya (or Kriyopaya). These methods develop in the Yogins (respectively) the powers of will, thought and physical activity. Although the Pratyabhijna system lays down the basis of this intuitive experience, viz. the system of Yoga, yet it claims to have ultimately revealed another new method (Navo margo) of intellectual pursuit, i. e. the pursuit of knowledge and reason at the empirical level, which it calls Anupaya (a processless method), that is, which does not need any Yogic - physical and mental - processes at all. The Yogic methods have, indeed, been incorporated in the Pratyabhijna system from the Trika Shastra and have been considered by the great authorities like Abhinavagupta as indispensable for realization. Abhinavagupta was himself a born Yogin (Yoginibhu) who constantly practised Shaiva-samavesha in his life.

The Yogic system was known in India from remote ages, not only as the means of developing human personality, but also as a wonderful aid to scientific observation. It is well-known that our great thinkers of the past entered deeply into the very core of things by means of Yogic processes. This yogic system has proved of greater value in attaining to heights in the sphere of knowledge than the modern scientific methods of "well-trained and keen sense-observation, experimentation and inductive thinking" having claim for the achievements of today. By practising the threefold Yogic method taught in Trika Shastra a person is said to manifest his profounder faculty and to get *omniscience*, all - penetrating grasp, along with many other supernatural powers. The following powers are mentioned by Patanjali in his Yogasutras (Chapter III) which a Yogin can and does manifest :- 'Knowledge of the past and future' (Psychometry and premonition) (Sutra 16), 'Knowledge of one's previous births' (18) 'Understanding of other people's minds' (Telepathy) (19) 'Disappearance (Invisibility of the body)' (21), 'Knowledge of the worlds' (26) 'the Knowledge of the starry regions' (27) 'mastery over the elements' (28) and so on.

Yoga is now generally understood as a method of attaining occult powers or magical power, because its right significance is lost in our time. For this reason even the value of Shaiva Yoga (Shaiva Samavesha) dealt with briefly in the Pratyabhijna Shastra cannot be understood

now. It is difficult to follow even the comprehensive exposition of Shaiva Yoga and the Yoga technique given by Abhinavagupta in the different chapters of Tantraloka, under the headings: Anupaya, Shambhavopaya, Shaktopaya, Anavopaya, Chakrodaya, Kalatattva, Deshadhva, etc. The Kashmir school of Yoga Shaivism is still an obscure subject. No investigation seems to have been made in this direction by modern inquirers. Even none of the scholars has made any attempt to translate the Tantraloka of Abhinavagupta which comprehensively deals with the methods of Shaiva Yoga. It will be desirable if some scholar takes up an intensive and extensive study of the Yoga system of Kashmir Shaivism and sets himself to the task of translating completely the particular literature on the subject, viz. Tantraloka and Tantrasara of Abhinavagupta which are already published in several volumes in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies. Attention of the scholars is drawn to the "Preliminary Note on Yoga" by Dr. L.D. Barnett prefixed to the well-known work Lalla-Vakyani (Asiatic Society Monographs, Vol. XVII, published in 1920) which gives the general account of the tenets of the Yoga system. The following is the brief information on the Yoga system based on the Dr. Barnett's Note.

"In Yogic theory the human body is conceived as a miniature copy or replica of the world without it; the forces by which this microcosm is controlled at the same time operate upon the macrocosm outside, and thus by certain physical and mental processes the Yogi can win for himself not only supernatural powers over his own body and mind but also a miraculous control over the universe, culminating in the complete translation of his soul into the highest phase of Being, the Absolute (usually conceived as Supreme Shiva) for ever and ever." In the human body there are numerous nadis (nerves) among which three are of supreme importance, Sushumna, Ida, and Pingala, which descend from the brain into the pit of the abdomen. It is stated that between the pudendum and naval is a 'bulb' (Kanda), into which the nadis debouch. These three nadis are in immediate conjunction, Ida being on the left hand of Sushumna, and pingala on the right. Sushumna rises vertically from the pelvis region along the vertebral column as far as the Brahma-randhra (the upper extreme of Sushumna and of the inner nadi enclosed in Sushumna); there it bends round the right of the Ajna circle (see below) and passes up into the

left nostril. In the centre of Sushumna is a nadi called chitra, ... There are six chakras or circles, which are conceived as being of the form of lotuses, attached at intervals to Sushumna. In the abdomen is situated the first circle called Muladhara, or simply Adhara, and is imagined to be a lotus of four digits in width, situated two digits above the anus and two digits below the penis. In the pericarp of this lotus is a triangular space on which dwells the Kula-Kundalini (or simply Kundalini), who is the Shakti or Chit-Shakti, the power of spirit, the creative force of the universe. A little distance above Muladhara, at the base of the penis, is the second circle, Svadhishthana. The third circle is Manipura, by the naval. The forth circle is Anahata, situated in the heart. Above Anahta, and situate in the throat, is the circle Visuddha. The sixth circle is Ajna situated between the eye-brows, which contains the mystic force called *akshara-bija*. Above all these circles is the highest of all, Sahasrara, situated at the base of the palate. The object of Yogic contemplation is to absorb the Kundalini in the microcosm, representing the macrocosmic Energy, into Sahasrara typifying the absolute ... In order to effect this transit of Kundalini through Sushumna and the Brahma-randhra into Sahasrara, the nadis must, by the exercise of pranayama, be blocked up with air introduced into them by inspiration (puraka) and retained in them (kumbhaka). The final expiration of this retained air is called rechaka. By performing the mystic exercises, the Kundalini shakti, i.e. the power of spinal cord is roused in its six centres (chakras); thus the Sadhaka (Yogi) attains supernatural subtle powers of soul. When the Kundalini is stimulated to a supreme effort by long Yogic exercise, the soul enters into the realm of the Absolute, in which it is merged into the infinite bliss of Parameshvara. It has been suggested that the chakras and other terms of Yogic anatomy correspond more or less to real parts of the human body, and the following identifications are proposed :- Sushumna: the spinal cord ; Ida : the left sympathetic cord; Pingala : the right sympathetic cord; Chitra : the grey matter of the spinal cord ; Brahma-randhra: the central canal of the spinal cord; Muladhara : the sacral plexus; Manipura : the epigastric plexus ; Anahata : the cardiac plexus ; Vishddha : the laryngeal or pharyngeal plexus; Ajna : the cavernous plexus; Sahasrara : the Medula oblongata. For details of the Shaiva Yoga, see the Dr. Barnett's Preliminary Note on Yoga referred [illegible]

and Shakta by woodroffe and Vatulanatha Sutras.

Recently some Psychologists have started the study of man and his spiritual nature with the modern scientific method. This has given rise to a new branch of Psychology, known as Parapsychology which is indeed one of the youngest sciences. It deals with the deeper and supernormal nature of man. It originated in the great movement, known as Psychical Research. Psychical Research is a scientific investigation into such rare, odd and strange phenomena which defy human intellect. Much progress has not been recorded as yet in the study of occult powers attained by man by practising Yogic methods.

It was in 1882 that a Society for Psychical Research was formed in England to investigate into the nature of such phenomena with the help of purely scientific method. As a result of the work of this society we are in possession of a vast scientific knowledge which throws a flood of light on the deeper nature of man. Psychical Research is now both a field and a laboratory science. There are Departments and Chairs of it in some well-known universities of the world, such as Cambridge in England and Duke in America. Psychical Research or Parapsychology has penetrated human nature more deeply than any other science, pursuing the modern scientific method, has so far done, although human nature still remains vastly unexplored. The achievements of the society and of the individual investigators in their inquiries into the abnormal phenomena, such as Telepathy or Clairvoyance, Retrocognition, Precognition or Premonition. Telekinesis etc. are indeed the mere beginnings of Parapysychology. Supernatural powers achieved by a Yogi need a thorough and deeper investigation. Modern Psychologists and Scientists cannot afford to neglect their investigation in this direction. 'A comperative study of Indian Psychology and Western Psychical Research is really overdue', says Dr. B. L. Atreya (of Benaras Hindu University) in his paper (Presidential Address) read in the Psychology Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1951. Emphasising the great purpose of "Comparative study of Western Psychical Research and Indian thought" for the service of mankind today, Dr. Atreya, while concluding his address, aptly remarks, "we have arrived, I venture to say, at such a juncture in the history of civilisation that a comparative study of Psychical research and Indian thought should be pursued in right earnest. It will, I think, unite the East and the West, Sus[illegible] [illegible] the present, science and religion, more than any other [illegible]ity of mnakind has so far done."

CHAPTER II

SOME CONTROVERSIAL VIEW POINTS

Pratyabhijna System indigenous to Kashmir; the name of the System; the time of its existence; its connection with Shankarachary's School of Vedanta; and its differences from theVedanta System.

In this chapter we shall take up some controversial view points with regard to the Pratyabhijna system and bring out its distinctive features.

Partyabhijna System Indigenous to Kashmir :- Dr. Pandey presumes that Pratyabhijna Philosophy was not indigenous to Kashmir but was introduced and developed by the two ancestral lines which came to Kashmir from outside. He says, according to the ending verses of Shiva-drashti, the Shaivagamas were brought to Kashmir by Samgamaditya, the fourth ancestor of Somananda who is stated to have come there from Kailasa. It is also stated by Dr. Pandey that Atrigupta, the renowned Shaiva philosopher of Kanauj and the earliest known ancestor of Abhinavagupta, was brought to Kashmir by king Lalitaditya sometime after 740 A.D. On the basis of these the references Dr. Pandey is of the opinion that "for building a monistic system of its own Kashmir needed men and material which were supplied by the two ancestral lines which came to Kashmir from outside." This finding of Dr. Pandy is hardly acceptable in view of the fact that Kashmir was from ancient times the seat of learning and the philosophic knowledge was no innovation there. The Pratyabhijna system was only a logical development of the philosophicel ideas prevailing in Kashmir at the time of its origination.

To those who think that the Pratyabhijna or Trika Darshana and its teachers were brought to Kashmir from outside, it may be questioned that before its emergence in Kashmir where else did it originally exist wherefrom it was brought to Kashmir by the ancestors of Somananda and Abhinavagupta. So far as the mythological origin of Shaiva

from Shrikantha or Bhairava in Kailasa (the abode of Shiva) and their spread in Kashmir by the fourth ancestor of Somananda are concerned, it may be noted that these are not the historical facts but are intended to give sanctity to Shaivagamas. Actually we have no trace of the system outside Kashmir before Somananda's time.

On Page 11 of his work "Abhinavegupta" Dr. Pandey accepts, on the authority of Tantraloka, Commentary, III, 194, that Abhinavagupta learnt Trika Darshana from Lakshmanagupta, a native teacher of Kashmir, and not from any outsider or his descendent or disciple. This is also corroborated by the statement of Pt. Madhusudan Koul in his Introduction to Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini, Vol. II, P. 7, (quoted by Dr. Pandey in his "Abhinavagupta", P.5) who says: 'He received instruction in the Pratyabhijna Shastra from his father Lakshmanagupta...'Dr. Pandey objects that 'Lakshmanagupta, though undoubtedly a teacher of Abhinava in Pratyabhijna, was certainly not his father' and therefore he says that it 'requires correction'. In this remark Dr. Pandey himself admits that Lakshmanagupta did not belong to Abhinavagupta's immigrant ancestral line but was born from some other native family of Kashmir. It is however certain that Lakshmanagupta, the teacher of Abhinavagupta, learnt the Pratyabhijna system in Kashmir and not outside. Jayaratha, the commentator of Tantraloka, states in clear terms in the following verse, that the Pratyabhijna Darshana (the Monistic system of Kashmir) emerged and flourished in Kashmir, and it is from this country that it spread in other parts of India :-

श्रीसोमानन्दपादप्रभृति-गुरुवरादिष्ट-सन्नीतिमार्गो
लब्ध्वा यत्रैव सम्यक्पटिमनि घटनामीश्वराद्वैतवाद : ।
कश्मीरेभ्यः प्रसृत्य प्रकटपरिमलो रंजयन्सर्वदेश्यान्
देशेऽन्यस्मिन्नदृष्टो घुसृणविसरवत्सर्ववन्द्यत्वमाप ॥

In this verse it is explicitly stated that the originators of this monistic system were the natives of Kashmir, namely Somananda and others. Just as saffron is indigenous to Kashmir, so is this system of philosophy. It was not to be found elsewhere before its origination in Kashmir (देशेऽन्यस्मिन्नदृष्टो). While it spread from Kashmir (कश्मीरेभ्यः प्रसृत्य) it was received and held in high esteem by the people of other countries as an unique thing like saffron. (Refer in this connection Dr. Pandey's "Abhinavagupta" Pages 83--84)

The name of the system :- Attention is drawn to para 4 under the same heading on the foregoing pages 9 and 10, in which it is concluded that the system, by which we mean a philosophic system, cannot be called by any other name, Trika, Spanda or Shaiva system, except the Pratyabhijna system. Dr. Pandey, however, prefers to call the system as 'Trika'. He has given the various reasons why the system is called the Trika, "As stated in Paratrimshika, the system as a whole is called the Trika in Shaiva literature since it deals with the triple principle Shiva, Shakti and Anu; or Pati, Pasha and Pashu; or Nara, Shakti and Shiva; or Para, Apara and Parapara; or it is called Trika for the reason that its chief authority is the triad consisting of the three chief Agamas-Siddha, Namaka and Malini (Tantraloka 1, 36), or for another reason that it included all the three systems broadly speaking Bheda, Abheda and Bhedabheda. It is also called Trika for the reason that it teaches the three-fold method of Agamic realisation-Shambhavopaya Shaktopaya and Anavopaya." As is apparent, in this wider sense it is not possible to say that Trika is a system of philosophy. It is true that Pratyabhijna and Spanda are parts and very important parts of the Trika system, but severally they do not present the whole of what Trika represents. If there is any part which can be said to be of philosophical import in the true sense, it is the Pratyabhijna Shastra, not any other branch of Trika system, Spanda etc. This part can be called the "Pratyabhijna Philosophy", but Spanda Shastra cannot be called the "Spanda Philosophy", nor, as a matter of fact, the whole system as "Trika Philosophy". Dr. Pandey again states, in the Introduction to "Bhaskari", "This monistic system of Philosophy is called the Pratyabhijna Darshana on the basis of the title 'Ishvara Pratyabhijna' which Utpalacharya gave to his Karikas. But before Madhavacharya gave this title to the system in his Sarvadarshana Samgraha, it was known as Svatantrya-vada, a name by which it is referred to by Abhinavagupta in his Vivrti Vimarshini." (I.P.V.V., Vol I, P.9) Svatantrya-vada could not have been a popular name of the system as it is only one of the doctrines included in the Pratyabhijna Philosophy.

Again, J.C. Chatterji has stated that "on the Trika there were many treatises each of which was called a Shastra, but these works do not represent so many different systems but only treatises on the various aspects of the same system of thought". Evidently J.C. Chatterji

could not differentiate the Pratyabhijna Philosophy from the whole system represented by the 'Trika Shastra.' Dr. Kurt F. Leidecker also states in his Notes to the Translation of Pratyabhijna Hrdaya that 'the Trika, Spanda as well as the Pratyabhijna are the designations of one and the same system and that distinction made by Dr. Buhler between the Spanda and the Pratyabhijna is erraneous'. The learned doctor is not only incorrect to suppose that Trika, Spanda and Pratyabhijna represent one and the same system, but also fails to notice that Pratyabhijna is the only 'Philosophy proper of the Trika', whereas Trika is the name of the whole system of religious cult with different branches, evolved from Tantric and Agamic dogmatism. It may be pointed out that Spanda branch of Trika has for its main subject matter the three mystical ways to the realization of the divine Shakti, viz. the Shambhava, the Shakta and the Anava. They are mere dogmatic statements of the fundamental principles of the Spanda system. The Spanda literature which grew on the basis of Shiva Sutras do not represent any manual of philosophy as the Pratyabhijna Shastra does. Metaphysical reasoning is the essense of a philosophical system. It is to this philosophical content of the system that Utpaladeva gives predominance in his whole work (Karikas) and treats of the Agamic tenets in a few Sutras only of Agamadhikara (part III of his work), thus relegating the religious dogmatism to a subordinate position.

This system of philosophy is also commonly known as "Kashmir Shaivism." Shaivism or Shaiva system is a more comprehensive term representing all the dualistic, non-dualistic and dualistic-cum-non-dualistic systems evolved from Shaivagamas and Shaiva Tantras. Shaiva system means any system based on Shaiva Tantras or Agamas. Sixty - four systems of the Shaiva cult are mentioned in the Shaiva scriptures of Kashmir which include Trika as one of them. Pratyabhijna is the philosophical content of the Trika, as it is so-called by Utpaladeva the originator of the system.

The time of its existence :- (*Dr. K. C Pandey's view* :) Dr. K. C. Pandey states, in his Introduction to "Bhaskari" Volume II (P. iv), that "Somananda represents himself to be the 19th descendent of Tryambaka...Therefore, if we follow the traditional method of allowing twenty-five years of each generation, we will have to admit that a period

of four hundred and fifty years intervened between Tryambaka, the propagator of the monistic Shaivagamas, and Somananda (who lived in the 9th Century A.D)." It may be admitted that the Agamic tenets, which are included by Somananda in his Shivadrshti amidst the philosophical contents, are derived by him from the earlier monistic Shaivagamas, said to have been first propagated by Tryambaka, as such their traditional knowledge indeed goes back to the hoary past; but it is not possible to agree with Dr. Pandey's conclusion : "the philosophic tradition, therefore, which Somananda systematises (represents), goes back to about the end of the 4th Century A.D". Dr. Pandey, however, admits that "Somananda is the first to make a definitely rationalistic approach to the problem of the Ultimate Reality.He distinctly refers to the various prevailing schools of thought and rationally proves the unsoundness of their theories." He indeed refutes and criticises so many systems by contradicting their various theories and puts in nu'shell his own new philosophical view-points and thus brings a radical change to the prevailing philosophical thoughts of the time. We can, therefore, say that it is Somananda who laid the foundation-stone of a new system, known as the Pratyabhijna School of Kashmir and not the particular Philosophic tradition existed before his time.

Prof. Lachhmi Dhar's View :- Prof. Lachhmi Dhar attempts to prove, in his book entitled the "Birth - Place of Kalidasa," that the Pratyabhijna Philosophy existed in Kalidas's time' (in the 5th Century A.D.). Firstly, according to him, 'Shaivism followed by Kalidasa is a Monistic Philosophy which is no other than the Pratyabhijna Philosophy of Kashmir.' Secondly, as he says, 'Kalidasa propounded the Philosophy of Pratyabhijna in his works, particularly Shakuntala...which is the allegorical representation of this philosophy.' The reasons given by Prof. Lachhmi Dhar need be examined with reference to these two points. There is no evidence in Abhijnana Shakuntala or any other work of Kalidasa to show that the Pratyabhijna system existed in his time, nor any reference to the doctrines of the system in his works.

It can be admitted that Kalidasa was a worshipper of Shiva and followed Shaivism of non-sectarian type, but there is no reason to agree with Dr. Lachhmi Dhar's remark : "We shall find that the

type of Shaivism represented by Kalidasa is the same that Madhavacharya describes as the 'Pratyabhijna Darshana' or Recognitive System, which is the Kashmirian Shaivism." Pratyabhijna as a distinct system with a name to it originated in the ninth century, A. D. being then taught for the first time by Somananda and his disciple Utpaladeva and not by any earlier teacher at the time of Kalidasa or before him as supposed by Prof. Lachhmi Dhar. Kalidasa lived in the fifth Century A.D. five centuries earlier than Somananda. Prof. Lachhmi Dhar says that the Pratyabhijna system was known to Kalidasa, because " the Shaivism of Kalidasa was essentially monistic in its character." It may be noted that it is the monistic doctrine of the Upanishadas which was known to Kalidasa and by which he was influenced as is stated by Dr. Hiller Brandt and some other scholars, and not by the Pratyabhijna system.

The next point which Prof. Lachhmi Dhar tries to make in his book is that there was no 'total dearth of ancient monistic Agamas in Kashmir'. This point does not go to prove that the system of Pratyabhijna Philosophy existed in Kalidasa's time. The only work which can be said to be a monistic Agama that has come down to us is the Shivadrshti of Somananda and this did not exist in Kalidasa's time. But even assuming that there existed various ancient Shaivagamas, monistic or any other kind, the existence of any connected system of philosophic thought such as the Pratyabhijna, earlier to Somananda, directed against the rival theories of other schools of thought, such as the Buddhists, the Vedantins etc. is not proved. Somananda was the first to collect together all the philosophic thoughts from the various systems as well as the agamas and give it a skeletan form of a distinct philosophy which was later on systematised by his pupil, Utpaladeva.

Here is an important point that needs consideration. Apparently Prof. Lachhmi Dhar is correct to say, on the basis of the verses Nos. 1270-1274, 1283-1286 and 1294-1295 of Nilamata Purana as quoted by him in note No. 123 given in his book "The Birth-Place of Kalidasa", "Now whatever may be the original form of Shaivism in Kashmir, it cannot be denied that in very early centuries Monistic Shaivism ... ... representing the Pratyabhijna doctrine is already existent in the Nilamata (Purana) which in its present form is assigned the date sixth or seventh centuries A.D., at any rate earlier than the revival of Vedantism by

the great Shankara". The central idea underlying these verses is briefly given as follows: "Brahma admonishes Indra that he must recognise (अभिज्ञातोसि) Shiva as the only Supreme Lord (सर्वेश्वर), Cause of all causes (कारणकारणम्); this great Lord (महेश्वर) is the supreme Actor(omni-potent) and the supreme Knower (omni-scient) (स एष सर्वकर्ताच सर्वज्ञश्च महेश्वर); who by His free will, creates the universe consisting of sentient and insentient beings(यदिच्छया जगदिदं वर्वर्ति सचराचरम्)Whose,*i.e* of the Lord(प्रभो),'Creeper of power (शक्तिलता) blooms forth (पुष्पिता) and manifests itself as the universe... (यस्य शक्तिलता सेऽयं...जगद् भासयते भवात्);"you and I (Indra and Brahma) act (stand) under His command';(त्वमहं चापियस्यैवशासने समवस्थितौ) From Indra's prayer to Shiva in Nilamate as quoted by the Scholar in his book, the following relevent points may be given: Indra says, that the Lord of Lords sustains the three worlds by his Maya Shakti (meaning the 'wonderous power of the Lord') (मायाधृत जगत् त्रय). He has no motive for his acts of creation other than his own innate desire (तव कार्यं न विद्यते). Moha or Delusion is produced by Shiva's own Shakti, Maya Shakti; and so on. The question arises, - Do these ideas only comprise the main doctrine of the Pratyabhijna philosophy? We admit that these ideas play a prominent role in the system, but they represent not only the central theme of the Pratyabhijna philosophy but also that of the Vedanta system. If such is the case, what are the distinctive features of the two systems of Philosophy by which they differ from one another? Perhaps it escaped the notice of Prof. Lachhmi Dhar. All these ideas are initially taught in the Upanishadas, and it is from this fountain-head that these ideas are incorporated in the Nilamata Purana as in the Vedanta and Pratyabijna systems. There is nothing new in the ideas given in the above-mentioned verses of Nilamata which existed earlier than the emergenee of the Pratyabhijna system. These ideas are not the distinctive features of the Pratyabhijna philosophy which, besides, is essentially something more and somewhat different from them. In reference to the central theme common in the Pratyabhijna system and the Vedanta, readers' attention is drawn to Chapter III, part ii (Survey of the earlier speculations and doctrines), in which most of these common ideas are traced in the Vedas, the Upanishadas and other earlier philosophic literature grown from Vedic and Buddhistic thought. Therefore, to denote the full implication of the Pratyabhijna in these ideas which existed

earlier, is not quite sound. These ideas have possibly been incorporated by shaivas in some shaivagama texts from the Vedic sources and also by Kashmirians in the Nilamata, either directly from the shaivagamas or from the vedic sources. It will be shown in this work that the system while incorporating these ideas undoubtedly made some additions and alterations to the earlier doctrines of the upanishadas and thus made a radical revision or reorientation of the Vedanta system. Regarding this the reader's attention is drawn to the last topic dealt with in this chapter.

Prof. Lachhmi Dhar's point that Shakuntala is an allegorical representation or dramatisation of Pratyabhijna Philosophy :- Prof. Lachhmi Dhar has also tried to prove in his book (The Birth - Place of Kalidasa) that 'Kalidasa propounded the Pratyabhijna Philosophy of Kashmir' in his works, particularly Shakuntala. He says, 'Kalidasa was a follower of the ancient Pratyabhijna Philosophy of Kashmir and that the beautiful drama of love between Dushyanta and Shakuntala is also a beautiful allegory on the tenets of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy of Kashmir...' He further says that : 'in order to popularise this Pratyabhijna Philosophy in its early days of promulgation, Kalidasa hits at the happy device of writing an allegory on the basis of the love story of Shakuntala in the Mahabharata'. We shall now try to discuss how far Prof. Lachhmi Dhar's view stands.

We find that the learned Prof. has strained the specific philosophical ideas in some of the common words occurring in Shakuntala which are used in technical sense in the Pratyabhijna system and twisted the tenets of the system in the various love incidents of the drama. In support of this he has given neither positives nor parallels. There is no evidence in Abhijnana Shakuntala or any other work of Kalidasa to show that he wrote Shakuntala as an allegorical representation of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy with the specific object of popularising it 'in its early days of promulgation'. From some words, such as 'Abhijnana' etc. used by Kalidasa, we have no reason to infer that Shakuntala is an allegory on the tenets of this philosophy. For instance, Kalidasa did not use the word 'Abhijnana' to denote any philosophic significance as we find in the technical term 'Pratyabhijna used in the system. Prof. Lachhmi Dhar, however, says, "The word 'Abhijnana' or 'Pratyabhijna

which occurs so frequently in the drama, should be taken in its philosophic sense. The poet has given us an important suggestion in using the word 'Abhijnana in such a prominent place as the title of the book itself-Abhijnana Shakuntalam which should signify in its philosophic sense the drama dealing with the 'recognition of Divine Shakti' or, in other words, realization of God". In this connection we may remark that the word 'Abhijnana' or 'Pratyabhijna' in ordinary sense means 'Recognition'. The word represents the experience in which direct perception (drshta) is associated with memory (Smarana), and ordinarily the word is used with this meaning in our every-day life. * For instance, we say 'here is Devadatta; I recognise him to be the same person whom I met some years ago in Burma'. Recognition takes place by perceiving some sign which recalls the memory of the object previously perceived. In the drama of Shakuntala, the recognition of the heroine by the sign of the finger-ring no doubt plays an important part; hence the word 'Abhijnana' is used by Kalidasa in the title of the book to denote this implication. But this word 'Abhijnana' as used in Shakuntala cannot convey the philosophic significance of the term 'Pratyabhijna' occurring in this system of philosophy. In this case also 'Pratyabhijna' means 'Recognition' in which the association of direct perception (Anubhava) with memory (Smrti) is necessary, but these two processes relate to the realization or 'recognition' of Divine Shakti. † So to attach this significance to the word 'Abhijnana' is evidently far-fetched.

We shall now follow how Prof. Lachhmi Dhar twists the Philosophy of Pratyabhijna in amongst the love incidents of Shakuntala. He writes, "it is highly probable, that the idea of allegorical representation of the Pratyabhijna tenet on the basis of a *love story*, was suggested to the mind of Kalidasa by a *love-metaphor* of a similar character

* स्मरणानुभवारूढा सामानाधिकरण्यधी :
संस्कारेन्द्रियजन्या च प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रकीर्तिता ।
(I. P. V, Vol I, P. 20 Foot-note)

† तस्य महेश्वरस्य प्रतिभिज्ञा—
प्रतीपमात्माभिमुख्येन ज्ञानं प्रकाशः प्रत्यभिज्ञा । (I. P. V., P. 19-20)
दृष्टस्मरणयोरैक्ये स्थिते तदुपपद्यते ।
तथा सा प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्स एवायमिति स्थितिः ॥
(Shivadrshti IV, 119-20)

that might be current among the teachers of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy in his day and employed to illustrate the novel point of the Pratyabhijna, as we note that the *metaphor of love*, was employed by Utpala who re-affirmed the Pratyabhijna doctrine and who might have borrowed that love metaphor from the ancient sources and traditions of that philosophy in Kashmir, as previously known to Kalidasa." It may be questioned why Kalidasa did not make any explicit reference, in Shakuntala or any other work, to the Pratyabhijna Philosophy which he intended to popularise? If he knew this Philosophy and deliberately invented the allegory in Shakuntala on the basis of its tenets, he should have clearly declared it in the drama, and preferably at the outset of it. Prof. Lachhmi Dhar presumes that the incidence of the recognition of the heroine by the perception of the finger-ring bringing to the mind of Dushyanta the recollection of his former love, indicates that Kalidasa must have known the Pratyabhijna Philosophy in which the 'Recognition' of the Divine Shakti is similarly caused by the direct perception (Anubhva) of some of its aspects associated with the recollection (Smrti) of its other aspects. † But this supposition is baseless, as there can be no motive in his remaining silent about the system of thought which Kalidasa meant to propagate in Shakuntala. From the coincidence of a love metaphor in the Pratyabhijna Philosophy and that of a similar character in Shakuntala, with the distinct incidence of Recognition, it cannot be concluded that the latter is borrowed by Kalidasa from the ancient sources and traditions of that philosophy in Kashmir, and has not originated from his mind. It is moreover presumed by Prof.Lachhmi Dhar that the same love-metaphor was employed by Utpaladeva in the tenth century A.D. to illustrate the novel thought of the Pratyabhijna as it might have been current among the teachers of the philosophy from the days of Kalidasa † or even

Compare —

† तैस्तैरप्युपयाचितैरुपनतस्तन्व्याः स्थितोऽप्यन्तिके
कान्तोलोक समान एवमपरिज्ञातो न रन्तुं यथा ।
लोकस्यैष तथानवेक्षितगुणः स्वात्मापिविश्वेश्वरो
नैवालं निजवैभवाय तदियंतत्प्रतिभिज्ञोदिता ॥

(I. P. V. Vol II, P. 273-4)

किन्तु अभिज्ञानाभरणदर्शनेन शापो निवर्तिष्यते
...... अथवा ईदृशोऽनुरागो-अभिज्ञानमपेक्षते
कथमिवेतत् । त्वया प्रत्यभिज्ञातमात्मानं पश्यामि ।

(Shakuntala)

before him. The learned Professor has profusefy compared the incidents in Shakuntala with many different ideas in the Pratyabhijna philosophy, such as the comparison of the dramatic 'Shrishti' with the universe stated to be 'the expression of divine love', Dushyanta and Shakuntala (the hero and the heroine) with Shiva and Shakti, Shakuntala appearing 'big with child' with Shakti carrying and developing the seed of Shiva's iccha (desire) to create the universe and so on, and on the basis of mere analogies concludes that Shakuntala is the dramatisation of this philosophy. But it may be noted that the philosophy of Pratyabhijna can hardly be woven into a drama by such comparisons.

All the above proves that the Pratyabhijna System which appeared in Kashmir in the ninth century A. D. as a distinct School of Monistic philosophy did not exist in Kalidasa's time, in the fifth century A. D., as there is no positive evidence to show that this philosophy was known to Kalidasa. On the other hand he is known to be an Advaita-vadi Vedantin as is affirmed by some scholars like Hiller Brandt who are of opinion that he was influenced by the philosophy of the Upanishadas and Bhagvata Gita which existed long before him. † Dr. Keith also remarks in his History of Classical Literature (P. 10) that "much more ingenious is an effort to fix his (Kalidasa's) home in Kashmir and to trace in his poetry an adumberation of the Pratyabhijna Shastra of that Land......" We must, however, admit that in Kashmir, where Kalidasa is supposed to have been born and bred up, there already existed various doctrines of the Shaivas, the Buddhists, the Sankhya, the Vedantins and other schools that gave an impetus to the development of a tendency of thought from which emerged the Pratyabhijna system with distinctive features of its own, in the ninth century A.D. That this system is indeed the Logical continum

† "In spite of being a devotee of the Muse, Kalidasa shows a thorough acquaintance with the Darshanas or systems of Indian Philosophy. His writings are saturated with profound devotion for his favourite deity, Shiva and other gods of the Indian mythology....... Even a cursory view of his works will show that he was influenced by the philosophy of the Upanishadas and the Bhagvatgita. He was an Advaita-vadi Vedantin, though he recognised the value of other systems of Philosophy as for as they harmonised with his own. Kalidasa appears to be a monotheist than monist...."

(Hiller Brandt's "Vaishnavism and Shaivism" V. I, P. 169)

of the earlier philosophic tendencies of the thinkers of the Land is indicated by a mention of numerous prevailing schools of thought in Shivadrshti of Somananda who does not agree with their points of view.

The connection between the Pratyabhijna System and the Shankaracharya's School of Vedanta :- There are two versions of the connection between the Pratyabhijna Philosophy and the Shankaracharya's system. One is according to Dr. Buhler's "Report" which says : 'This system (Pratyabhijna) does not appear to be older than the end of the ninth century A.D. and because it is of so late a date, it seems to me most probable that its resemblence to Shankaracharya's doctrines cannot be purely accidental. The connection between Shankaracharya's school and the Pratyabhijna points also to a Kashmirian tradition which asserts that the great Acharya of the South came to Kashmir and was vanquished in a disputation by the chief exponent of Pratyabhijna doctrines.' Thus, according to Dr. Buhler's point of view, it is possible that Shankaracharya's System of Vedanta may have somewhat influenced the Pratyabhijna School. Another version of the incident may be read from Dr. K. C. Pandey's account in his thesis : "Abhinavagupta" (An Historical and Philosophical Study, pp. 88-90). He writes that the decline of Budhism had started in Kumaril Bhatta's time (750 A.D.). 'Shankaracharya visited Kashmir some time in the second decade of the ninth century A.D. after giving his final blow to Buddhism in the rest of India. The influence of Shankara's Tantric philosophy on the Trika is so great...This visit of such a great person (Shankara)...purged the local faith of its Buddhistic element and strengthened the position of the new Tantric creed.'(Ref. Shankara Digvijaya Chapter XVI,54-80.)

We come to know from Dr. Buhler's account that Shankaracharya visited Kashmir and held a discussion with 'the chief exponent of Pratyabhijna doctrines (Abhinavagupta)' in which the former was vanquished. According to tradition in Kashmir, Shankara preached his idealistic philosophy as expounded in his Vedanta Sutra Bhashya wherein Maya-vada or Adyasavada is one of the prominent doctrines. But this philosophy did not appeal to Kashmirian philosophers like Abhinavagupta. Further investigation in this connection establishes that this supposed discussion between Shankaracharya and Abhinavagupta never actually took place because the former flourished in 778-820 A.D., while the

latter lived towards the eleventh century A.D. But even if the supposed disputation took place between Shankaracharya and some one else, the only bearing that it has on our subject is that, according to tradition, the superiority of Kashmir Shaiva Philosophy had to be admitted by Shankaracharya. But, there exists no internal evidence to this effect in any of his main works. According to the Shankara Digvijaya of Madhava, which is noticed under a slightly different name "Sukshma Shankara Vijaya" in Dr. Aufrecht's catalogue, we have a different account of the disputation between Shankaracharya with some person named Abhinavagupta outside Kashmir who was a Shakta contemporary of Shankaracharya. This namesake of Kashmirian Abhinavaguptacharya belonged to Kamarupa (Assam). He was a great opponent of the monistic theory of Shakara. He is stated to have engaged Shankaracharaya in a controversial discussion (Shastrartha) when the latter reached Assam in the course of his Digvijaya. In that he was defeated and so he became a disciple of the victor. This information is given by Dr. Pandey in his book "Abhinavagupta," p 2. But regarding these accounts we have got no reliable evidence. It cannot also be supposed that it is this account which somehow became current in Kashmir under different circumstances.

From Dr. Pandey's version of the connection between the two systems, it is evident, not that Shankarachrya's Philosophical thought was rejected or refuted by Kashmirian Philosophers, but his Tantric Philosophy, which he propagated in Kashmir, influenced the Trika System. In this connection it may be remarked that the well known historical Shankaracharya, the expounder of the Vedanta Sutras and the Upanishadas, never upheld, preached or practised any kind of Tantric Philosôphy in his System (Darshana). The internal evidence from his main works, the Brahma Sutra Bhasya and the Upanishada Bhashya, shows that neither the Tantra technique, nor the Tantric doctrine was ever known to Shankaracharya, the great Vedanta Philosopher. The occurrence of some philosophical ideas and technical terms as common in Shankaracharya's Dakshinamurti Stotra (D.M.S.) and Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini, (I,P.V.), as pointed out by Dr. Pandey in certain quotations from both these works on pages 88-89 of his thesis on "Abhinavagupta," do not show the influence of any Tantric philosophy on Pratyabhijna, as we are familiar with these ideas and terms in the early Upanishadas

and also in Bhadarayana's Brahma Sutras. It is not understood what specifically Tantric is in these ideas which represent more or less the Vedantic thought.

The common idea underlying D.M.S,, S. 2 and I.P.V., I, 182 * is that "the object world is manifested (Prakashyte) by Chidatman (the Supreme Soul) by the power of his will (Ichha vashat) like the creation of a Yogin without any extraneous substance." This evidently is a doctrine of the Upanishadas which is incorporated by Badarayana in his Vedanta System in Brahma Sutra II, i, 25 -- "देवादिवदपिलोके" Shankaracharya in his commentary on the sutra, explains that creating the world, in the case of Brahman, is the same as the creation of Gods, Yogins and others in their ordinary experience from mere will (Sankalpa). There is nothing specifically Tantric in the terms Maya, Sveccha, Chidatma and Iccha, The common idea contained in D.M.S., Commentary (2), S, 13 and I.P.V., I, 39 † is that the Supreme consciousness (Chetana) is endowed with Knowledge (Jnana) and Activity (Kriya). These are the very life of the universe, or, in other words, are potent to create the universe. This idea is initially found in Shvetashvatara Upanishada, "परासिशक्ति विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञान बल क्रिया च" Sv Up. VI, 8. As regards the common expression "Satta

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* बीजस्यान्तरिवांकुरो जगदिदं प्राङ्निर्विकल्पं पुन–
मॉया कल्पित देश काल कलना वैचित्र्यचित्रीकृतम् ।
मायावीव विजृम्भयत्यपि महायोगीव यः स्वेच्छया
तस्मै श्री गुरु मूर्तये नम इदं श्रीदक्षिणा मूर्तये ॥

D. M S., S.2, and

चिदात्मैव हि देवोन्तः स्थितमिच्छा वशाद्ब हः ।
योगीव निरुपादानमर्थजातं प्रकाशयेत ॥

1.P.V.,I, 182

† ज्ञान क्रिये जगत् कॢपतौ हश्यते चेतनाश्रये

D.M.S., Comm(2),S.13 and

ज्ञानं क्रिया च भूतानं जीवतां जीवनंमतम्

I.P.V., 1,39

sphuratta" found in D M.S. commentary (2), S. 13 and I.P.V., I, 207 ‡, it may be remarked that in Weber's Indica Studien IX, Page 163, we find that 'Satta' (existence) occurs in Nrsimha Tapani Upanishad and Ramatapani Upanishad 287. 'Sphuratta' in the sense of 'manifestation' is often used in Vedantic texts. Finally the common idea underlying D.M.S., Commentary (2), S. 50 and I.P.V.,I, 29 § that Knowledge (Jnana) and Activity (Kriya) are innate in the Supreme Being, occurs in Shvetashvatara Upanishad, as already shown in the item 2 above.

From these quotations given by Dr. Pandey, it is rather evident that there is a close resemblence between the doctrines of the Vedanta and Pratyabhijna systems, as has also been observed by Dr. Buhler in his 'Report'. It may be pointed out that Tantra Shastra has incorporated a large stock of doctrines and technical terms from the Vedic and Agamic sources, which seems to be the possible basis of Dr. Pandey's observations. It appears certain that the doctrines and technical terms mentioned in the quotations referred to by Dr. Pandey are borrowed by Tantra Shastra from the Upanishads which are definitely the earlier source of the Vedanta and other systems, not that these doctrines are initially taught in Tantras. Besides, Tantras mainly teach Tantric processes by virtue of which they represent a distinct school, but Dr. Pandey has not been able to trace any such doctrine either in the Shankara's Vedanta or the Pratyabhijna System. In fact, he quotes no reference from the Shankarachary's main works, about the occurrence of any Tantric idea or expression. This want of internal evidence from his works shows that he never preached any kind of Tantric Philosopy, not to speak of the influence of that over pratyabhijna.

‡ तस्मात् सत्ता स्फुरत्ता च सर्वत्राप्यनुवर्तते

D.M.S Comm. 2,S. 13

सा स्फुरत्ता महा सत्ता देशकालाविशेषिणी

1.P.V., 1, 207

§ ज्ञातत्वमपि कर्तृत्वं स्वातन्त्र्यं तस्य केवलम्।

D.M.S,Comm. (2),S.50.

कर्तरि ज्ञातरि स्वात्मन्यादिसिद्धे महेश्वरे

I.P.V.,I, 29

The reference to a verse from Saundarya Lahari to prove that Shankaracharya accepted the authority of Tantras does not appear satisfactory for the reason that there is doubt regarding the Adi-Shankaracharya's authorship of this Stotra. Saundarya Lahari is a devotional poem, addressed to the Goddess, abounding mainly in the rhetorical descriptions of her sublime beauty and Tantric and Yogic ideas with the exception of a few verses containing some common Vedantic thoughts. It appears that these ideas are not at all the product of a philosophic genius like Shankaracharya. According to A. Avalon, the translator of "Ananda Lahari" (Wave of Bliss), Shankara's authorship of such like Tantric works is a hotly discussed point among scholars which is still unsettled. (Refer to the Introduction to 'Ananda Lahari'). A. Avalon does neither favour nor refute the point that "Adi-Shankara", the Vedanta Philosopher, was also the author of the Tantric works. He says, 'Amongst other matters yet to be determined is the age of Adi Shangkara himself'. There can, therefore, be no reliance on this work for evidence to prove that Shankaracharya had any inclination towards the Tantric practices prevalent in Kashmir or elsewhere and to support or propagate the Tantric creed in any of his genuine works. As regards 'his establishing Shri-chakra in some of his Mathas', it is possible that perhaps some name-sake of the great Shankaracharya, the Vedanta Philosopher, following the Tantric creed, may have established Shri-chakra in certain Mathas, as we hear of numerous Shankaracharyas following diverse philosophic and religious creeds who are known to have occupied the sacred 'pithas' (seats of learning) in several Mathas in southern India associated with the name of the great Shankaracharya. Moreover, Dr. Pandey gives no evidence to prove that Adi-Shankaracharya established Shri-chakra in any Matha.

We, therefore, agree with Professor Buhler's view and conclude that the Pratyabhijna system is greatly influenced by Shankara's Vedantic doctrines and not that Shakaracharya taught any Tantric philosophy which influenced the Pratyabhijna system. For similar reasons as put forth above, we cannot also agree with Dr. Paranjoti in holding the view, in her thesis on the Shaiva Siddhanta, that "Shankara was an adherent of the Shakta sect, and his system of Advaita, though to all appearances independent of Shakta Agamas, is yet

influenced by the Tantric theory." It is unfortunate that these Scholars do not base their conclusions on evidences from Shankara's main works on the Vedanta system which he represents in the Indian Philosophy. There is hardly any thing to show in Shankara's Brahma Sutra Bhashya and the Upanishada Bhashya that his system of Advaita is influenced by the Tantric theory.

Differences between the Pratyabhijna Darshana and the Vedanta System, according to traditon :- Through the invaluable efforts of Dr. Pandey, *Bhaskari*, an easy commentary on Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini of Abhinavagupta and the most important work on the Pratyabhijna Philosophy, believed to be lost, was unearthed which is now available in print. Bhaskaracharya, the author of this commentary, was perhaps the last teacher of this system who lived seven generations ahead of the present descendents of his family known as Rajanakas or Rajdans in Kashmir. Bhaskari not only furnishes a traditional interpretation of the abstruse text of Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini, but also brings out outstanding differences, according to tradition, between the Pratyabhijna Darshana and the Vedanta Philosophy, in a discussion between the adherents of the two systems given in its Introduction. In this discussion a distinct *line* of demarcation is drawn between the two systems which are shown differing widely from one another. The origin of the Pratybhijna system has been traced from Goddess Vak, Vagishvari (Goddess of Learing), since eternity and it is stated to be traditionally handed down from Mathika Gurus. † According to the Shaivas, it is itself the sacred authority and sanction for the followers of Mathika Gurus and needs no other authority. The Shaiva adherent says that the Vedantins have got no faith in the Mathika Gurus. They accept the Shruti, the Vedic scriptures, only as their sacred authority. The Shaivas are, therefore, prohibited to take part in discussions (Shastrartha) with the Vedantins. On this point Bhaskaracharya introduces a long discussion between a Vedantin and a Shaiva adherent [the follower of Pratyabhijna System] as follows :-

† **Mathika Gurus :-** 'Matha' means a hut in Mahabharata. In Rajatarangini, III, 460, occurs 'Pashupatanam Mathah'. In Rajatarangini VI, 87 and 308 occurs 'Vidyarthinam matha'. 'Vidya-matha' is stated to be the name of a college in Kashmir, Rajatarangini III, 476, Brahman's *College* in Kashmir.

[Note from O Bohtlingh und R. Roth - Dictionary]

The Vedantin opens the argument with a question to the Shaiva, how is it that a discussion on sacred matters is allowed to be held between a Shaiva and a Buddhist and not between a Shaiva and a Vedantin? The Vedantin is much superior to the Buddhist, as the latter, in his definition of the Supreme Cause, stops short at Buddhi Tattva (the principle of determined thought, Reason) which is even lower than Maya Tattva (the principle of Limitation) of Shaivas. On the other hand, the Vedantin goes higher in his definition of Brahman which is perfectly in accord with the definition of Sadashiva, the third principle of the Shaivas. In reply to this the Shaiva puts a counter-question. On what authority do the Vedantins hold Brahman equivalent to Sadashiva? According to the Vedantins, Brahman is existent (Sat), Conscious (chit) and Tranquil (Shanta) as the Shrutis declare :-

'सच्चिदानन्द ब्रह्म'; 'एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा !
सर्वा-(कर्मा-)ध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षीचेता केवलो निगुर्णश्च ॥'
"एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन"

Brahman is All-pervading, Absolute, transcending all forms (Rupa), devoid of plurality and the substratum (Adhishthan) of this world which is superimposed upon it. It is free from the diversity of three kinds, technically called Sajatiya, Vijatiya and Svagata, i.e., there is nothing like nor unlike Brahman, nor is it in itself diverse in nature. This definition is accepted by the Shaivas for their third principle, Sadashiva or Sadakhya Tattva. Shiva and Shakti, the first two Tattvas, are higher than this Tattva (Sadakhya). Below these are thirty-three Tattvas beginning from the principle of Ishvara and ending with the earth, the principle of solidity. Brahman is spoken of as Auspicious (Shiva) but lacks in Vimarsha (Power of perception related to objects). Aham-vimarsa(self-perception, viz. self-consciousness)and Prakasha(manifestation) are the distinctive characteristics of the first Tattva, viz. Shiva. Brahman is a little lower than this. It is of the nature of changeless or inactive consciousness (Shanta Chit). Vimarsha implies changing nature (Kshobhatvam) and activity (Kriya), viz. Its innate power of expansion into cosmos. This Vimarsha is lacking in Brahman as it is contrary to Its tranquil (Shanta) or inactive nature. Vimarsha of Shaivas is, according to the Vedantins, a form of Vikalpa, i.e. a superimposition.

But this view is not right (न तत् युक्तं), since by accepting Vimarsha as Vikalpa (Superimposition), an unlike characteristic (Vijatiya Dharma) attaches to Brahman; to wit, the world, according to the Vedantins, is Vikalpa, i.e., mere illusion, hence unreal, and Brahman is the only real entity. Thus it implies attributing unlike characteristics (Vijatiya Dharma) to Brahman, on which the world is superimposed, which is illogical. Hence, the Vedantins will have to accept Vimarsha as a real characteristic of Brahman which gives Him the changing nature (Ksobhatvam), and *not a Vikalpa* (*mere illusion*). Prakasha in relation to subjects implies Aham-Vimarsha (self-perception, viz. self-consciousness) which is therefore the distinctive characteristic of self (svabhava bhutah eva), whereas in relation to objects, it is of the nature of their becoming manifest (Prakasha): (प्रकाशस्य हि स्वविषयोऽहमिति विमर्शः स्वभावभूत एव; बाह्यविषयोऽहमिति विमर्शो... परमार्थतः सोऽपि शैवनये प्रकाश स्वभाव एव ।)

According to the Shaivas, Shiva is all powerful, viz. He has got in Himself the changing nature (Kshobatvam), i.e. the potentiality of changing Himself into the form of the world just as fire is endowed with the nature of burning. It cannot be supposed that something extraneous causes in Shiva the nature of changing into the form of the world, as Vedantins do in attributing Nescience (Maya) to Brahman for causing the manifestation (superimposition) of the world in Himself. The Shaivas do not attribute any thing extraneous to cause the potency of burning in fire, but it has got by nature in itself the power of burning. The **Vedantins do not accept any 'real power' belonging to Brahman.**

The Shaiva puts another question to the Vedantin : Are Jivas and Brahman inseparate or separate (किं भवत-मते जीव-ब्रह्मनोरैक्यं वर्तते भिन्नत्वं वा?) If the Vedantin says that Jivas are separate from Brahman, the Shaiva remains silent, since according to his system also Jivas (Pashus) are separate from Shiva though in reality their nature is the same as that of Shiva. In case the Vedantin holds that Jiva and Brahman are identical, the Shaiva demands from him a textual authority from Sruti. The Vedantin quotes the following Srutis in support of his point of view "अयमात्मा ब्रह्म"; "सत्यं चिदात्मा"; "तत् सत्यं चात्मा". The Shaiva says, the followers of the Pratyabhijna Darshana have also got the same goal and come to prove the same result, the identical relation of Jiva and Ishvara.

The Vedantin demands from the Shaiva a textual authority from his own scriptures in support of this tenet. The Shaiva says, the Pratyabhijna Darshana does not need any authority to stand upon. Recognition (Pratyabhijna) is in itself sufficient for the realization of this end, the unity of Jiva and Ishvara. It is a new path (Margo navo) to this realization. The Vedantin retorts, Recognition cannot be applicable to the realization of the unity of Jiva and Ishvara, as in this case there occurs no simultaneity of the present perception (Anubhava) and the past perception, i.e. the present perception is not associated with the memory of the past perception (Smarana), indispensable to the process of '*Recognition*', since Atman is self - manifest in both the states, past and present (भातभासमानैकीकरणरूपा प्रत्यभिज्ञात्रन युक्ता). The shaiva says, it is true that Atman is perceived in the past (Bhato) as well as at present (Bhasamanashcha). Owing to forgetfulness (Vismrti) innate in his own nature of self-dependence (Svatantrya), Atman lacks in Lordliness (Ishvaratva) which is, however, regained by the intuitive experience 'Recognition.' In every-day life, this forgetfulness takes place even in the things which are actually before us, as in the famous example of the Vedantins - 'Where is the tenth boy?' the counter being the tenth in the group, forgets to count himself when he counted nine boys only standing in his presence. (भासमानस्याप्यात्मनो विस्मृतिर्जायतएवान्यथा दशमस्त्वमसीतिन्यायेन तत्त्वमसीत्युपदेशायोगात् ।)

Lordliness (Ishvaratva) is of two kinds, Para and Apara, the former is that which relates to the Transcendental Self and the latter pertains to the immanent self, i.e. the limited perceiving selves (subjects) in relation to this object-world. Para is characterised by Aham-Vimarsha or Aham- Paramarsha (i.e. manifestation of self-'I')and Apara by Idam-Vimarsha or Idam-paramarhsa (i.e. perception of 'this'–object world). In practical life individual self is dependent upon Aham-vimarsha, perception of self (as denoted by Aham-'I')i.e. self-consciousness, as well as Idam-vimarsha perception of object (denoted by Idam -'this'), which is the counterpart (pratiyogi) of the former, hence it lacks lordliness. In this connection the Vedantin says, that Jiva is of the nature of Vikalpa, fiction or illusion, विकल्परूपः विषय i.e., on its Aham-paramarsha is superimposed its counterpart Idam-paramarsha. The Shaiva asks, how can Brahman be of the nature of Vikalpa, while Vedantins themselves admit Brahman assuming the form of Jivas, according to the Sruti,

'यथा विस्फुलिंगा...' i.e. 'Jivas evolve from Brahman as sparks from fire' 'अग्निकनन्यायेन'. It also explains the plurality of Jivas in conformity with the non-dualistic doctrine of Vedanta. This doctrine is also supported by another Shruti, * (The Self transforming Itself in diverse creation assumes various names and forms). From this it is clear that Jiva is of the nature of Brahman. If the Vedantin supposes that Brahman lacks the Paramarsha Shakti, viz. the Power of differentiating subjects from objects, then Jiva also lacks it. Thus its very existence as Jiva becomes null and void. But as we find that a spark has by nature the power of burning which is originally innate in fire from which the spark evolves; so does Jiva imbibe the Paramarsha Shakti from Brahman or Shiva who is endowed with It initially. The Vedantin objects to this point and says that Vimarsha comes to Jiva by adopting Upadhi (body) † (Upadhi means something that conditions limitation to holding capacity.) The Shaiva questions, can smoke be produced from water in an Upadhi (pitcher) of wood? It is, of course, right, that the Upadhi (body) renders Jiva limited in powers, but the power of perception (Vimarsha) cannot be the result of adopting an Upadhi (body). The Vedantin replies that he accepts Maya Shakti as a principle that divides Brahman into limited forms. On this point the Shaiva puts the question: Is Maya Shakti innate in Jiva or Brahman? If the Vedantin says, Maya Shakti is innate in the former, then the division into Jiva and Brahman is impossible, since Maya Shakti which causes this division is not, in that case, innate in Brahman. ‡ In case **Maya Shakti is supposed to be innate in the latter** (Brahman), then its purity is impaired by limitation which is inconsistent with the nature of Brahman (Shiva). § On this inconsistency the vedantin says that in essence Maya is not a real thing: ¶ What is it then, the Shaiva asks? The Vedantin answers, it is of the nature of illusion, i e. which causes one to manifest itself in the form of many. What is the characteristic

* "अनेन जीवेनानुप्रविश्ये नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि";

† "ननु देहाद्युपाधिना सात्र स्फुरिता";

‡ 'आश्रयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी निर्विभागचितिरेव केवला पूर्वसिद्धतमसो न पश्चिमा नाश्रयो भवति नापि गोचरः ।"; § 'अन्योन्यप्रतिघाततनाशविधुरं विश्वं कथं भासताम् । मायामभ्रमिदं ततोऽतिनिपुणवेदान्तिनः संश्रिता । माया कस्य शिवस्य तर्हि शिवता [illegible]"; ¶ 'माया परमार्थतः किमपि तु नाविद्य ।' (Refer Bhaskari PP.10-15)

[rupa] of this Maya ? If the Vedantin says, it is of the nature of ignorance, the Shaiva asks, in that case, is it something of a positive character (bhavarupam) or of a negative character (abhava rupam) i.e. characterised by the absence of knowledge (Jnan-abhava-rupam) ? The latter alternative cannot be accepted as in the absence of knowledge, there will be no manifestation of diverse objects. It must have some positive characteristic causing diversity of objects, since we learn in the vedas "Indra assumes many forms by Maya". (इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते). Moreover, pure Brahman cannot be the cause of the impure world, which is of the nature of illusion, and not real like Brahman. Thus if Brahman, which is a real entity, is presumed to become illusive world, it will be reduced to nothingness (Abhava–rupam). In case of the former alternative, i.e. if it is admitted that Maya is ignorance of a positive characteristic (Bhava rupa), the Shaiva questions, what is the nature of this positive entity (Bhava) ? The Vedantin replies, it is inexplicable (Anirvachya). The Shaiva questions again, how do you call it Maya, then ? The Vedantin replies : 'Inexplicably' (अनिर्वाच्यतया इति). The Shaiva says, then Maya is the same as Brahman, since the Shruti decla es: "from Whom all expressions cease" (यतोवाचोनिवर्तन्ते) The Sruti refers to Brahman. The Vedantin retorts if Maya is admitted as a positive entity (Bhava rupa) having ignorance as its characteristic (Ajnana rupa and is the same as Brahman, what is objectionable in it? (ननु स ब्रह्मैव भवतु का हानि?) In reply to this, the Shaiva says that the Vedantin has arrived at the Shaiva's own point of view, since he (the Vedantin) also admits Brahman as the substratum (Adhishthan) of the universe and also indirectly accepts Maya and Brahman as identical, having the power (Shakti) to assume the form of this world (Jagat). The Shaiva states further that, according to him, Maya is power (Shakti) of Brahman (Shiva). The Vedantin asks, what is the nature (rupa) of the Maya Shakti ? The Shaiva replies, its nature is the same as that of Self or Brahman (स्व स्वरूप भूता). The Vedantin questions again, what necessitates the assumption (Kalpana) of another attribute (Shakti) in Brahman ? The Shaiva replies, it is so because Maya alone is not the Shakti of Brahman. The Vimarsha, power of perception relating to objects, is also a power (Shakti) of Brahman, the sentient Being (Cit-rupa), since Vimarsha is

innate in His consciousness (chit-amsha) existing in Buddhi, the principle of reason (बुद्धयवच्छिन्ने तदंशे). But contrary to this doctrine, the Vedantin assumes that a veil (Avarnam) hides the real nature of Brahman, the Supreme Consciousness in an individual being *(Jiva)* (जीवाश्रयं ब्रह्मविषयं). This veil is caused by Maya *(* Mayakrtam), as the shruti declares : (जीवाश्रया ब्रह्मपदा ह्यविद्या तत्त्वविन्मता). From this point, The Shaiva draws a corollary, the part of Brahman which is circumscribed by Jivatva (limitation innate in Jiva) is veild, and the part not so cirumscribed is free from this veil : "तत्र च ब्रह्मणो जीवत्वानाक्रान्ते भागे नावरणमेवेति". In the Shaiva technique, the Vedantin's point means that the part of Brahman which is not veiled is characterised by Prakasha (Power of Ma ifestation) alone and lacks Vimarsha (Power of perception); but according to the Shaiva Prakasha without Vimarsha is like an unreal entity (प्रकाशश्च विमर्शं विना-असत्कल्प एव) and hence null and void.

From the above discussion, the Shaiva comes to the logical conclusion that ' Pakasha ' or in other words Aham-Paramarsha (Manifestation of Self) only is equivalent to Vedantin's Brahman. According to the Srutis as quoted by Vedantins, 'स ऐक्षत' (Chhandogya Up. VI, 2,3), 'तदैक्षत' and 'सर्वज्ञः' so on, Ikshana (seeing or thought] i e. mere manifestation of self (स एव स्वाहं-परामर्शः) is atributed to Atman before the creation, viz. in its precosmic state, when no other entity existed. Pratyavamarsha or Vimarsha state is the changing state of Brahman, opposite to its state of rest or tranquility (Shantatvam) which lies in its Prakasha aspect. The Supreme Being *(* Shiva) Who is all powerful *(* Shakta) manifests Himself in the form of this universe in His changing state (Paramrshtam), as the water in its disturbed state assumes the form of waves. In this instance the insentient water is lacking Paramarsha, viz. reflection or consciousness related to itself and other than itself, which is the nature of Self only.: "स्वपर विशया पारमर्श रहितः". On this point the Vedantin questions, 'although the water is lacking *Paramarsha* (perceiving power or consciousness *)* i.e. the power of perceiving subjects and objects, it possesses *Prakasha* i.e. the power of manifesting itself and other than itself (ननु स्वपर दर्शनमपि तस्य संभवत्येव). The Shaiva disagrees

with the Vedantin on this point. He says, *Prakasha* (Manifestation) without *Vimarsha* (Perception) is of the nature of mere reflection (परामर्श रहितं दर्शनं हि प्रतिसंक्रान्तिरूपमेव) as we see in insentient objects like glass or a piece of marble. The same thought is given in Pratyabhijna Sutra :-

"स्वभावमवभासस्य विमर्शं विदुरन्यथा,
प्रकाशोऽर्थोपरक्तोऽपि स्फटिकादिजडोपमः"

Knowledge of everything in this world, according to the Shaiva, is the result of blending of unlimited (aparimita) *Aham-paramarsha* (manifestation or consciousness of 'Self') with the limited (parimita) *Idam-paramarsha* (perception of objects). The blending of these two processes is indeed indispensable for luminous knowledge. The Vedantin, on the other hand, tells to the Shaiva that according to him (Shaiva) *Svanubhava* (individual perception) is the prerequisite for the phenomena of knowledge. It is true, the Shaiva says, that not only Jiva but also Brahman (Shiva) is characterised with *Svanubhava* (individual perception) and their identity is realized by *Aparoksha Jnana* (direct perception or knowledge) as denoted by "Aham brahmasmi" (I am Brahman). On the other hand, *Paroksha Jnana* (indirect perception or knowledge) implied in "Asti Brahma" (Brahman is) also denotes the existence of Brahman. These two kinds of knowledge, *Paroksha Jnana* and *Aproksha Jnana* (direct and indirect knowledge) and the *Vimarsha* (of Shaivas) do not depend upon another experience *Anubhava* which, according to the Vedantin, is of the nature of *Vikalpa* (Superimposition or Nescience). According to the Shaiva, everything is cogniseed by the powers of *Prakasha* and *Vimarsha* independent of any such experience as *Anubhava* or *Svanubhava* which is not at all required in the phenomena of knowledge. Here the Shaiva means by Svanubhava that experience which, according to Vedantin, is characterised by Vikalpa or Nescience. But Svanubhava in its true sense, i e. Vimarsha, according to Shaiva, is rather indispensable to all kinds of knowledge. The Shaiva says that the powers of *Prakasha* and *Vimarsha* are self-illuminating and do not need illumination from any other source, viz. experience, as there is no need of showing one lamp by another. The Vedantin questions on this point, Prakasha alone

tree

is self-illuminating, how is Vimarsha to be such? The Shaiva replies to this objection, Prakasha without Vimarsha is meaningless. The Vedantin objects here, how do you then say that the *Sadashiva Tattva* [principle] which is equivalent to the Vedantin's Brahman is lacking in Vimarsha. The Shaiva explains that *Sadashiva Tattva* is the line of demarcation between *Shiva Tattva* in which *Aham-paramarsha* [Self-manifestation or Self-Consciousness) is unblended with *Idam-paramarsha* (object-perception) and *Ishvra-Tattva* in which the former is blended with the latter. Here *Aham* and *Idam* denote 'I' and 'This' in the universal sense as different from the limited individual Aham and Idam which are lower than Maya Tattva. In other words, Aham and Idam in the universal sense, as implied in this relation, belong to the principle of Shuddhavidya and do not come under the limitation of Maya.

The Vedantin demands from the Shaiva a textual authority from the Vedic scriptures in support of the doctrines upheld by the latter, since according to the former the Vedas are sacred, being uttered by God Brahma. In reply the Shaiva says, we quote the authority of the Agamas in support of our doctrines, and not that of the Vedas. The Vedantin asks, in Agama Shastra who has seen Ishvara as Actor (Karta) ? In reply to this the Shaiva puts a counter-question, who has seen Him so in the Vedas? The Vedantin responds, Sanaka and other seers have seen Ishvara as Actor in the Vedas. The Shaiva says the 'Mathika Gurus' and others have seen Him so in the Agamas. Why is the Vedantin not satisfied with the secred authority of Agamas? The Vedantin says, this is not the authentic authority (Pramanyam) according to him. The Shaiva questions, how is then the authority of Sanaka and other seers accepted by them as authentic with regard to the Velas? The Vedantin replies, because it is so accepted by eminent persons. The Shaiva also considers himself justified in saying that the authority of Mathika Gurus is accepted by great seers like Durvasa and others. Why the Vedantin is not satisfied with their authority? The Vedantin says it is accepted by a limited few only and that is not enough. The Shaiva rejoins, certainly it is so, because the sacred doctrines are not meant generally for all, but for the few only. Anything reasonable stated even by a boy is acceptable to us (the Shaivas) as authentic, nor to speak

of a highly sacred Shāstra which is a potent means of achieving the Supreme beatitude, and anything unreasonable spoken even by Brahma should not be accepted, as Vasiṣta says :

" Yukti yuktam-upādeyam vacanam bālakādapi,
Śeṣam tranamiva tyājyam - apyuktam padma-janmana."

Thus ends the discussion (Shāstrārtha) between the Vedāntin and the Shaiva. In this discussion, Bhāskarācarya tries to bring into light the main points of difference between the two systems, the Pratyabhijñā and the Vedānta, and also to establish the superiority of the former over the latter. Obviously the two systems are not poles asunder. The Pratyabhijñā and the Vedānta systems can hardly be dissociated from one another. The Kashmir Shaivas do not, however, accept the authority of the Vedic scriptures, but strictly assert that the fountain-head of their doctrines is the Shaivāgamas. But it is evident that the Pratyabhijñā system is more or less affiliated to the Vedic systems. The Vira Shaiva School accepts the sacred authority of the Vedas besides the Āgamas. The above controversial discussion shows that the Pratyabhijñā is opposed to the later system of Shankara's Vedānta which differs greatly from the earlier Vedānta system taught originally in the Upaniṣads. As a matter of fact, the Pratyabhijñā philosophy is mostly in accord with the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, and the two systems differ from one another in minor points only.

The differences between Kashmir Shaivism (Pratyabhijñā system) and the Vedānta and the distinctive features of the former are well brought out in an article on the subject by Prof. B. N. Pandit published in J. & K. University Review (Vol. II, No. 1) of May, 1959. He writes: 'There is no doubt that there is sufficient accord and similarity between the principles of the Vedānta of Gaudapāda and Shankara, on the one hand, and those of the Shaivism of Kashmir, on the other. But, in spite of this accord and similarity, these two schools are as different from each other as are so many of the other schools of Indian Philosophy. For that matter, there is accord and similarity on many points between Shaivism and Buddhism or Shaivism and Sānkhya Philosophy. But that does not mean that Shaivism is identical with any of those schools of Philosophy.'

There are so many points common to Kashmir Shaivism and the Vedānta. As regards the fundamental differences between these two schools, Prof. Pandit writes that the Shaivas argue as follows :- 'According to the Vedanta the universe is false; it has only a visionary existence like that of a mirage. The cause of this visionary appearance of the universe is a sort of ignorance, called *Avidya*. That Avidya has no beginning. It has been working through eternity but can be ended by means of true knowledge or *Vidya*. The powers of Avidya are to be admitted, but cannot be explained ... In reality the soul was ever the Absolute Brahman itself, but on account of Avidya it considered itself as different from the Brahman; and now when this Avidya vanishes, the soul realizes its true nature as Absolute Brahman. This realization is the real liberation and this is the final goal of human life. In reality there is nothing like a soul, or the universe, or any sort of bondage or liberation. All this is false and visionary and appears to exist because of Avidya. This Avidya also is not a real thing. Only the Absolute Brahman is real. He is tranquil and calm like space. His nature is *Sat. Chit* and *Ānanda*, that is existence, consciousness and bliss.

The Shaivas raise objection to this view on the following points : 'If Avidya is false, it cannot be the cause of this universe which has been existing from times immemorial. How can a thing, which is false and unsubstantial, bring into existence anything full of substance ? It is not clear as to whom this *Avidya* involves. It cannot involve Brahman which is ever pure, all knowledge and all bliss. Now it could involve a limited soul, but no limited soul, according to the Vedānta, does ever exist. It is only the Brahman which exists. So Vedanta leaves this problem unsolved. Again, when this Avidya is apparent, is well known and is conceived also, then how is it that it cannot be explained ? A true philosophy should explain such an important topic. If this remains unexplained, the foundation of the whole Vedāntic theory remains unexplained. A thing which has an end must have beginning also. So this *Avidya* also must have some beginning and must have some cause. To say that it is beginningless and inexplicable is to betray one's lack of deep insight. It also amounts to self-deceit and incapability in teaching. Space-like tranquility of the Brahman may mean his emptiness and lifelessness. When the Brahman is calm and ineffectual like pure space,

then what is meant by his consciousness and bliss? Space is never blissful and is never conscious. A conscious element is always active, because consciousness itself is a subtle activity. If the Brahman is conscious, it cannot be passive like space; and if it is like that, then it cannot have consciousness as its nature. Blissfulness also presupposes some sort of stir, though not a stir in the physical sense. It may be a subtle stir of consciousness. But Vedanta does not admit any sort of stir in the space-like Brahman.'

'How can a person dispense with the universe as something visionary and absolutely false? ... In the view of the Shaivas, the universe is not absolutely false. It is true ... The universe exists. It always existed in the all-pervading form of Shiva. Shiva has pure luminosity and pure consciousness as his form. Luminosity is not the luminosity of the light waves known to physicists. It is that luminosity by which consciousness makes itself always known to itself ...In fact, such consciousnes is by itself luminous in nature and that luminosity is by its nature conscious and thus these two are only two names of one and the same substance and that substance is God or *Parama Śiva*. His luminosity is called as Shakti or his energy. As has been said above, this energy of Shiva is a sort of stir in him... There is a constant succession of ideas going on in one's mind. If one is mentally supervigilant, then he can have the experience of this pure stir of consciousness in-between any two ideas of the mind. This stir is the most important nature of the absolute Shiva. It is a sort of vibration, ...† In fact, it is a sort of constant inward and outward vibration-like activity of the consciousness. It is named as *Spanda* in Shaivism. Because of this Spanda, the Absolute Shiva is always feeling his transcendental as well as his universal aspects. His transcendental aspect is felt by him through the inward stir of that Spanda and his universal aspect is felt by him through its outward stir. Which of these two aspects of the Lord can be called true and which can be called false? Both are true in reality. Therefore the Lord is not lifelessly tranquil like space...But he exists and exists as Shiva and therefore is always full of energy, which is a divine stir within his soul. That stir is always making this universe of limited subjectivity and objectivity appear in

†"*Sā sphuratā mahā sattā, deshakālāvisheṣiṇī,*
Saiṣā sārataya proktā, hṛdayam parameṣṭhinaḥ."

countless forms. Every soul is a hero in this divine drama of Shiva and has to reach the conclusion of this drama by shaking off his self-imagined ignorance and by realizing his nature as Shiva the Absolute. This is precisely the view of the Shaivaistic philosophers of Kashmir.

'Gaudapāda has realized this nature of the self and there are clear hints to this effect found in his *Kārikas*. Shankara also has at places expressed this view and so has Bādarāyana. Upaniṣads also have preached this energetic nature of the Brahman. But, in spite of all this, this view-point has not been clearly discussed by any of the Vedāntists. All the major works on Vedānta have emphasised the falsehood * of the universe and the passive tranquility of the Brahman. There are two points of view expressed in the Upaniṣads regarding the nature of the Brahman. One is the positive approach according to which it has been preached that everything is Brahman, I am Brahmān, thou art that, and so on. † The other approach is the negative approach, according to which it has been taught that the Brahman is not this, He is not that, ‡ He transcends all the objective elements, and so on. But it is this latter approach which has become popular with the authors of the major works on Vedānta. This one-sided view of the truth popularised by the Vedāntists has been responsible for all the criticism made on the Vedānta by other schools of Indian philosophy. Some have called the Vedāntists as hidden Buddhists. There is so much confusion in the Vedāntic exposition of the Truth...The Shaivaistic style of the exposition of the Truth is, on the other hand, free from all confusion,... It is thus clear that Kashmir Shaivism is an independent school of thought and is very distinct and different from the Vedānta or any other Vedic or non-vedic school of Indian philosophy...'

It will be noticed here that the history of the Vedānta really begins with the system of Shankarācārya, being a predominant school of thought in the Vedānta. In the course of time the doctrine of Māyā, as taught by Shankarācārya, invited criticism from the Vedāntins like Bhāskara, who is probably not removed from Shankara by more than two centuries. Rāmānujācārya joined Bhāskara in vehemently criticising

* *"Sā ca māyā na vidyate. (Gauḍapāda Kārikā)*
† *"Sarvəm Khalvidam brahma," aham brahmāsmi tat-tvam-asi, (Upaniṣad)*
‡ *"Sa neti neti ātmā" (Upaniṣad)*

Shankara's interpretation of the Upaniṣads and the Brahmasūtras. Rāmānuja was followed by Ācāryas (teachers) like Nimbāraka, Mādhava, Vallabha and Caitanya, and many other saints and writers who helped the cause of humanity by advocating *bhakti* in one from or the other. They were also obliged to criticise Shankarācārya. Vallabhacārya (1473 - 1531 A.D.) tells us that he was asked by the Lord Krishna to appear in the world and to offer a correct interpretation of the Upaniṣads and the Brahmasūtras, as these sacred works were misrepresented by Shankarācārya. Accordingly he taught a system of Vedānta known as the Shuddhādvaita. It clearly shows that the non-duality as taught by the Upaniṣads can be very well explained even without the help of Māyā, which appears in the system of Shankara. The writers of the works on Pratyabhijñā school also revelled in vehemently criticising Shankarācārya's theory of Māyā and other points of difference. Like the schools of Rāmānujacārya and Vallabhāchārya, Pratyabhijñā system is therefore a criticism of Shankara's school of thought in the Vedānta as well as Buddhist phenomenalism which appears to be the possible basis of Shankara's idealism. (Ref. the system of Vallabhāchārya by Prof. G. M. Bhatt, the Cultural Heritage of India - I - P. 797)



CHAPTER III

RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHIC BACKGROUND

1. *Religious beliefs of the earliest inhabitants of Kashmir; Religious upheavels in the valley; Śaivism and Buddhism; The origin of philosophic spirit in Kashmir (under the impetus of Buddhism);*
2. *Survey of the earlier philosophical speculations and the doctrines evolved from the Vedas and the Upaniṣadas and different Brahmnical schools as well as Buddhists.*

In the present chapter we shall trace the religious upheavels in the valley from the earliest times and survey the earlier philosophical speculations prevailing there before the rise of the Pratyabhijñā system.

Religious beliefs of the earliest inhabitants of Kashmir :- The geographical position of Kashmir, situated as it is in the midst of high mountains, shows that it might have long remained secluded and so uneffected by any external influence. But, it seems that while a number of old cults and religious practices flourished in Kashmir, at times different religious and philosophical doctrines reached there from outside its boundaries. Various evidences point to the fact that the inhabitants of Kashmir professed both kinds of Aryan and aboriginal beliefs from very ancient times which prevail even at the present day. This consisted in the performance of the Vedic rites and recitations of Vedic prayers as well as the worship of the aboriginal deities Shiva, Viṣṇu and their Shaktis. According to the Nilamata Purāna*, there existed in Kashmir in very ancient times a polythiestic religion, which included, among many other primitive types of worship, the worship of the aboriginal deities such as God Shiva, Geneśa or Vināyaka, various Vedic and Purānik gods, and even the worship of the Buddha as an

* This is the earliest extant work in Kashmir and is supposed by Dr. Buhlar to be the record of the time not older than the sixth or seventh century A. D.

Autar (incarnation). The account of the creation of Kashmir by Prajapati Kashyapa from the lake Satisara (the lake of Sati-goddess Durga) according to the Nilamata Purāna, mentions that the original inhabitants of Kashmir were Piśācas who can be identified with aborigines. We are told that the men of four castes (Āryans) were introduced into Kashmir by Kaśyapa (from India). This evidently shows that when Āryans and aborigines following their particular creeds came in contact with one another, each of them gradually adopted the religion of the other.

Religious upheavels in the Valley :- Dr. Sunil Chandra Ray states in his work : "The Early History and Culture of Kashmir" (Chapter VI, PP. 140 ..), 'The earliest inhabitants of Kashmir probably cherished some aboriginal beliefs, the details of which are not traceable now. The snake-cult or Nāga worship seems to have been established in the valley from a remote period and undoubtedly had been one of the earliest religions of the land. In the third century B. C., Buddhism seems to have made some headway into Kashmir, converted a large number of people and overshadowed the Nāga cult which ultimately sunk into oblivion. Among Hindu gods, Shiva either originated or entered the valley sometime before the faith of the Sākya prince made its entrance and was later followed by Visnu, Surya and other Brahmnical gods and godesses.' Various evidences produced by the scholar show that Buddhism was in a thriving state in Kashmir from the 3rd century B.C upto the last days of the Hindu rule. Buddhism, however, seems to have been overshadowed by the growing Vaiśnava and Shaiva faith which became predominant in the valley in the centuries following the Karkota period (ending 855 A.D). The history of the introduction of Shaivism in Kashmir is shrouded in mystery. Archaeologists have discovered traces of Shiva worship in the proto-historic Harappa culture. It is not known, whether the Shiva of Kashmir was an immigrant from the neighbouring Indus Valley or was of local origin. The facts furnished by Kalhana in his Rajatarangini, the Chronicle of the kings of Kashmir, however, indicate, in the main, the wide prevalence of the Shaiva cult in the valley from an early period. There are innumerable references to the foundations of Shiva shrines and erection of temples in honour of Shiva.

In reference to the above-said observations of Dr. S. C. Ray,

in the first place, it may be noted that, as stated by H. H. Wilson in his Essays on the Hindu History of Kashmir, 'originally, no doubt, it (the religion of Kashmir) was ophite or snake worship but this is a part of the Hindu ritual and the Nagas are included in the orthodox pantheon. The adoration of the Shiva was soon engrafted upon this, even if the two rites were not originally identified". † In the second place, it will be noticed that there are numerous references in Vedas, Brahmanas, Upaniṣads, epics and Purānas, as pointed out by the scholars like Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, C. Hayavadana Rao, R. W. Frazer and Dr. Hardayal, which show that Shiva worship was in vogue in India in the Vedic age. ‡ Some of the references clearly prove that this form of worship was gradually borrowed by Aryans from non-Aryans. In fact, Shiva worship seems to have been prevalent in India from the age of the Indus Valley Civilization, even before 3000 B. C., as the statues of Shiva have been unearthed in the excavations of Mohenjodaro and Harappa. It will be observed further that in the Rājatarangini, Kalhana connects the reigns of his first two rulers of Kashmir, Gonardo I and Damodara I, with the time of the Great Bhārata war. It is mentioned that the two rulers went to Mathura and took part in the war against Krishna and were assasinated. If we believe Kalhana, communication must have existed between Kashmir and the plains of India from the days of Mahābhārata. It will not therefore be hazardous to assert that Indian culture along with the various forms of religion then followed in the country, including Shiva worship, must have entered the valley by the time of the Great Bhārata War, which is generally believed to have occurred around B. C. 1000.

Shaivism and Buddhism :- As is evident from the above, there can be no doubt that Shiva as a popular deity must have been widely worshipped in the valley from remote period. As the first reference to Shiva worship in the Rajatarangini, Kalhana writes that there was a shrine

† Quoted in the Article : 'A Survey of the origin of the people of Kashmir by H. N. Koul Part II, in "Kashmir Today" (Sept. 1958)

‡ See Indian Philosophy by Dr S. Radhakrishnan; Shrikara Bhāṣya on Vedānta Sutras, Vol I, Introduction, by C. Hayavadana Rao; Indian Thought Past and Present by R. W. Frazer; The Boddhisatva Doctrine by Dr. Har Dayal.

of Vijayesha even in pre-Ashokan days. Ashoka himself built two temples of Shiva Ashokeshvara and was the devotee of Bhutesha (Shiva). There are numerous references to the foundations of Shiva shrines and erection of templas in honour of Shiva. Shaiva faith became predominant in the valley in the centuries following the Karkota period. Avantivarman (855-883 A. D.) was the devotee of Shiva. Shaivism received patronage from the Utpalas, who succeeded the Karkotas. It also flourished under the second Lohara dynasty. Shiva Shrikantha was regarded in the valley as the promulgator of Shaivagama Shaivism which included within itself the Pashupata cult. Kalhana refers also to the Tantric cult which is closely connected with Shiva worship. When Buddhism entered into Kashmir some time before the reign of Ashoka (272-232 B. C.), there already existed a religion, the prominent feature of which was the worship of 'God Shiva in company of his female concert Paravati or Shakti'. In this form of worship God Shiva and his Shakti, adored as father and mother of all creation, symbolize the two generative principles of the universe, viz. male and female cosmogonic principles. Thus Shiva worship and Shakta faith are closely associated with one another.

It is commonly believed that the Buddhist period in Kashmir follows from the third century B. C. with the reign of Ashoka, but the new faith seems to have obtained a footing in the valley much earlier, since it was prevalent there in the time of the native king Surrendra who ruled some time after the Buddha but before Ashoka. The Ceylonese chronicle Mahavamsha preserves an account of the introduction of Buddhism in the valley by Majjahantika (Madhyantika) who was sent to Kashmir by Ashoka to propagate the new faith. This fact is recorded also by the Tibetan writer Taranath who says that Madhyantika found twelve Viharas in existence at the time of his arrival. We learn from Kalhana that Kashmir formad a part of the empire of Ashoka, who was a follower of the Buddha It is in the reign of king Ashoka that Buddhism spread all over India and flourished in the valley by the side of the ancient Shaiva faith. Kashmir was a great centre of Buddhism under the Kushanas. It was under the auspices of Kanishka, the Kushana ruler, that the **Great Buddhist Council** was held in Kashmir. It seems that in the beginning the religious policy of Buddhists was non-interfering and the Brahmans of Kashmir did not feel its advent seriously. The Nilamata Purana records that in Kanishka's

reign (125-160 A. D.) excesses were committed by the Buddhists under the lead of the famous Boddhisatva Nagarjuna. We further learn that Buddhists defeated the learned classes of people in Kashmir by preaching their own nihilistic doctrines. In consequence, the 'time-honoured cere-monies' followed by Kashmiris had to be suspended. The Nagas, perhaps a class of the original inhabitants of the valley, were greatly provoked and with their help one Brahmana, named Chandradeva, finally restored the traditional customs and freed the land from the plague of the Bhikshus (Nilmata Purana 424-429). Even after this incident the Buddhist cult was there in a very flourishing condition. As recorded by Kalhana, Meghavahana, Lalitaditya and many other rulers or the members of the royal families built monasteries and stupas there. This fact is in full accord with the report of the Chinese pilgrim, Ou-kong. That Buddhism was patronised equally along with other orthodox creeds by the rulers of Kashmir, is evident from the gifts and endowments made by Kashmirian rulers, especially by king Lalitaditya, and by the mem-bers of their courts. The worship of Buddha was recognised in Kashmir from ancient times, as is evident from Nilamat Purana which mentions the Buddha's birthday as a great festival (Ref. verses 809-816). The thriving State of Buddhism in Kashmir after Kushana ruler Kanishka is testified by archaeological evidence, and that, during the reign of Karkotas, i. e. during the 7th and 8th centuries A. D, is also attested by the evidence of the Chinese travellers Heun Tsang (who visited Kashmir du ing the years 631-633 A. D) and Ou-Kong who came to Kashmir in 759 A. D. They spent many years in the valley in pilgrimages to holy sites and in studying Sanskrit. Both of them witnessed Buddhism flourishing in the country. All this shows that Buddhism and Brahmanic cults existed peacefully side by side in Kashmir for centuries before Kalhans's time (cf. Chronicle of kings of Kashmir, by Dr. M A. Stein, Introduction, P. 9).

Origin of Philosophic spirit in Kashmir (under the impetus of Buddhism) :- It has beeu said above that Buddhists existed in Kashmir for many centuries and lived peacefully along with Brahmins who were the followers of Shiva-Shakti cults from very early times. Consequently the exchange of views on religious matters between the two sects was inevitable. The influence of Buddhistic thought upon the people of Kashmir was so great tinat during the eighth and ninth centuries of

Christain era the ancient Shaiva faith was gradually vanishing as is observed by Pt. Madhusudan Koul in his introduction to Ishvara Pratyabhijna Vimarshini (P. I). A religious upheaval, however, came in the ninth century A. D. which brought about the waning of Buddhism and revival of ancient Shaiva faith in the country. It will be observed that Buddhists initiated a critical view in matters which were so far believed only as gospel truths. The various philosophical doctrines evolved from Buddhists, such as Vijñānavāda and Kshanikvāda, were already known in Kashmir. Under the impetus of the Buddhistic thought, various schools of philosophy developed in the valley (as did in the rest of India) among the non-Buddhists, viz. Brahmanas, Vaidyakas, Shaivas and Shāktas. The people were also well versed in the doctrines of Vaiyākarnas (Grammarians), Sānkhyas, Naiyāyikas and the Yoga system which had come into the valley from India through ages. Consequently, in the ninth century A.D. there existed a concourse of various religious and philosophical currents converting the valley into a battle-ground at the time of the rise of the Pratyabhijna system.

As has been observed above,Shiv-Shakti cults were prevalent in every part of India long before the Vedic age. In course of time there grew a mass of literature of these cults, known as 'Agamas and Tantras', side by side with and possibly independent of the Vedic scriptures. Consequently in a place like India where different schools of thought grew gradually in the Vedic fold, there developed similar schools within the ambit of Shaiva fold. Shri S. G. Sakharpeker mentions in his address on 'Shaivagamas', delivered in the Seventh All-India Oriental Conference, held in 1933, that before the arrival of Shankarāchārya on the religious stage, the Agamavādins of Shaiva school were separated into different schools, viz. Mahāpāshupatas, Shaiva Siddhānta, Nipāla-Pāshupatas, Kashmir Shiavas and Vira-shaivas, These different Shaiva sects held varied philosophical theories, such as Dvaita (Dualism), Advaita (non-dualism), Vishishta-dvaita (modified non dualism) and Dvaita-dvaita (dualism-cum-monism) like similar schools in the Vedic fold.

Survey of the earlier philosophical speculations and doctrines :- As has been stated above, the rudiments of every system of philosophy in India originally existed in the Vedas, the Upanishadas and the Buddhist sources, which subsequently developed in different systems with some additions and alterations. These germinal ideas constitute the common

theme or skeleton of various systems, of course, including the Pratyabhijna system. They, however, differ from one another in propounding some new doctrines of their own and coining different nomenclature. As observed above in Chapter II (P. 54), the main ideas constituting the central theme of the Pratyabhijna Philosophy are traced by Dr. Lachhmidhar in the verses Nos. 1270-1274, 1283-86 and 1294-1295 of the Nilamat Purana.* Dr. L. D. Barnett, while bringing to notice the similarity between 'modern theology of South India' and 'the ancient teachings of the north', endeavoured to indicate what, in his opinion, the links are which join the two, and ultimately both of them to the school which is represented by the Shvetashvatara Upanisad†. Some verses occuring in this Upanisad, such as VI-7, 8 & 9 and IV-10‡, indeed, give almost the same or similar ideas as are contained in the above-mentioned verses of Nilamata Purana representing the central theme of the Pratyabhijna System. As a matter of fact these are the common ideas which connect the Pratyabhijna system with the Vedanta school. Pt. Suryanarayana shastri $ and some other scholars of his view think that the Svetasvatara-Upanishad and Kaivala-Upanishad have probably grown under the shadow of Agamas, as is indicated by the sectarian title given to the Ultimate Cause (Shiva), symbolised generally by the term Brahman in the Upanishads. It will be clear from the following that the above ideas not only occur in these two Upanishads but are also scattered in various other Upanishads as well as in the hymns of the Rig-veda. These ideas will, therefore, be traced out from the Vedas and the Upanisads in a systematic order as follows :-

*The main ideas contained in these verses are as follows :- "Indra must 'recognise' (abhijñātah) Shiva as the only Supreme deity (Maheshvarah), Cause of all causes (Kārana kāranam), all-doer and all-knower (sarva kartā ca sarvajñashca) (1270-1271), who by his free will (iccha) creates the universe comprising animate and inanimate objects. This is the creeper of power (Shakti-latā) of the Lord (Prabho) which manifests the world from itself (Jagad bhāsayate bhavāt (1272-1273). The Lord brings into existence (Lit supports) the three worlds by his Maya (wonderous power) (Māyā-dhrata jagat-traya) (1283). Shiva has no extraneous motive for his acts of creation etc. other than His own nature (Tava kāryam na vidyate) (1285). He is the eternal witness (sākshi-vatasthitah) (1286). Moha or delusion is produced by Shiva's own Shakti, namely Maya Shakti (Tavaiva mayaya mohitena) (1294) Indra has known this Supreme Lord (Shambho) only by his favour (Prassannosi dhruvam Shambho ena jnātosi vai mayā) (1294).

Foot Notes Continued on Page 85.)

